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Phishing techniques have not only grown in number, but also in sophistication. Phishers might 
have a lot of approaches and tactics to conduct a well-designed phishing attack. The targets of 
the phishing attacks, which are mainly on-line banking consumers and payment service 
providers, are facing substantial financial loss and lack of trust in Internet-based services. In 
order to overcome these, there is an urgent need to find solutions to combat phishing attacks. 
Detecting phishing website is a complex task which requires significant expert knowledge and 
experience. So far, various solutions have been proposed and developed to address these 
problems. Most of these approaches are not able to make a decision dynamically on whether the 
site is in fact phished, giving rise to a large number of false positives. This is mainly due to 
limitation of the previously proposed approaches, for example depending only on fixed black 
and white listing database, missing of human intelligence and experts, poor scalability and their 
timeliness. 
 
In this research we investigated and developed the application of an intelligent fuzzy-based 
classification system for e-banking phishing website detection. The main aim of the proposed 
system is to provide protection to users from phishers deception tricks, giving them the ability 
to detect the legitimacy of the websites. The proposed intelligent phishing detection system 
employed Fuzzy Logic (FL) model with association classification mining algorithms. The 
approach combined the capabilities of fuzzy reasoning in measuring imprecise and dynamic 
phishing features, with the capability to classify the phishing fuzzy rules.  
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Different phishing experiments which cover all phishing attacks, motivations and deception 
behaviour techniques have been conducted to cover all phishing concerns. A layered fuzzy 
structure has been constructed for all gathered and extracted phishing website features and 
patterns. These have been divided into 6 criteria and distributed to 3 layers, based on their attack 
type. To reduce human knowledge intervention, Different classification and association
algorithms have been implemented to generate fuzzy phishing rules automatically, to be
integrated inside the fuzzy inference engine for the final phishing detection. 
 
Experimental results demonstrated that the ability of the learning approach to identify all 
relevant fuzzy rules from the training data set. A comparative study and analysis showed that 
the proposed learning approach has a higher degree of predictive and detective capability than 
existing models. Experiments also showed significance of some important phishing criteria like 
URL & Domain Identity, Security & Encryption to the final phishing detection rate. 
 
Finally, our proposed intelligent phishing website detection system was developed, tested and 
validated by incorporating the scheme as a web based plug-ins phishing toolbar. The results 
obtained are promising and showed that our intelligent fuzzy based classification detection 
system can provide an effective help for real-time phishing website detection. The toolbar 
successfully recognized and detected approximately 92% of the phishing websites selected from 
our test data set, avoiding many miss-classified websites and false phishing alarms. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
1.1.1 Internet Banking (e-banking) 
 
Internet banking (e-banking) is defined as the automated delivery of new and traditional
banking products and services directly to customers through interactive electronic 
communication channels. E-Banking includes the systems that enable customers,
individuals or businesses, to access accounts, transact business, or obtain information on
products and services through a public or private network, including the Internet
(FFIEC, 2003). Commercial banking is undergoing rapid changes, as the international
economy expands and advances towards institutional and market completeness. A major
force behind these developments is technology, which is breaching geographical,
industrial and regulatory barriers, creating new products, services and market
opportunities, and developing more information and systems-oriented business and
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 2 
management processes (Liao and Cheung, 2002). Banks across the world are motivated
to implement e-banking to achieve either top-line or bottom-line benefits. This is
achieved through increased market share due to product delivery convenience and
product innovation (Jaleshgari, 1999; Orr, 1999). The Internet is the fastest growing
banking channel today, both in the fields of corporate and retail banking. The
development is no longer just driven by the banks’ desire to save money: first and
foremost it is a manifestation of customers’ demand to access bank services on-line at
any time and from any terminal. 
 
Internet banking is rapidly becoming more and more popular as customers recognize the
advantages Internet banking has to offer. It offers a cost effective alternative to
telephone and branch banking services. Visiting a local branch bank costs around 68
times more than using Internet banking, and using the telephone would cost around 7
times more (Cryptomathic, 2004). For one most banks charge fewer fees when their
customers take advantage of their online banking services. Customers can conduct 95%
of their business over the Web, accessing their account and information, making
payments and reconciling statements using computers rather than paper or phone to
complete transactions. Instead of going down to the local branch bank office, Internet
banking customers can accomplish multiple tasks at once with the click of a button. It
can be accessed at any time from any Internet connection, and does not require any
human interaction at the bank’s end. 
 
There are many advantages of Internet banking for customers who can use their
computer from home or any site where they have regular access to a computer. The
services are available 7 days a week, 24 hours a day and transactions are executed and
confirmed almost instantaneously. The range of transactions available is normally fairly
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 3 
broad. Customers can do anything from checking on an account balance to applying for
a mortgage.  
Banks also see advantages to offering their services on the Internet as follows: 
 
• Opportunity to provide 24/7 client services 
• Potential to offer more services 
• Increased customer loyalty 
• Ability to attract new customers 
• Increased customer satisfaction 
• Reduction in the need for data entry 
• Reduction in costs, as the need for physical branches is reduced (Sukkar and Hasan,
2005). 
Transactional websites provide customers with the ability to conduct transactions
through the financial institution’s website by initiating banking transactions or buying
products and services. Since transactional websites typically enable the electronic
exchange of confidential customer information and the transfer of funds, services
provided through these websites expose a financial institution to higher risk than basic
informational websites. Wholesale e-banking systems typically expose financial
institutions to the highest risk per transaction, since commercial transactions usually
involve larger amounts (FFIEC, 2003).  
In developed countries, banking customers are increasingly taking advantage of on-line 
services, and this phenomenon is regularly studied by researchers. The willingness of
consumers to adopt on-line banking usually depends on how Internet-aware they are. 
 
Electronic banking is still young, although the acceleration in its adoption has been
enormous and, at the current time, many banks offer their services through the Internet.
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
   
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 4 
However, in the not-too-distant future, it is expected that every big bank will offer this
service through the Internet in one way or another, with an increase in quality of service
and performance (Sukkar and Hasan, 2005). 
 
 
1.1.2 Phishing Websites  
 
Phishing is a relatively new internet crime in comparison with other forms, e.g., virus
and hacking. More and more phishing web pages have been found in recent years in an
accelerative way (Fu, et al., 2006). Its impact is the breach of information security
through the compromise of confidential data and the victims may finally suffer losses of
money or other kinds. A phishing website as shown in Figure1.1 is a broadly launched
social engineering attack that attempts to defraud people of their personal information
including credit card number, bank account information, social security number, and
their personal credentials in order to use these details fraudulently against them (James,
2006). Phishing has a huge negative impact on organisations’ revenues, customer
relationships, marketing efforts, and overall corporate image. Phishing attacks can cost
companies tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars per attack in fraud-related losses and 
personnel time. Even worse, costs associated with the damage to brand image and
consumer confidence can run into the millions of dollars (Brooks, 2006). 
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Figure1.1: Screenshot of a phishing website  
 
Definition of Phishing Website  
There are many definitions of phishing website; we want to be very careful how we
define the term, since it is constantly evolving. One of these definitions comes
according to the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG)’s definition (APWG, 2005),
"Phishing attacks use both social engineering and technical subterfuge to steal
consumers' personal identity data and financial account credentials”. Typically a
phishing attack is a combination of fraudulent emails, spoofed websites, and identity
theft. Internet users or customers of many banks and financial institutions are the targets
of phishing attacks (Ding and Li, 2006).  
 
Nevertheless, there are lots of definitions of a phishing website from different
perspectives. Hereunder we mention some of these definitions to get better
understanding of its features and attack tactics. 
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Phishing is a particular type of spam which reflects social engineering. Phishing frauds
are characterized by attempts to masquerade as a trustworthy person or emulate an
established and reputed business in an electronic communication such as email or
website (James, 2006). The objective is to trick recipients into divulging sensitive
information such as bank account numbers, passwords, and credit card details. A person
engaged in phishing activities is called a phisher (Chhabra, 2005). Phishing website
attacks use web sites designed to look as if they come from a known and legitimate
organisation, in order to deceive users into disclosing personal, financial, or computer
account information. The attacker can then use this information for criminal purposes,
such as identity theft, larceny, or fraud. Users are tricked into disclosing their
information like bank accounts, credit cards etc., either by providing it through a web
form or by downloading and installing hostile software (Wu, 2006). A phishing website
is an attempt to commit fraud via social engineering. The impact is the breach of
information security through the compromise of confidential data. A phishing website is
a style of offence that network fishermen tempt victim with pseudo website to surrender
important information voluntarily (Ming and Chaobo, 2006). The phishers usually
camouflage themselves as a known bank, tradesman on line, a credit card corporation
and so on (Qi and Yang, 2006). Phishing website is a form of electronic online identity
theft in which the attackers use a combination of social engineering and web site
spoofing techniques to trick a user into revealing confidential information. This
information is typically used to make an illegal economic profit (e.g., by online banking
transactions, purchase of goods using stolen credentials, etc.) (Ludl, et al., 2007). This is
accomplished primarily by crafting a faux online presence to masquerade as a legitimate
institution and soliciting information from unsuspecting customers (Seker, 2006).
Phishing attacks involving websites are among the most commonplace and effective
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 7 
types of online fraud, having the potential to cost both victims and targeted
organisations in privacy, reputation, and monetarily (Zdziarski, et al., 2003).  
We can summaries all these different definitions of phishing website in just one
sentence, "Phishing website is the practice of creating a replica of an existing web page
to fool a user into submitting personal, financial, or password data" (MAAWG and
APWG, 2006). 
 
Phishing websites use a number of different techniques to hide the fact that they are not
authentic including overwriting or disguising the true URL shown in the browser,
overlaying the genuine web site with a crafted pop-up window, drawing fake padlock
images on top of the browser window to give the impression that SSL is enabled, and
registering SSL certificates for domain names similar to the real organisation etc. In
practice, these tricks make it extremely difficult for the average user to distinguish a
phishing site from a genuine one (Gundel, 2005). Following the rapid development of
online financial services and e-commerce, phishing website attacks have become one of
the most dangerous and prevalent threats on Internet, causing inestimable damage. More
and more phishing web pages have been found in recent years in an accelerative way
(Fu, et al., 2006). To avoid phishing websites, both online financial organisations and
their consumers have to understand phishing and anti-phishing technologies and take
security actions. The scope and complexity of phishing activities are increasing very
rapidly as phishing turns into an organized crime from a low budget amateur activity.
Phishing website attacks not only cause significant financial damage to both individuals
and companies and financial organisations, but also damage users’ confidence in e–
commerce and e-banking as a whole (Dong, et al., 2008). While most phishing attacks
are relatively unsophisticated, there is a very clear trend towards them becoming more
and more clever, both in terms of the psychological aspects and the technology
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 8 
deployed. As this is occurring, the organisations concerned with preventing phishing
attempts are also developing improved countermeasures. Without any definitive attack
or countermeasure in sight, this is likely to remain a cat-and-mouse race where each
party keeps trying to anticipate the other’s next move (Jakobsson and Young, 2005). 
 
1.1.3 Evolution of Phishing  
At the beginning of phishing history, phishers were usually acting alone or in small,
unsophisticated groups. Literature often portrays early phishers as adolescents desiring
account data to cause mischief and to make long-distance phone calls, usually with a
low level of organisation or malice (The Honeynet Project & Research Alliance, 2005).
As financial organisations have increased their on-line presence and investment, the
economic value of compromising on-line account information has increased
dramatically. Phishing attacks became more and more professional, organized and
systematic. 
 
From the 1990s, following the popularity of Internet, America OnLine (AOL) became
the first target of the phishing attacks. The first attempts at hacking into AOL were
aimed at legitimate AOL accounts, and the phishing attacks were connected with the
wares community which exchanges pirated software. There were programs (like
AOHell) that automated the process of phishing for accounts and credit card
information. Back then, phishing wasn’t used as much in e-mail compared to Internet
Relay Chat (IRC) or the messaging alert system that AOL used. Phishers usually
pretended to be an AOL staff member and sent instant messages to the customers. They
created messages such as "verify your account" or "confirm billing information" to lure
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
   
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 9 
victims into revealing passwords or other sensitive information. The information they
obtained would be used to trade in the wares community.  
 
With the increasing growth of online financial services and e-commerce, the focus of
phishing attacks turned to consumers of on-line banks, on-line retailers and other on-
line service providers such as eBay or PayPal. The media of phishing are usually on-line 
forums of e-banks, Internet Relay Chatting (IRC), Instant Messaging (IM), and Email.
Typically, the phisher poses as an employee of an on-line organisation, gains trust from
the consumers of the organisation, and then deceives the consumers into sending out
their sensitive information. 
 
The sudden onslaught of phishing against financial institutions was first reported in July
2003. According to the Great Spam Archive, the targets were primarily e-loan, e-gold,
Wells Fargo, and Citibank. The most remarkable twist about the phishing phenomenon
is that it introduced a new class of attack vectors that was overlooked in almost every
financial institution’s security budget: the human element. All the expensive firewalls,
SSL certificates, IPS rules, and patch management could not stop the exploitation of on-
line trust that not only compromises confidential user information but has had a major
impact on consumer confidence regarding telecommunications between an
establishment and its clients. 
 
Phishing started as e-mails written to convince the target to reply with the information
asked for. This is still the most common method of initiating phishing attacks, but today
phishers use several different ways to collect the information they require. Copied
websites, Trojans, key-loggers and screen captures are just a number of different
methods they are currently using (Jakobsson, et al., 2007).  
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Phishers began to create fake websites to increase the successful rate of phishing. For
instance, phishers register dozens of domain names that look like a famous brand, such
as “www.cit1bank.com” or “www.citi-bank.com”. Victims, who enter one of these
websites by making mistakes in typing or by falling for the phisher’s ruse, may believe
that the website is the real one, and operate their account on the website. Phishers 
embed website designs into the emails, completing them with stolen logos and
trademarks from the targeted organisation, and forge the return address so that the
address appears to come from the legitimate organisation (Jagatic, et al., 2005). 
 
Many new attacks include a link to a legitimate banking website in the background, but
a fake "login" box placed in front of the real site. Obviously it is more convincing
because the legitimate site and the pop-up appear to be from the same source. After
giving up personal financial information on a phishing site, the victim is redirected to
the real home page of the company being targeted. Thus, the victim will not suspect the
website of being false. Two user studies were conducted and the researchers found that
actively interrupting a user with a pop-up message during a phishing attack is more
effective than just a passive warning displayed in the browser toolbar (Hernandez and
Leggio, 2006). 
 
Phishing website attacks are growing at a torrid pace. The numbers of phishing attacks
and reported phishing sites are increasing every year, even every month. Damage
caused by phishing is severe. The APWG (Anti-Phishing Working Group) is an industry
association focused on eliminating identity theft and fraud that result from the growing
problem of phishing and email spoofing. This voluntary-based organisation provides a
forum to discuss phishing issues, trials and evaluations of potential technology
solutions, and access to a centralized repository of reports on phishing attacks (Zin and
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Yunos, 2005). The number of unique phishing websites detected by this organisation 
showed that there has been a huge increase in unique phishing sites all over the world. 
In December 2005, the forged phishing site alone exceeded 7,000 (Brooks, 2006).
APWG has also recently released a new report containing statistics of phishing attacks
during the first half of 2009. According to the APWG global phishing survey report
(APWG, 2009) there were at least 55,698 phishing attacks, around 7 per cent higher
than the previous year. Those attacks occurred on 30,131 unique domain names. APWG
identified that 4,382 were registered by phishers, representing about 14.5% of the
domain names involved in phishing. In addition, phishing was detected on 3,563 unique
IP addresses. The Gartner study (Gartner, 2007) shows that phishing attacks escalated in
2007; more than $3 Billion was lost to these attacks. The survey found that 3.6 million
adults lost money in phishing attacks in the 12 months ending in August 2007, as
compared with the 2.3 million who did so the year before. And, in 2008, Gartner
reported a 39.8 per cent increase over the number of victims a year earlier. Media
outlets have reported that phishing website-related scams have resulted in more than $5
billion in fraudulent bank and financial charges to date (Microsoft Corporation, 2008).  
Phishing techniques have a short history compared with other Internet threats, but there
have emerged tens of thousands of variations in the evolution of phishing, which makes
the research into anti-phishing very difficult. 
 
1.1.4 Phishing and the Trust of e-Banking Business  
Phishing websites can severely hurt Internet business, because people lose their trust in
Internet transactions for fear that they will become victims of fraud. For example, many
people believe that using on-line banking increases the likelihood that they will become
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victims of phishing websites and identity theft, even though on-line banking provides 
more secure identity protection than paper- and mail-based systems.  
The most harmful effect is that it will create “trust crises”. The trust will be eroded
gradually without effective countermeasures to deal with the fraud, and everyone
participating in network transactions will be harmed in the end. Trust is one of the most
important determinants of successful e-banking (Suh and Han, 2002). Many researchers
have argued that trust is essential for understanding interpersonal behaviour and is
relevant to e-banking. Trust is not merely a short-term issue, but also the most
significant long-term barrier to realizing the potential of BtoC e-commerce (Gefen,
2002). Falling victim to phishing websites could steal a customer’s proprietary
information such as their account information and passwords, trade secrets, or other
intellectual assets. Theft of a customer’s confidential information could have a
disastrous effect on the companies or banks using electronic technology and could
damage the trust between them and their clients. 
 
Even in developed countries, many people are worried that their credit card details will
be misused or hacked into, and are concerned about on-line fraud, such as phishing
websites that offer imaginary services or items.  
 
 
1.2 Motivation 
 
Phishing websites are forged web pages that are created by malicious people to mimic
web pages of real websites. Most of these kinds of web pages have high visual
similarities to scam their victims. Some of these kinds of web pages look exactly like
the real ones. Victims of phishing web pages may expose their bank account, password,
credit card number, or other important information to the phishing website owners. 
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Phishing website is a very complicated and complex issue to understand and to analyze,
since it is a combination of technical and social dynamics for which there is no known
single silver bullet to solve it entirely.  
 
Despite the great quantity of applications available for phishing website detection, there
are only a few solutions that utilise machine learning mining techniques in detecting
phishing websites. Moreover, most of these proposed and already implemented
solutions are impractical, inaccurate and suffer from unacceptable levels of false
positives or miss detection (Wu, et al., 2006; Cranor, et al., 2008). 
 
The motivation behind the present study is to create a resilient and effective intelligent
model to detect phishing websites and to discover whether phishing activity is taking
place or not, in order to prevent all users from being deceived or hacked. 
 
The methodology approach of this research is quantitative, and it investigates intelligent 
phishing website detection system, based on an artificial intelligence (AI) supervised
machine learning approach. The technique uses fuzzy logic with simple data mining
associative classification techniques and algorithms to process the phishing data
features and patterns, for extracting classification rules into the data miner. The
proposed phishing website system combines these techniques together to automate the
fuzzy rules, produced by using the extracted classification rules to be implemented
inside the fuzzy inference engine. These fuzzy rules allow us to construct if-then rules,
which reflect the relations between the different phishing characteristics and features
and their association with each other, to be used for the final phishing website detection
rate. 
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From my position as an IT manager of one of the biggest banks in Jordan, I realized the
serious effect of phishing websites towards consumers trust and confidence to online
banking services. This derived me to do many investigations and research studies
towards finding a solution to overcome this problem, especially for naive banking
clients and consumers. 
 
1.3 Aims & Objectives  
 
Our aim is to build a hybrid system which combines and integrates fuzzy logic with a
supervised machine learning mining technique using variations of associative
classification algorithms to provide an efficient technique for classifying and
indentifying phishing website with low false positive and false negative detection rate. 
This new mechanism reduces the need for human intervention and enhances the
performance and the precision of detecting phishing websites rate.   
We can summarize our objectives with the following points: 
1. Thorough literature review in order to demonstrate the existing state-of-the-art
of technology.  
2. Building an intelligent dynamic phishing website detection system that
combines association classification mining techniques and fuzzy logic to detect
phishing websites. The resulting system has to be practical, adaptive and low in
false alarms. 
3. Demonstrating the applicability that by analyzing a large number of phishing
websites datasets and page properties, we can utilise supervised machine 
learning techniques using associative classification mining algorithms and fuzzy
logic for phishing detection. 
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4. Proving the validity and the applicability of applying fuzzy logic-based expert
systems, that uses phishing fuzzy rules driven by human expert knowledge for
building resilient and flexible phishing website detection system. 
5. Automating the generation of the phishing fuzzy rules using intelligent
classification mining algorithms, in order to reduce the human knowledge
intervention, and shorten the development time of the phishing classifier to
provide more accurate and efficient outputs. 
6. Providing a solution that improves existing anti-phishing approaches using an
AI heuristic search. The solution will provide installable web browser plug-ins, 
which should be effective, accurate and work in real time. 
 
Quantitative research methodology has been developed and implemented to achieve all
our abovementioned objectives, taking into consideration experimental case-studies 
analysis, data gathering, testing measures and comparing results. 
 
 
1.4 Introducing Basic Terminologies and Technologies 
 
 
1.4.1 Fuzzy Logic Model 
 
Fuzzy Logic (FL) is a problem-solving control system methodology that lends itself to
implementation in systems ranging from simple, small, embedded micro-controllers to
large, networked, multi-channel PCs or workstation-based data acquisition and control
systems. It can be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of both. FL
provides a simple way to arrive at a definite conclusion based upon vague, ambiguous,
imprecise, noisy, or missing input information. FL's approach to control problems
mimics how a person would make faster decision. FL incorporates a simple, rule-based 
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‘IF X AND Y THEN Z’ approach to a solving control problem rather than attempting to
model a system mathematically. The FL model is empirically-based, relying on an
operator's experience rather than their technical understanding of the system.  
 
The fuzzy logic approach provides more information to help risk managers effectively 
manage assessing and identifying phishing website risk rates than the current qualitative
approaches as the risks are quantified based on a combination of historical data and
expert input. Modelling techniques that can accommodate a combination of data and
expert input are better suited for modelling phishing operational risks. Fuzzy logic has
been used for decades in the computer sciences to embed expert input into computer
models for a broad range of applications. It offers a promising alternative for measuring 
operational risks (Samir, 2003). The advantage of the fuzzy approach is that it enables
processing of vaguely defined variables, and variables whose relationships cannot be
defined by mathematical relationships. Fuzzy logic can incorporate expert human
judgment to define those variables and their relationships. The model can be closer to
reality and be more site specific than some of the other methods (Mahant, 2004). 
 
In contrast to the true or false world of Boolean logic, fuzzy logic techniques allow the
use of degrees of truth to calculate results. They allow one to represent concepts that
could be considered to be in more than one category. In other words, these techniques
allow representation of overlapping and partial membership in sets or categories
(Bridges and Vaughn, 2001). 
 
Fuzzy logic can be justified in our work since it can tolerate imprecisely-defined data,
can model non-linear functions of arbitrary complexity and can build on the experience
of experts (Mahant, 2004). 
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1.4.2 Data Mining 
 
Data Mining is the automated extraction of previously unrealized information from
large data sources for the purpose of supporting actions. The rapid development of data
mining has made available a wide variety of algorithms, drawn from the field of
statistics, pattern recognition, machine learning and databases. Fayyad, et al. (1998)
defines data mining as one of the main phases in Knowledge Discovery from Databases
(KDD), which extracts useful patterns from data. The availability of high speed
computers, automated data collection tools and large memory capacities has made the
process of collecting and storing huge quantities of information possible. The process of
extracting this useful knowledge is accomplished using data mining techniques (Fayyad, 
et al., 1998; Elmasri and Navathe, 1999). 
Consider a retail store with a large collection of sales transactions and customer
information. The marketing division at the store is promoting a new credit card in a new
geographical area. Typical business decisions have to be made such as how credit card
limits are decided for each customer and how each customer’s total purchases contribute
to the decision process, etc. Finding associations between customer’s different features
can help the managers in making business decisions. These associations are known as
association rules, an example of which is: “55% of customers who buy crisps are likely
to buy a soft drink as well; 4% of all database transactions contain crisps and a soft
drink”.  
 
“Customers who buy crisps” is known as rule antecedent, and “buy a soft drink as well”
is known as rule consequent. The antecedent and consequent of an association rule
contain at least one item. The 55% of the association rule mentioned above represents
the strength of the rule and is known as rule’s confidence, whereas the 4% is a statistical
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significance measure, known as the rule’s support. In a credit card application, the
store’s management is only interested in one class of association rules where the rules
consequent is related to whether a credit card should be offered. They would like to
develop an automated computer system, which analyses the customer’s different
attributes in a certain geographical area to come up with a set of rules. These rules are
then used to assess credit card applications for new customers by predicting the credit
card attribute. The subset of the association rules, which consider the credit attribute as
the class attribute is known as Class Association Rules (CARs) (Liu, et al., 1998). An
example of a CAR is: “60% of rows that contain incomes which exceed 25k have been 
granted a credit card; 4% of all rows contain incomes exceeding 25k”. Similar to the
association rule approach, the 60% of the above CAR represents the confidence and the
4% denotes the support. The main significant difference between a CAR and an
association rule is that the consequent of the CAR is only the class attribute, whereas in
an association rule, the consequent could be multiple items (Freitas, 2000). 
 
 
1.4.3 Association Rule Mining 
 
Association rule algorithms find correlations between features or attributes used to
describe a data set. Association rule mining can be decomposed into two sub-tasks
(Agrawal, et al., 1993; Agrawal and Srikant, 1994): (1) The discovery of all frequent
itemsets (those whose support is above the minsupp threshold) and (2) for each frequent
itemset found, Z, produce rules of the form X → (Z − X ),￿X ￿ Z whose confidence is 
above the minconf threshold. The support of an itemset in association rule mining is
defined as the proportion of transactions in the database that contain that itemset and the
confidence of a rule X → Z , defined as support(X￿Z)/support(Z). 
1.4.4 Traditional Classification Rule Mining 
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Given a training data set of historical transactions, the problem is to discover the CARs
with significant supports and high confidences (attribute values that have frequencies
above user specified minimum support and minimum confidence thresholds). One
subset of the generated CARs is chosen to build an automatic model (classifier) that
could be used to predict the classes of previously unseen data. This approach, which
uses association rule mining to build classifiers, is called "associative classification"
(AC) (Liu, et al., 1998, Li, et al., 2001). Unlike the classic classification approaches
such as rule induction and decision trees which usually construct small sized classifiers,
AC explores all associations between attribute values and their classes in the training
data set, aiming to construct larger sized classifiers. This is because AC methods aim to
produce useful knowledge missed by traditional methods, which therefore should
improve the predictive accuracy within applications. 
 
1.4.5 Associative Classification Rule Mining 
 
The AC approach was introduced in 1997 by Ali, et al. (1997) to produce rules for
describing relationships between attribute values and the class attributes and not for
prediction, which is the ultimate goal for classification. In 1998, AC has been
successfully employed to build classifiers by Liu, et al. (1998) and later attracted many
researchers (e.g. Li, et al., 2000; Dong, et al., 1999; Yin and Han, 2003) from data
mining and machine learning communities.  
 
AC is a special case of association rule mining in which only the class attribute is
considered in the rule’s consequent (Liu et al., 1998). For example in a rule such as X
→ Y, Y must be a class attribute. Let us define the AC problem, where training data set
T has m distinct attributes A1, A2… Am and C is a list of class labels. The number of
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rows in T is denoted |T|. Attributes could be categorical (meaning they take a value from 
a finite set of possible values) or continuous (where they are real or integer). In the case
of categorical attributes, all possible values are mapped to a set of positive integers. For
continuous attributes, a discretisation method is first used to transform these attributes
into categorical ones. 
 
An AC task is different from association rule mining. The most obvious difference 
between association rule mining and AC is that the latter considers only the class
attribute in the rules consequent. However, the former allows multiple attribute values
in the rules consequent. 
 
 
1.5 Contributions of this Research and Investigation 
 
There are different topics and issues that arise in a phishing website case, including:
Extraction techniques of phishing website main features and characteristics, Phishing
datasets execution, Performing special phishing experiments and case studies for 
analyzing and collecting phishing factors and relation rules., Utilisation of fuzzy logic
and data mining techniques for building intelligent phishing website detection model
and practical plug-ins phishing toolbar implementation for testing and validating. 
The main contributions of this research and investigations are introduced below. 
 
 
1.5.1 Empirical Phishing Experimental Case-Studies 
 
We have performed a number of experiments to cover all phishing concerns related to
its approaches, motivations and deception behaviour techniques. We have implemented
two phishing experiments which cover website phishing attack techniques and a survey 
scenario of phishing website detection procedure. We analyzed all these phishing
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experiments and covered all their reactions. These different experiments helped us
greatly in gathering and analyzing many of the different social engineering phishing
features, characteristics and factors with their mutual relationships’.  
 
 
1.5.2 Extracting Phishing Features  
 
In this thesis, and by analyzing a large number of phishing pages, conducting different
phishing experimental case studies, reviewing different phishing investigations,
technical reports, research papers and implementing many phishing questionnaires and
surveys, we managed to extract 27 features and factors which can characterize and
signature any phishing website case or incident. We divide these features into 6 criteria
or categories distributed into 3 layers, depending on its attack type. We give special
weight to every phishing criteria and layer, based on different strategies and attack
tactics, to be implemented on our detection model for more precision final output. We
use these collected phishing website features and patterns on our experimental archive
datasets for analyzing and testing, using specific mining association classification
algorithms and techniques for automating classification rule generation. Layer 1 has one
criterion (URL & Domain Identity), layer 2 has 2 criteria (Security & Encryption,
Source Code & Java Script) and last layer has 3 criteria (Page Style & Contents, Web
Address Bar, Social Human Factor). All criteria have different numbers of related
phishing website features and patterns.  
 
 
 
 
 
1.5.3 Fuzzy-based Association Classification Mining Model for
Phishing Website Detection 
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We propose a dynamic intelligent phishing website detection system, based on a
specific AI supervised machine learning approach. The technique used utilises fuzzy
logic with simple data mining associative classification techniques and algorithms to
process the phishing data features and patterns, for extracting classification rules into
the data miner. The proposed phishing website system combines these techniques
together to automate the fuzzy rules production by using the extracted classification
rules to be implemented inside the fuzzy inference engine. These fuzzy rules, allow us
to construct if-then rules that reflect the relations between the different phishing
characteristics and features and its association with each other, to be used for the final
phishing website detection rate. 
 
In this thesis, we want to prove that by analyzing a large number of phishing websites
datasets and page properties, we can use supervised machine learning techniques using
associative classification mining algorithms and fuzzy logic to design and develop an
intelligent efficient system that can predict and detect whether phishing activity is
taking place on a website or not. That is why we believe that a hybrid system which
combines and integrates fuzzy logic with supervised machine learning data mining
technique, using variation of associative classification algorithms (CBA, JRip, PART,
PRISM, C4.5) implemented into the Data Miner, allows for valuable phishing feature
extraction and rule processing, providing efficient techniques for classifying and
indentifying phishing website with low false positive and false negative detection rate. 
Finding association rules between phishing website different features and patterns
which distinguish legitimate websites from phishing website can greatly help the
performance and precision of the detection system, by automating a rule generation
process using data miner classification rules as an alternative to human expert
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knowledge to be implemented and processed by the fuzzy inference engine for the final
output.  
 
 
1.5.4 Implementation of Intelligent Phishing Website Detection Model
(Plug-ins phishing toolbar) 
 
We designed a plug-ins phishing website detection toolbar for testing and validation
using our integrated association classification mining fuzzy model to show and prove its
feasibility, reliability and accuracy. The implementation was programmed using Java
language, and it successfully recognized and detected approximately 92% of the
phishing websites selected from our test data subset, avoiding many miss-classified 
websites and false phishing alarms. Further, we show from this practical plug-in toolbar
implementation that data mining fuzzy-based solutions are actually quite effective in
protecting users against phishing websites attacks, and also we believe it can be used to
improve existing anti-phishing approaches which use AI heuristics search. 
 
 
 
1.6 Thesis Road Map 
 
 
In this thesis, we introduce an extensive literature review concerning the phishing 
website problem and all its related work. Then we show from quantitative point of view 
our implementation of empirical phishing experiments and case studies to gather and
analyze all the different social engineering phishing website features, characteristics and
patterns with all their mutual relationships. Further, we present a fuzzy logic model for
building a phishing website detection system using its four phases (Fuzzification, Rule
Evaluation, Aggregation and Defuzzification). Fuzzy logic is used to characterize the
phishing website features and patterns as fuzzy variables with specific fuzzy sets. Fuzzy
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set operations are then used to generate all the phishing fuzzy rules which come from
previous human expert knowledge, to be processed into the fuzzy inference engine for
the final calculation of the phishing website risk rate. We then enhance the phishing
fuzzy rule generation by combining fuzzy logic with intelligent mining association
classification algorithms and techniques (CBA, JRip, PART, PRISM  and C4.5). Finding 
association rules between phishing websites’ different features which classify legitimate
websites from phishing website can greatly help the performance and precision of the
detection system. Automating the rule generation process using data miner association
classification algorithms can be used as an alternative to human expert knowledge, to be
processed by the fuzzy inference engine for the final output. 
 
Finally, we show the practical implementation of our model for testing and validation. 
We design an intelligent plug-ins phishing website detection toolbar using our
integrated association classification mining fuzzy model to show and prove its
feasibility, reliability and accuracy.  
 
 
1.7 Outline of the Thesis  
 
 
The thesis consists of 7 chapters. Chapter 2 introduces a general literature review of
phishing website problem, types, classification and different anti-phishing approaches
and technology. Chapter 3 defines the concept of social engineering attack and presents
our case studies: Website Phishing Experiment and Phishing Website Survey Scenario
Experiment, followed by users’ reaction analysis. Chapter 3 also states all the phishing
website characteristics and features extracted from these different phishing experiments
and case studies. Chapter 4 presents our intelligent fuzzy logic phishing detection model 
with its system design implementation and fuzzy rule-base for all model phases.
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Chapter 5 introduces and covers all implemented supervised machine learning
associative and classification mining algorithms and techniques used on our intelligent
phishing website detection model, to combine and integrate with fuzzy logic inference 
engine. In this chapter we present our five association and classification algorithms and
approaches (JRip, PART, PRISM, C4.5, CBA) with all their parameters and conditions,
to be used to automate the classification rule generation for enhancing the performance
and precision of the final phishing website detection rate. Followed by the presentation
of our intelligent fuzzy-based association classification mining model for phishing
website detection which combines fuzzy logic with association and classification
algorithms and techniques to automate fuzzy rule generation and reduce the role of
human intervention. This chapter shows our intelligence heuristic webpage analysis, our
experiential setup for phishing website dataset and extracted features, utilisation of
different DM classification algorithms and its rules generation for all criteria and layers 
related to our intelligent detection model. Chapter 6 is devoted to the practical
implementation of the phishing detection model for testing and comparing,
demonstrating and analyzing the developed plug-ins intelligent phishing detection
toolbar to prove its feasibility, reliability and accuracy comparing to other phishing
detection toolbars. The last chapter, Chapter 7, summarizes the main achievements of
this thesis, presents the general conclusions and suggests further research directions. 
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Chapter 2  
 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Phishing websites are a recent problem. Nevertheless, due to their huge impact on the
financial and on-line retailing sectors and since preventing such attacks is an important
step towards defending against website phishing attacks, there are several promising
approaches to this problem and a comprehensive collection of related works. In this
section, we briefly survey existing anti-phishing solutions and a list of the related
works.  
 
Dhamija and Tygar’s (2005) approach involves the use of a so-called dynamic security 
skin on the user’s browser. This technique uses a shared secret image that allows a
remote server to prove its identity to a user in a way that supports easy verification by
humans but which is difficult for the phishers to spoof. The disadvantage of this
approach is that it requires effort by the user. That is, the user needs to be aware of the
phishing threat and check for signs that the site he/she is visiting is being spoofed. The
proposal approach requires changes to the entire web infrastructure (both servers and
clients), so it can succeed only if the entire industry supports it. Also this technique does
not provide security for situations where the user login is from a public terminal. More
recently, Dhamija et al. (2006) analyzed 200 phishing attacks from the Anti-Phishing 
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Work Group database and identified several factors, ranging from pure lack of computer
system knowledge, to visual deception tricks used by adversaries, due to which users
fall for phishing attacks. They further conducted a usability study with 22 participants.
The participants were asked to study 20 different websites to see if they could tell
whether they were fraudulent or authentic. The result of this study showed that age, sex
and computer habits didn’t make much difference. They even noticed that pop-up
warnings of invalid signature of the sites and visual signs of SSL (Secure Sockets
Layer), padlocks etc. were very inefficient and were overlooked. They found that 23%
of the participants failed to look at security indicators warning about phishing attacks
and, as a result, 40% of the time they were susceptible to a phishing attack. Based on
their analysis, the authors suggest that it is important to re-think the design of security
systems, particularly by taking usability issues into consideration. Wu et al. (2006a)
proposed methods that require web page creators to follow certain rules to create web
pages, by adding sensitive information location attributes to HTML code. However, it is
difficult to persuade all web page creators to follow the rules. 
 
Liu et al. (2005) analyzed and compared legitimate and phishing web pages to define
metrics that can be used to detect a phishing page on visual similarity (i.e. block level
similarity, layout similarity and overall style similarity). The DOM -based (Wood, 2005)
visual similarity of web pages is oriented, and the concept of visual approach to
phishing detection was first introduced. Through this approach, a phishing web page
can be detected and reported in an automatic way rather than involving too many human
efforts. Their method first decomposes the web pages (in HTML) into salient (visually
distinguishable) block regions. The visual similarity between two web pages is then
evaluated in three metrics: block level similarity, layout similarity, and overall style
similarity, which are based on the matching of the salient block regions. A web page is
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classified as a phishing page if its visual similarity value is above a predefined 
threshold. Fu, et al. (2006) proposed a phishing web page detection method using the
EMD-based visual similarity assessment. This approach works at the pixel level of web
pages rather than at the text level, which can detect phishing web pages only if they are
“visually similar” to the protected ones without considering the similarity of the source
codes. 
 
The phishing filter in IE8 is a toolbar approach with more features such as blocking the
user’s activity on a detected phishing site. The most popular and widely-deployed 
techniques, however, are based on the use of blacklists of phishing domains that the
browser refuses to visit. For example, Microsoft has recently integrated a blacklist-
based anti-phishing solution into its Internet Explorer (IE8). The browser queries lists of 
blacklisted and whitelisted domains from Microsoft servers and makes sure that the user
is not accessing any phishing sites. Microsoft’s solution is also known to use some
heuristics to detect phishing symptoms in web pages (Sharif, 2005). Obviously, to date,
the company has not released any detailed public information on how its anti-phishing 
techniques function. 
 
Chandrasekaran et al. (2006) proposed an approach to classify phishing based on
phishing emails’ structural properties. 25 features, comprising style markers (e.g. the
words suspended, account, and security) and structural attributes, such as the structure
of the subject line of the email and the structure of the greeting in the body, were used
in the study. 200 emails (100 phishing and 100 legitimate) were tested. Simulated
annealing was applied as an algorithm for feature selection. After a feature set was
chosen, information gain (IG) was used to rank these features based on their relevance.
Thus, they applied one-class SVM to classify phishing emails based on the selected
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features. The results demonstrated a detection rate of 95% of phishing emails with a low
false positive rate. 
 
Fette et al. (2007) compared a number of commonly-used learning methods through
their performance in phishing detection on a past phishing data set, and finally Random
Forests were implemented in their algorithm PILFER. The authors claim that the
methods can be used in the detection of phishing websites as well. 860 phishing emails
and 6950 legitimate emails were tested. The proposed method correctly detected 96% of
the phishing emails with a false positive rate of 0.1%. Ten handpicked features were
selected for training using a phishing dataset that was collected in 2002 and 2003. As
pointed out by the authors themselves, their implementation is not optimal and further
work in this area is warranted. 
Abu-Nimeh et al. (2007) compared six machine-learning techniques to classify phishing 
emails. Their phishing corpus consisted of a total of 2889 emails and they used 43
features (variables). They used a bag-of-words as their feature set and the results
demonstrated that merely using a spam detection mechanism, i.e. bag-of-words only,
achieves high predictive accuracy. However, relying on textual features results in high
false positive rates, as phishing emails are very similar to legitimate ones. The studied
classifiers could successfully predict more than 92% of the phishing emails. 
 
Pan and Ding (2006) examined the anomalies in web pages, in particular, the
discrepancy between a web site’s identity and its structural features and HTTP
transactions. Herzberg and Gbara (2004) proposed a solution to combine the technique
of standard certificates with a visual indication of correct certification; a site-dependent 
logo indicating that the certificate was valid would be displayed in a trusted credentials
area of the browser (Olsen, 2004), (Perez, 2003). Another approach detects certain
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common attack instances, such as attacks in which the images are supplied from one
domain while the text resides with another domain, and attacks corresponding to
misspellings of URLs of common targets (Jakobsson, 2005). 
 
Previous research works on duplicated document detection approaches focus on plain
text documents and use pure text features in similarity measure, such as collection
statistics (Chowdhury, et al., 2002), syntactic analysis (Broder, et al., 1997), displaying
structure (Chen, et al., 2003), (Nanno, et al., 2003), (Yu, et al., 2003), visual-based 
understanding (Gu, et al., 2002), vector space model (Salton, et al., 1975). Hoad and
Zobel have surveyed various methods on plagiarized document detection in (Hoad and
Zobel, 2003). However, as (Liu, et al., 2005) demonstrated, pure text features are not
sufficient for phishing web page detection since phishing web pages mainly employ
visual similarity to scam users (Fu, et al., 2006). 
 
“The Phishing Guide” by Ollmann (2004) gives a detailed understanding of the
different techniques often included in phishing attacks. The phenomenon that started as
simple emails persuading the receiver to reply with the information the attacker required
has evolved into more advanced ways to deceive the victim. Links in email and false
advertisements sends the victim to more and more advanced fraudulent websites
designed to persuade the victim to type in the information the attacker wants, for
example to log into the fraudulent site mimicking the company’s original. Ollmann also 
presents different ways to check whether websites are fraudulent or not. Apart from
inspecting whether the visited site really is secure through SSL (Secure Sockets Layer),
the user should also check that the certificate added to the website really is from the
company it claims to be from and that it is signed by a trusted third party. Focusing
more attention on the URL can also often reveal fraudulent sites. There are a number of
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ways for the attackers to manipulate the URL to look like the original, and if the users
are aware of this they can more easily check the authentication of the visited site.
Watson et al. (2005) describe in their White Paper, “Know your enemy: Phishing”,
different real-world phishing attacks collected in German and United Kingdom
honeynets. Honeynets are open computer networks designed to collect information
about different attacks out in the real world, for further forensic analysis. They noticed
that phishing attacks using vulnerable web servers as hosts for predesigned phishing
sites are by far the most common, compared to using self-compiled servers. A
compromised server is often host for several different phishing sites. These sites are
often only active for a few hours or days after being downloaded to the server.
PassMark (2005) includes a personalized image in a web page to indicate that the user
has set up an account with the site. This approach places the burden on users to notice
the visual differences between a good site and a phishing site and then to correctly infer
that a phishing attack is underway. However, this requires user awareness and prior
knowledge. Another approach is two-factor authentication, which ensures that the user
not only knows a secret but also presents a security token (FDIC, 2004). However, this
approach is a server-side solution. Phishing can still happen on sites that do not support
two-factor authentication. Sensitive information that is not related to a specific site, e.g.,
credit card information and SSN, cannot be protected by this approach either. The
PRIME project (Pettersson, et al., 2005) helps users to manage their on-line identity in a 
more natural and intuitive way using three UI paradigms. It supports drag-and-drop
actions for personal information submission. It does not specifically target the phishing
problem but its improved user interface could help users correctly manage their on-line 
information. One potential problem with the PRIME interface is its “Just-In-Time-
Click-Through Agreements” (JITCTAs) that is used to generate “small agreements that
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are easier for the user to read and process”. Users could still ignore the agreements by
directly clicking through the “I Agree” button. 
 
APWG provides a solution directory (APWG, 2005) which contains most of the major
anti-phishing companies in the world. However, an automatic anti-phishing method is
seldom reported. Cyveillance Fraud Management (Kirda and Kruegel, 2005a) uses
proprietary Internet monitoring technology to identify phishing-related activity such as
suspicious domain registrations, phishing lures, spoofed sites and the post-attack sale of 
compromised credentials. Others include Internet Identity’s Domain Security Audit
(Liu, et al., 2005). These approaches are mainly motivated to protect corporations’
interests. Nonetheless, they do not directly defend against phishing attacks for users. 
 
Other browser-integrated anti-phishing tools include Google Safe Browsing (Schneider,
et al., 2007) and McAfee SiteAdvisor (McAfee SiteAdvisor, 2007). Similar to the
Microsoft IE 8 anti-phishing protection, Google Safe Browsing uses blacklists of
phishing URLs to identify phishing sites. The disadvantage of the approach is that non-
blacklisted phishing sites are not recognized. The success of a blacklist relies on
massive amounts of data being collected at frequent intervals. In contrast, SiteAdvisor
is a database-backed solution that is, however, mainly designed for protection against
malware-based attacks (e.g., Spyware, Trojan horses, etc.). It includes automated
crawlers that browse web sites, perform tests and create threat ratings for each visited
site. Unfortunately, just like other blacklist or database-based solutions, SiteAdvisor
cannot recognize new threats that are unknown and not in the database (Zhang, et al.,
2006). Verisign (2005) has also been providing a commercial anti-phishing service. The
company is crawling millions of web pages to identify “clones” in order to detect
phishing web sites. Furthermore, just like other large companies such as Microsoft,
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McAfee and Google, blacklists of phishing websites are maintained. Note that one
problem with crawling and blacklists proposals could be that the anti-phishing 
organisations will find themselves in a race against the attackers. This problem is
analogous to the problems faced by anti-virus and anti-spam companies. Obviously,
there is always a window of vulnerability during which users are susceptible to attacks.
Furthermore, listing approaches are only as effective as the quality of the lists that are
maintained. Gabber et al. (1999), present a tool that tries to protect a client’s identity
and password information. They define client personality in terms of username,
password and email address and introduce a function which provides clients with
different personalities for the different servers they visit. Chandrasekaran, (2005)
proposed inserting intelligent chip to sign as anti-phishing new fighting technique.
Chinchani and Upadhyaya (2005) introduced new procedure by stemming software’s
flaws and improving vigilance with psychological defence, using different logon
passwords and payment passwords. Emigh (2006) discussed a wide variety of phishing
attacks and countermeasures for the attacks. He also discussed why users are fooled by
phishing attacks and the effectiveness of anti-phishing toolbars. 
 
Jakobsson introduced a new model, called a phishing graph, to visualize the flow of
information in a phishing attack (Jakobsson, 2005). While this model is not, in essence,
a defensive technique, it is the first step towards developing an abstract model for
visualizing phishing. A phishing graph enhances the ability to analyze and understand
the course of a phishing attack. TrustedBrowser (Ye and Smith, 2005) uses a
synchronized random coloured boundary to secure the path from users to their browser.
The trusted status content is marked in the trusted window whereas the server content is
shown in the distrusted window. Anti-Phish (Kirda and Kruegel, 2005b) compares the
domains for the same sensitive information in web pages to the domains in the caches.
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That is, if it detects that confidential information such as a password is being entered
into a form on a distrusted website, a warning is generated and the pending operation is
cancelled. PhishHook (Stepp, 2005) converts a web page to “normal form” through text,
images and hyperlinks transformations.  
 
PwdHash (Ross, et al., 2005), in contrast, creates domain-specific passwords that are
rendered useless if they are submitted to another domain (e.g., a password for
www.gmail.com will be different if submitted to www.attacker.com). 
The limitation of browser-based schemes is that they require prior knowledge of the
target site, which is unfortunately not always available. More importantly, since
phishing attackers are able to update the inducement techniques to get around those
schemes, the effectiveness of these schemes is not convincing. In a proactive manner, a
set of techniques are designed to capture phishing sites on the Internet.  
Several commercial and open-source toolbars have been proposed to protect the users
from phishing attacks. Most of these techniques perform static checking of the visited
web pages and URLs to detect the phishing attacks, as shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Existing security toolbars 
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Spoofstick (Spoofstick, 2005) is a widely-used tool that performs reverse DNS lookup
on the visited website, for the purpose of displaying the IP address of the visited site on
the browser’s toolbar. Although this information can be used to separate legitimate and
masqueraded websites, it still requires a ‘human-in-the-loop’ to make the actual
decision. 
  
NetCraft anti-phishing toolbar (Netcraft toolbar, 2006) employs distributed decision
mechanisms that rely on its client’s majority vote to infer a website’s validity. The
websites tagged malicious by its subscribed clients are scrutinized, and the result is
disseminated among other subscribing members in the form of blacklists. The approach
partially uses a database of sites that are maintained by the company. As this technique
relies on users’ feedback for its decision-making, it may be subject to increased false
positives and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, since the new phishing sites that are not
in the database may not be recognized, especially in cases where a group of hackers
maliciously frame a legitimate website as malicious. Also, since the masqueraded
websites are short-lived, it is highly unlikely that such responses will be propagated to
the clients before their lifetime. The weakness of this approach is its poor scalability and
its timeliness.  
 
One of the popular methods of detection is using add-in toolbars for the browser. Chou
et al. introduced one such tool, SpoofGuard (Chou, et al., 2004), that determines if a
web page is legitimate based on a series of domain and URL-based tests. It uses domain 
names, URLs, links, and images to measure the similarity between a given page and the
pages in the caches or histories. It looks for phishing symptoms (e.g., obfuscated URLS)
in web pages and raises alerts. The technique examines the downloaded website using 
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various stateful and stateless evaluations like checking for invalid links, URL
obfuscation attempts etc. The major disadvantage with these approaches is that they are
susceptible to attacks launched from the compromised legitimate website. Also, in many 
web-hosting domains the attacker could create a user account with the name login and 
launch a successful phishing attack by hosting the masqueraded page in his domain
space, which would typically appear as www.domain.com/login, thereby circumventing
the aforementioned approaches. Herzberg and Gbara (2004) proposed TrustBar, a third-
party certification solution to phishing. The authors propose creating a Trusted
Credentials Area (TCA). The TCA controls a significant area, located at the top of every
browser window, and large enough to contain highly visible logos and other graphical
icons for credentials identifying a legitimate page. While their solution does not rely on
complex security factors, it does not prevent spoofing attacks. Specifically, since the
logos of websites do not change, they can be used by an attacker to create a look-alike 
TCA in a distrusted web page. 
 
It should be emphasized that none of the above defence techniques – blacklist, spoofing 
detection, password-scrambling, anti-phishing toolbars or spam filters – will completely 
make phishing attacks impossible to perpetrate. Instead, they provide valuable but
scattered roadblocks impeding the attacker. 
 
2.2 Anti-Phishing Technology 
 
2.2.1 Anti-Phishing Overview 
Anti-phishing tools provide consumers with a dynamic system of warning and
protection against potential phishing attacks, and they also defend the brands of
legitimate ISPs and web commerce site developers from being “spoofed” to propagate
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scams. Of course, the most important role of an anti-phishing tool is to identify phishing 
websites in a very accurate way and within an acceptable timescale. Some of these tools
provide binary indicators which show whether that site is phishing or not, and that can
be implemented by using coloured indicators (green represents a legitimate site, and red
represents a positively-identified phishing site). Other tools use a ternary system which
means that the site can be phishing, legitimate, or unknown (suspicious), and that can
also be implemented by using coloured indicators (green represents a legitimate site, red
represents a positively-identified phishing site and a yellow or gray indicator represents
an unknown or suspicious site). 
 
Phishing techniques have not only grown in number, but also in sophistication. Phishers 
might have a lot of approaches and tactics to conduct a well-designed phishing attack.
The target of the phishing attacks - consumers of on-line banking and payment services 
providers - are facing a large amount of financial loss and loss of trust in Internet-based 
services. There is an urgent need to find solutions to combat phishing attacks. So far,
various solutions have been proposed and developed in response to phishing. These
solutions target both non-technical and technical problem areas. 
 
 
2.2.2 Non-Technical Anti-Phishing Solutions 
 
Legislation 
 
Legislation is obviously a direct way to minimize phishing by tracing and arresting
phishing criminals. Followed the lead of the US, many countries have enacted laws
against suspected phishers, and many phishers have been arrested and prosecuted. There
are some problems that reduce the effectiveness of the excising laws Firstly, the phisher
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is always hard to trace and catch; a phishing attack can be perpetrated very quickly and,
afterwards, the perpetrator can vanish into cyberspace. In addition, the fake websites
typically migrate rapidly from one server to another. The average phishing website is
online for only about 54 hours (Garera, et al., 2006). The other problem is that many
laws are of use only after the damage is done, when a consumer has already been
defrauded as a result of the phishing. And before the phishing is perpetrated, it is
difficult to define which class of fraud is a crime. 
 
 
Public Education and Awareness 
 
Generally speaking, the primary advantage for criminals conducting phishing attacks is
the public’s lack of education and awareness of both the existence of financial crimes
targeting Internet users and the policies and procedures of online sites for contacting
their customers regarding account information and maintenance issues. Thus, public
education and awareness are important factors to counter phishing. As awareness of
phishing grows among consumers, the incidences of phishing will shrink to a certain
extent. 
 
However, getting rid of phishing through education alone will be very difficult. First of
all, there are always new or technology-naive Internet users who do not have any
experience, and become victims of phishing. Another aspect is that phishers are getting 
better and better at mimicking genuine emails and websites; even the security expert
may sometimes be fooled (Adida, et al., 2005). Finally, in order to be up to date with
the latest phishing techniques, users have to spend a lot of time studying the 
phenomenon, which is impossible for the majority of Internet users (Binxing and
Ruifeng, 2006). 
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2.2.3 Technical Anti-Phishing Solutions 
To combat phishing, security organisations such as APWG and some of the world’s
leading security companies such as M acAfee and Symantec have proposed many
technical anti-phishing solutions. Some desktop protection software already has built-in 
anti-phishing functions. 
 
Since phishing attacks have many types and variations, and involve lots of attacking
techniques, there is no ‘silver bullet’ to solve all phishing problems. the following
sections, we will analyze some aspects of anti-phishing solutions based on the phishing
technologies they use. All investigated anti-phishing applications create warnings to
inform the user when a website appears to be fraudulent. Most anti-phishing 
applications are extensions or improvements of an existing web browser. Although a
wide range of anti-phishing products are available, most of them are not able to make a
decision dynamically on whether the site is in fact phished, giving rise to a large
number of false positives.  
 
The most popular techniques are described in detail below with some common anti-
phishing examples described afterwards, which use one or more techniques combined
with each other: 
 
Blacklist Check 
A “blacklist” is a dynamic list of known phishing-sites that is updated frequently with
newly reported attacks. The suspicious URL is matched against a list of known phishing
sites. This method is susceptible to “zero day attacks”. Also, techniques like URL
obfuscation and routing through alternate domain names can hinder this method
ineffective.  
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Heuristics 
This uses heuristics like domain registration information (owner, age, and country), the
number of links to other known-good sites, image-hashing, third-party cookies and user
reviews. Most of the heuristics used are subjective and produce a large number of false
positives (Chinmay, et al., 2008).  
 
User Rating/Polling 
These techniques deem the URL as phished, based on user votes. However, it is
ineffective against new phishing attacks and is very subjective.  
 
Third Party Certification Authorities and Reputation Services 
This requires an additional interface, which itself is susceptible to phishing.  
 
Using Page Rank Methodology 
Page rank can be used to detect a phishing URL (Garera, et al., 2006). However, false
positives have been observed in these methods. Also, a website routed through a content
distribution network (CDN) would create problems for domain-based checks (Chinmay, 
et al., 2008). 
 
 
2.3 Anti-Phishing Security Toolbars 
 
Many proposed anti-phishing solutions use toolbars that show different types of security
messages and warnings in the web browser’s interface to help users detect phishing
sites, such as Spoofguard (Chou, et al., 2004), Trustbar (Herzberg and Gbara, 2004),
SpoofStick (Spoofstick, 2005) and Netcraft (Netcraft toolbar, 2006) toolbars. Users are
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advised to look at the existing browser security indicators, e.g., the URL displayed in
the address bar and the lock icon displayed in the status bar when a connection is SSL-
protected. However, controlled user studies have shown that these security indicators
are ineffective against high-quality phishing attacks for several reasons (Wu, et al.,
2006b): 
 
First, warning indicators located in a peripheral area provide a much weaker signal than
the centrally displayed web page and can be easily overwhelmed by convincing web
content. Many users rely on the web content to decide if a site is authentic or phishing. 
 
Second, the security-related information shown by the indicators is not really needed for
the user’s current task. Since security is rarely a user’s primary goal, users fail to pay
continuous attention to the indicators. Making security a separate task that users are
required to remember is not an effective solution. 
 
Third, sloppy but common web practices cause some users to rationalize the violation of
the security rules that some indicators use to detect phishing attacks. For example, users
are told to examine the hostname displayed in the address bar, to make sure that the
hostname is the one they are expecting. But some legitimate websites use IP addresses
instead of hostnames (e.g., the Google cache) and some sites use domain names that are
totally different from their brand names (Herzberg, 2005). 
 
Fourth, some indicators deliver warnings without detailed, convincing explanations,
which makes users think that the software is buggy and thus not treat the warning
seriously. 
 
Fifth, although users do notice the system model displayed by the toolbar under
phishing attacks, most of them do not have the expertise to correctly interpret it. For
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example, they cannot tell the difference between a lock icon displayed on a web page
and the one displayed in the status bar. (e.g., amazon.com vs. amazon-department.com) 
are actually from the same organisation in the real world. 
 
Finally, security indicators tend to show that something is wrong and advise users not to
proceed, but they do not suggest good alternatives. This may encourage users to risk
submitting their information anyway, since they don’t see any other way to accomplish
their goal. 
 
2.4 Justification of the Proposed Research 
Phishing website attacks are well-organized and financially motivated crimes which 
steal the user's confidential information and authentication credentials. It damages the
confidence in e–commerce as a whole. It is obvious that phishing problems could be a
stumbling block, impeding the development of on-line financial services. Current anti-
phishing technologies have lots of limitations and constraints and will not completely
stop phishing websites. An Artificial Intelligence (AI) heuristic-based search approach
can be more appropriate and suitable for phishing website detection. We want to prove
the applicability of using fuzzy-based classification mining techniques for building new
phishing website detection. Extracted fuzzified phishing website features and patterns
can be correctly classified and integrated in a supervised machine-learning solution to
identify phishing websites effectively and dynamically.  
 
The intelligent phishing detection system should reduce the requirement for human
knowledge intervention for detection of phishing websites and be an alternative solution
to the black-list or white-list dependency approach, by adopting new fuzzy-based 
classification mining technique to detect phishing websites. The proposed solution
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should outperform the existing techniques in terms of accuracy, reliability and 
dependability. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Social Engineering Phishing Attacks and
Experimental Case-Studies 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The first step in fighting out phishing is to understand its technique and its
methodology. That is why studying and knowing everything about social engineering is
very crucial, since we know now that phishing is a social engineering technique
employed to deceive users into giving away financial and personal information (Weider,
et al., 2008). Implementing and conducting some empirical experiments and case-
studies are also very important for studying and analyzing different social engineering
phishing attacks in order to help us to design effective countermeasures.  
 
The key element of a social engineering attack is trust - the target trusts the hacker. To
resist this form of attack, we need to stimulate a healthy scepticism among staff of
anything out of the ordinary and engender their trust in the company IT support
infrastructure. We performed different case-study experiments to assess and to evaluate
the accuracy and precision of phishing website factors to find the most common
phishing clues and indicators that convey authenticity to our employees. Also, one of
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 45 
the purposes of our experiments was to identify which malicious strategies and attack
techniques are successful in deceiving general users, and why. 
 
3.2 What is Social Engineering Phishing Attack? 
Social engineering phishing attack is the act of manipulating people into doing what
hackers want in order to gain access to information or resources. It’s a collection of
techniques used to deceive people into performing actions or divulging confidential
information (Callow, 2009). 
Social engineering phishing attack exploit the credulity, laziness, good manners, or even
enthusiasm of people. Therefore it is difficult to defend against a socially-engineered 
attack, because the targets may not realize that they have been duped, or may prefer not
to admit it to other people (Midsize Business Security Guidance, 2006). 
It is being predicted that social engineering phishing attacks will be on the rise in the
years to come. Billions of dollars are lost every year by corporations and internet users
to social engineering attacks, in the process making participants in e-commerce 
increasingly distrustful. The problem of social engineering attack is that there is no
single solution to eliminate it completely, since it deals largely with the human factor. 
There are many types of social engineering attacks but, in this chapter, we will only
concentrate on one popular type of these attacks which called "Social Engineering
Phishing Attack Using Internet Access". 
 
3.3 The Goals of Social Engineering Phishing Attacks 
A social engineering phishing attack attempts to persuade company staff to provide
information that will enable him or her to use their systems or system resources to gain
unauthorized access to a company’s money, information, or IT resources. The social
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engineering phisher persuades a staff member to provide information through a
believable ruse, rather than infecting a computer with malware through a direct attack.
An attack may provide information that will enable the hacker to make a subsequent
malware attack (Midsize Business Security Guidance, 2006). 
 
These phisher’ goals are based on money, social advancement, and self-worth. Phishers  
want to take money or resources, they want to be recognized within society or their own
peer group, and they want to feel good about themselves.  
 
3.4 Social Engineering Phishing Attack Using Internet Access  
Most employees browse the web for personal reasons, such as on-line shopping or
research, at some time. Personal browsing may bring employees, and therefore the
company computer systems, into contact with generic social engineers who will then
use the staff in an effort to gain access to the company resources. The two most
common methods of enticing a user to click a button inside a dialog box are by warning
of a problem, such as displaying a realistic operating system or application error
message, or by offering additional services. 
 
The following Figure 3.1 shows how a hyperlink appears to link to a secure PayPal
website (https), while the status bar does not show anything that indicates for sure that it
will take the user to a hacker’s site. A hacker can suppress or reformat the status bar
information. 
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Figure 3.1: Web page phishing hyperlink 
 
 
3.5 Empirical Phishing Experimental Case-Studies  
Conducting different kinds of phishing experiments can shed some light on social
engineering attacks, such as phone phishing and phishing website attacks, and can also
help us in designing effective countermeasures and analyzing the efficiency of
performing training and security awareness about phishing threats (Jakobsson, et al.,
2007). The surprising percentages of victims who disclosed their credentials in our
phishing experiments underscore the need to redouble our efforts in developing
phishing prevention techniques. 
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3.5.1 Case-Study 1: Website Phishing Experiment  
We engineered a website for phishing practice and study. The website was an exact
replica of the original Jordan Ahli Bank website www.ahlionline.com.jo , designed to
trap users and induce them by targeted phishing emails to submit their credentials
(username and password). The specimen was inclusive of our colleagues at Jordan Ahli
Bank after attaining the necessary authorizations from our management. 
We targeted 120 employees with our deceptive phishing email, informing them that
their e-banking accounts were at risk of being hacked and requesting them to log into
their account through a fake link attached to our email using their usual customer ID
and password to verify their balance and then log out normally. 
 
 
Deceiving Phishing Email 
 
E-banking Services BES 
 
We have automatically reviewed your accounts recently and we suspect
that they were tampered with by an unauthorized third party. Protecting the
security of your account and our network is our primary concern.
Therefore, as a preventative measure, we have deactivated the services in
your account that are liable for breaching and we kindly ask you to
thoroughly follow the hereunder procedures to ascertain that your account
is intact. 
 
 Login to your Internet Banking account. 
 Enter your Customer ID and Password as usual. 
 Review your recent account history for any unauthorized
withdrawals or deposits. Report to us immediately if you suspect any
unauthorized activity has taken place on your account. 
 After checking, we will automatically update your account records
and reconnect it with the main web server database. Confirmation
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message will appear to you after successful update and reactivation
of your account. 
“Thank you, 
 
 Your record has been updated successfully” 
 
 To get started,  please click on the link below: 
 
https://www.ahli.com/ahlionline 
 
We apologize for any inconvenience this may cause, and appreciate your
assistance in helping us maintain the integrity of the entire e-banking 
system. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Banking Electronic Services Team 
 
 
The web site successfully attracted 52 out of the 120 targeted employees, representing
44% who interacted positively by following the deceptive instructions and submitting
their actual credentials (customer ID, Password).  
Surprisingly, IT department employees and IT auditors constituted 8 out of the 120
victims representing 7%, which shocked me, since we expected them to be more alert
than others. From other departments, 44 of the 120 targeted employee victims,
representing 37%, fell into the trap and submitted their credentials without any
hesitation. 
The remaining 68 out of 120, representing 56%, were divided as follows: 28 employees
(23%) supplied incorrect info, which seems to indicate a wary curiosity; and 40
employees, representing 33%, received the email, but did not respond at all, as shown in
Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1: Phishing website experiment 
Response to Phishing 
 Experiment 
Number of  
Employees 
Interacted positively (IT Department) 8 
Interacted positively (Other Departments) 44 
Interacted negatively (Incorrect info) 28 
Interacted negatively (No response)  40 
Total 120 
 
The results clearly indicate, as shown in Figure 3.2, that the target phishing factor is
extremely dangerous since almost half of the employees who responded were
victimized, particularly trained employees such as those of the IT Department and IT
Auditors. 
Increasing the awareness of all users of e-banking regarding this risk factor is highly
recommended; this includes customers and employees alike. 
Website phishing experiment chart
Interacted
positively (Other
departments ); 44 ;
37%
Interacted
positively (IT
department ); 8;
7%
Interacted
negatively
(Incorrect info);
28 ; 23%
Interacted
negatively (No
response ) ; 40 ;
33%
Interacted positively (IT department) Interacted positively (Other departments)
Interacted negatively (Incorrect info) Interacted negatively (No response)
 
Figure 3.2: Website phishing response chart 
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3.5.2 Case-Study 2: Phishing Website Survey Scenario Experiment  
After the success of our previous phishing website empirical experiment which was
conducted at our bank, targeting a specific number of its employees (120), the bank was
really interested in studying the vulnerability of their employees towards spear phishing
e-banking websites, since targeted spear phishing attacks have always been more
successful than generic phishing attacks in conning people and causing financial
damage to companies and individuals. We found this a good opportunity to perform a
new usability study experiment to assess and to evaluate the accuracy and the precision
of our 27 phishing website factors and features, previously collected and analyzed as a
result of our cognitive walkthrough of phishing websites’ patterns and clues. 
This time, we decided to create two groups from our bank employees, each group
consisting of 50 participants. In the first group, the employees were totally naïve about
the phishing threat and did not have any previous experience or training in dealing with
this kind of social engineering phishing attack. Regarding the second group, we decided
to choose the 50 employees from our previous 120 employee specimen who had
participated in our previous phishing website experiment case, in order to measure and
evaluate the effectiveness and the efficiency of prior phishing website awareness
training, and past experience of dealing with phishing attack hacking incidents.  
In total, our new specimen was 100 bank employees; half of them were untrained (First
group) and the second half were trained (Second group). 
We analyzed a set of phishing attacks and tricks to measure their effectiveness and
influence, and developed 50 phishing and legitimate website survey scenarios which
were collected from the APWG’s archive (APWG, 2008), and Phishtank archive
(Phishtank, 2008). The scenarios analyzed were carried out with the latest scenarios
added to the archive by APWG and Phishtank experts. The scenarios were described
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and explained in detail in their archives. From these different scenarios, 30 out of the
50 were phishing websites and the rest were legitimate. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3:  An example of phishing website scenario survey 
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We showed the two participating groups (trained and untrained) the 50 different website
scenarios that appear to belong to decent financial institutions and reputable banks, as
shown in Figure 3.3, and asked them to determine which ones were fraudulent and
which ones were legitimate and to give the reason for their decision and evaluation. 
 
We showed the participants that the purpose of this experiment was to help them
discover their knowledge and awareness of the new rising phenomenon of social
engineering phishing website attack, and their capability to identify and to distinguish
the legitimate genuine website from the phishing spoofed website.  
 
For our part, the purposes of our experiment are to find the most common phishing
clues and indicators that appear in the scenarios, to determine what aspects of a website
effectively convey authenticity to our employees, and to try to identify which malicious
strategies and attack techniques are successful at deceiving general users, and why
(Alnajim and Munro, 2008).  
From this experiment, we also tried to determine the effectiveness and the value of
implementing some security training awareness and phishing courses or classes about
phishing threats and detection expertise, and how this might reflect the determination of 
website legitimacy by the second, trained, group. 
 
Our 27 phishing website factors and features were all deliberately distributed randomly
across the 30 phishing website scenarios. One phishing factor could appear in many 
phishing scenarios and one phishing scenario could have more than one factor or
feature. This is illustrated in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Phishing factor indicators 
Phishing Factor Indicator No. of 
Appearance 
Appearance
Percentage 
% 
Using the IP Address 14 46.66 
Abnormal Request URL 30 100 
Abnormal URL of Anchor 7 23.33 
Abnormal DNS Record 2 06.66 
Abnormal URL 5 16.66 
Using SSL Certificate 17 56.66 
Certification Authority 4 13.33 
Abnormal Cookie 2 06.66 
Distinguished Names Certificate(DN) 4 13.33 
Redirect Pages 3 10.00 
Straddling Attack 2 06.66 
Pharming Attack 4 13.33 
Using onMouseOver to Hide the Link 6 20.00 
Server Form Handler (SFH) 2 06.66 
Spelling Errors 24 80.00 
Copying Website 5 16.66 
Using Forms with “Submit” Button 6 20.00 
Using Pop-Ups Windows 8 26.66 
Disabling Right-Click 2 06.66 
Long URL Address 22 73.33 
Replacing Similar Characters for URL  16 53.33 
Adding Prefix or Suffix 9 30.00 
Using the @ Symbol to Confuse 6 20.00 
Using Hexadecimal Character Codes 8 26.66 
Much Emphasis on Security and Response 5 16.66 
Public Generic Salutation 12 40.00 
Buying Time to Access Accounts 3 10.00 
 
As Table 3.2 presents, the phishing factor indicator ARUL "Abnormal Request URL"
appeared in all 30 of the phishing scenarios. Furthermore, the phishing factor indicator,
"Spelling Error", appeared in 80% of the phishing scenarios (24 appearances). In
contrast, phishing factors such as "Abnormal DNS Record" and "Disabling Right Click"
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have the fewest appearances (6.66 %, representing 2 appearances). We made sure that
each phishing factor indicator had appeared at least once in the phishing website
scenarios. 
 
The result from this experiment was very interesting. As shown in Table 3.3, in the first,
untrained, group we found 72% of their decisions were wrong regarding the legitimacy
of the websites presented to them in the experiment. These results were represented by
either False Positive Case (FP, 38%), which happens when a legitimate website is
considered as phishing by the participant, or by False Negative (FN, 34%), which
happens when a phishing website is considered legitimate by the participant. Just 28%
of their decisions were right regarding the legitimacy of the website, represented by
either True Positive Case (TP, 11%) , which happens when a legitimate website is
considered legitimate by the participant, or by True Negative (TN, 17%), which
happens when a phishing website is considered as phishing by the participant. Figure
3.4 represents the column chart for website legitimacy decisions for the first, untrained,
group.  
 
We found that most of these wrong decisions made by first, untrained, group arose from
their lack of knowledge and awareness of the most common phishing website tricks and
deceptions. Most of them did not pay attention at all to some very obvious phishing
clues or indications like address bar contents, URL, domain name, page style, page
contents and security indicators like SSL certificate or logos, leading to this high
incorrect decision percentage. Most of their decisions and judgements concentrated on
the look of the website and its fancy colours, pictures and animation style, thus
supporting the arguments mentioned by Dhamija, et al., (2006). 
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Table 3.3: The results of website legitimacy decisions for the first group (Untrained 
group) 
 
Decision 
Website
Legitimacy 
True False 
 
Positive 
TP (11%) 
275 Decision 
FP (38%) 
950 Decision 
 
Negative 
TN (17%) 
425 Decision 
FN (34%) 
850 Decision 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Website legitimacy decisions chart for first group 
 
Regarding the second, trained, group, the results were totally different. Their previous
experience of the phishing website experiment and the skills they gained from that were
very obvious, and played a big role in the total outcomes.  
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As shown in Table 3.4, from the second, trained, group we found 72% of their decisions
were right regarding the legitimacy of the website, represented by either True Positive
Case (TP, 39%) or by True Negative (TN, 33%). Just 28% of their decisions were
wrong regarding the legitimacy of the websites presented to them in the experiment.
These results were represented by either False Positive Case (FP, 12%) or by False
Negative (FN, 16%). Figure 3.5 represents the column chart for website legitimacy
decisions by the second, trained, group.  
 
We found that most of these correct decisions made by the second, trained, group
resulted from their good experience, knowledge and awareness of the most common
phishing website tricks and deception attacks that they had faced before. Most of them
depended on their judgment and assessment of the website address bar, URL domain
name and the different security indicators. They were not fooled by the design, style or
fancy look of the website structure or animation, and their main concentration was
focused on detecting all phishing website factor indicators, which led to this acceptable
correct decision percentage. This of course suggests the importance of conducting
phishing training awareness for all users.  
  
Table 3.4: The results of website legitimacy decisions for the second group
(Trained group) 
 
Decision 
Website
Legitimacy 
True False 
 
Positive 
TP (39%) 
975 Decision 
FP (12%) 
300 Decision 
 
Negative 
TN (33%) 
825 Decision 
FN (16%) 
400 Decision 
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Figure 3.5: Website legitimacy decisions chart for second group 
 
Nevertheless, still some expert employees of the second trained group did not took the
right decision for some of phishing or legitimate websites, and they were fooled for
some visual deception phishing attacks. These results illustrate that traditional standard
security phishing factor indicators are not effective enough for detecting phishing
website, and suggest that alternative intelligent approaches are needed. 
 
3.6 Reactions Analysis to Website Phishing Experiment 
43% of the employees saw the learning value of the experience, and appreciated the
insights they had gained as a result of being part of the study. The rest of the employees 
felt that the study had no value, and felt violated at not having been asked permission
before the experiment was performed. They called the experiment unethical,
inappropriate, illegal and unprofessional. These reactions highlight that phishing has a
significant psychological cost for victims. 75% of the employees stated that they did not
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and would never fall for such an attack. This natural denial reaction suggests that we
may find it hard to admit to our own vulnerability. As a consequence, many successful
phishing attacks may go unreported, meaning that phishing success rates in surveys may 
be severely underestimated. Phishers know that most users don’t know how to check the
security and often assume that sites requesting sensitive information are secured. When
users don’t know how secure they are, they assume that they are secured, and it’s not
easy for them to see the difference between authentic security and mimicked security
features. We found that security is often a secondary goal for most of our employees.
They did not look at the address bar, status bar, or certificate authority. They often focus 
on their major tasks, and neglect all other security pointers or warning messages. We 
found that 48% of the employees were fooled by the presence of an SSL closed padlock
icon appearing within the body of a web page instead of looking for it in the right place.
Many employees always looked for a certain type of content like the closed padlock
icon when making their judgment and never mentioned the other security features like
the characters and numbers shown in the address bar, the certificate authority or any
other factors whatsoever. 37% of the employees did not look for any SSL signs that can
distinguish the secured encrypted website from the non-secured one, such as observing
the “HTTPS” in the address bar. 27% of the employees had some reservations when
they saw an IP address instead of a domain name and they were able to distinguish
between them. On the other hand, 66% of the employees did not know what an IP
address is!  
 
42% of our employees did not check the certificate that was presented to their browser
in our study since they do not know what it means; those that do know occasionally
check them out. 30% of the employees pointed out that the content details of the
website and its fancy design and style were one of the main reasons for their opinion
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about the legitimacy of the website. They assumed that the site would be legitimate if it
contained high quality images and lots of animations. 45% of the employees who
clicked on the forged VeriSign logo that we created did not compare the URL displayed
in the faked pop-up window, which shows the SSL certificate status of
www.ahlionline.com.jo hosted at VeriSign, to the URL in the address bar to detect
whether they are referring to the same website. Unfortunately, any site can provide a
link to this pop-up page in order to gain credibility (Jagatic, et al., 2007). We found 
67% of our employees do not know how to check or locate the self-signed certificate, 
and they have never checked a certificate before. We also found that visual deception
attacks can fool even the most sophisticated users. 
 
As a conclusion, our employees made incorrect decisions about the legitimacy of the e-
banking website because of their lack of knowledge and understanding of the phishing 
techniques and its malicious methods and indicators.  
 
 
3.7 Approaches to Quantify Website Phishing Problems  
 
In our research, we used three primary approaches to quantify the phishing website
problems: 
1- Using questionnaire, inspection, examination, investigation and survey in order to
quantify the problem and all its characteristics and factors. 
2- Performing lab experiments. This approach also covers common trials, which allows
the evaluation of the new and expected attacks and suitable countermeasures. 
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3- Performing experiments that mimic real website phishing attacks; this creates a
tricky ethical issue for the researcher, since measuring the actual success rates can
only be done by making sure that the study cannot be distinguished from reality.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Fuzzy Logic Model for Phishing Website
Detection 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Fuzzy logic is a powerful tool for defining systems through a natural use of language. It
connects knowledge discovery mechanisms that automatically isolate and generate rules 
covering both relationships in the data as well as the processes that connect these
relationships; in a way, it can be used to optimize our e-banking phishing detection 
system. In the next section we will propose a novel framework for using fuzzy logic for
modelling phishing website detection system.  
 
4.2 Proposed Model for Phishing Website Detection Using
Fuzzy Logic  
 
 
Results of phishing website detection risk rate are usually qualified with a statement of
uncertainties. This work presents a novel approach to overcome the ‘fuzziness’ in
phishing website detection by using fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic is used to characterize the
phishing website factors and indicators as fuzzy variable, which determines the
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likelihood of phishing. After that, fuzzy set operations are used to combine the severity
of these indicators and likelihood of occurrence to calculate and detect phishing website
risk probability. Phishing website risk rate detection is an “assessment” of something
hypothetical, defined as “phishing website risk”, which must then be interpreted as
“phishy”, “suspicious” or “legitimate”. 
  
Fuzzy logic variables and fuzzy set operations enable characterization of vaguely
defined (or fuzzy) sets of likelihood and consequence, impact the mathematics, to
combine them using expert knowledge, to detect phishing websites. The fuzzy phishing
website risk rate approach presented in this chapter is the first of its kind.  
 
4.3 Collected Phishing Websites’ Features and Patterns 
 
From our background phishing knowledge experience and the vast knowledge we
gained from conducting a series of phishing experiments with case-studies and surveys
for analyzing anti-phishing techniques and solutions, we managed to collect 27 main
phishing website features and characteristics that can help us to differentiate the
phishing website from the legitimate one.  
The list below demonstrates all our 27 collected phishing website features, which will
be used later in the methodology study analysis for our fuzzy-based phishing detection
model. 
1. Spelling errors: Most phishing websites have errors in spelling and grammar
since they are created on a temporary basis and the phishers are always in a
hurry. Increased number of spelling errors could be a sign of phishing website. 
2. Long URL address: A website with a short URL address is more reliable and
trustworthy than a website with suspiciously long URL address. For example,
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this website with a short URL address : http://www.ahli.com is more reliable
than this suspicious URL address:
http://www.boj.View?DocId=Index&siteId=AC&langID=EN  
3. Emphasis on security and quick response: Some phishers can defraud and
lure many visitors into using their forged websites by emphasizing on the
security issue to gain their trust and by always asking for their prompt action to
protect their personal information from being hacked. 
4. Personalization vs. public generic salutation: Personalization increases the
trustworthiness of the website, and the more personal information present on the
website the more likely it is to be legitimate; vice versa, the more generic and
public the information on the website the more suspicious the website is.
(Example of generic salutation: Dear customer or Dear member). 
5. Using SSL certificate and padlock icons: The website with the secured
encryption transaction SSL certificate (https ://) is more trustworthy and reliable
than the unsecured website (http ://) since most of the forged phishing websites
don't use this feature for many reasons. Using SSL can be distinguished by
looking for the padlock at the bottom of a browser frame. 
6. Certification authority: Mouse-over reveals a made-up certification authority
and digital signature. 
7. Replacing similar characters for URL and registered domains:
Transforming the real URLs by replacing characters such as an uppercase “I”
with a lowercase “L” or the number “1” — transforming WWW.CITI 
BANK.COM to WWW.C1T1BANK.COM , for instance; and also registering a
domain name very similar to the original, owned by a reputable company. 
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8. Adding a prefix or suffix: Add a prefix or suffix to the real domain name, as
with www.online-citibank.com or www.citibank-card.com. Here for example,
we can see the prefix word "online" before the legitimate Citi Bank domain
name, www.citibank.com, in order to confuse the user. 
9. Redirect pages: Utilise programming bugs in real websites to redirect to other 
pages — for example, the Citibank site used to include a script that could
redirect users to any site specified in place of PHISHING LINK in the URL
http://citibank.com/ws/citibankISAPI.dll?MfcISAPICommand=RedirectToDom
ain&DomainUrl=PHISHINGLINK. 
10. Straddling attack. The phishermen insert spiteful data in the HTML code of
the long-range web page. When the web page is downloaded, the script inside
will be executed. 
11. Pharming Attack. The fishermen amend users’ HOST files to shine upon the
domain name which is often visited and spurious IP address by cockhorse
procedure, spy software, browser hijacking and so on. So the users will joint trap
website though having imported correct domain name. 
12. Copying website: Copying the content of an official web page and imitating its
whole style and contents. 
13. Using forms with “Submit” button: Generally, the "Submit" button at the
bottom of the form causes the information to be sent to the fraudster's specified
location. <FORM action=http://www.citibank-offer.com/sendmail.php 
method=get target=_blank> 
14. Using onMouseOver to hide the Link: Using JavaScript event handler
“onMouseOver” to show a false URL in the status bar. 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 66 
15. Using the IP Address: Fraudsters attempt to conceal the destination website by
obscuring the URL. One method of concealing the destination is to use the IP
address of the website, rather than the hostname. Here is an example of an IP
address used in a fraudulent website: http://210.14.228.66/sr/. 
16. Using the @ Symbol to Confuse: When the ‘at’ symbol (@) is used in an
“http://” or “https://” URL, all text before the @ symbol is ignored and the
browser references only the information following the @ symbol. In other
words, if the format <userinfo>@<host> is used, the browser is directed to the
<host> site and the <userinfo> is ignored. To further conceal the URL, the @
symbol can be represented by its hexadecimal character code “%40.” 
17. Using Hexadecimal Character Codes: Fraudsters can also hide URLs by
using hexadecimal character codes to represent the numbers in the IP address.
Each hexadecimal character code begins with “%.” For example: 
http://www.visa.com%00@%32%32%30%2E%36%38%2E%32%31%34%2E
%32%31%33. The URL is put in <userinfo><null>@<host> format. 
18. Using Pop-Ups windows: Many fraudulent web pages are opened as pop-ups
which redirect the main browser window to the real company site. This
transaction appears to the user as a pop-up over the real company site.
Fraudsters use this technique to make their information-gathering appear more
credible. Some fraudsters use JavaScript to reopen the fraudulent pop-ups, if
closed, until the user fills out the requested information. 
19. Disabling Right-Click: Using JavaScript to disable the right-click function,
which prevents the user from viewing and saving the source code. Sometimes
the right-click function is also disabled on fraudulent web pages that are opened
in the menu browser window. The following is JavaScript taken from a
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fraudulent PayPal website. Function click() { if (event.button==2) {
alert(‘WARNING ! © Copyright 1999-2004 PayPal. All Rights Reserved.’)}}. 
20. Buying Time to Access Accounts: Fraudsters try to buy some time before their
victims check on their accounts to give the fraudsters an opportunity to use the
personal information they have acquired. The scammers indicate in the web
pages that it will take a certain amount of time for the account to be updated.
They hope that this will prevent their victims from checking their accounts
during this time period. 
21. Abnormal Request URL (RURL): External objects (such as images, css, and
external scripts) in a web page are loaded from another URL. For a normal
corporate website, a large percentage of those URLs are in its own domain. 
22. Abnormal URL of Anchor (AURL): A web page is suspicious when the
domains of most of the AURLs are different from the page’s domain, or anchors
do not link to any page. A high proportion of anchors in a legitimate website
point to the same domain as the page itself. (for example: <a
href=http://www.citibank.com/> ). 
23. Abnormal DNS record: A full DNS record usually has identified relevant
information. For phishing sites, either the record of the host name is not found in
the WHOIS database, or the claimed identity is not contained in the record. 
24. Abnormal URL: The host name in URL does not match its claimed identity (a
URL is unique in cyberspace. For a regular website, its identity is usually part
of its URL).  
25. Server Form Handler (SFH): Most e-banking websites usually contain a
server form handler. For phishing sites, the SFHs are usually a void (“about:
blank” or “ “) or refer to a different domain. 
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26. Abnormal Cookie: In a phishing site, its cookies either point to its own
domain, which is inconsistent with the claimed identity, or point to the real site,
which is inconsistent with its own domain. 
27. Distinguished Names (DN) Certificate: In many phishing attacks, the
Distinguished Names (DN) in their certificates is inconsistent with the claimed
identities. 
 
 
4.4 The Phishing Website Detection Design Methodology  
 
 
The technique of the model involves the fuzzification of input variables that is based on
the 27 phishing website characteristics and factors (previously extracted from our
implemented phishing website case-studies experiments, anti-phishing tools and surveys
which are mentioned and analyzed in Chapter 3) , rule evaluation, aggregation of the
rule outputs, and defuzzification technique as shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The four steps of inference fuzzy system 
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The model consists of four phases. We will explain each phase in more detail to fully
understand its function and output, and how it is connected with the other phases, to
produce the final desired output. 
 
  
4.4.1 Fuzzification 
 
This is the process of generating membership values for a fuzzy variable using
membership functions. The first step is to take the crisp inputs from the 27
characteristics and factors which stamp the forged phishing website and determine the
degree to which these inputs belong to each appropriate fuzzy set. This crisp input is
always a numeric value limited to the universe of discourse. Once the crisp inputs are
obtained, they are fuzzified against the appropriate linguistic fuzzy sets. The fuzzy
detection model provides more thorough definitions for each factor and its interactions
with other factors. This approach will provide a decision tool for identifying phishing
websites. 
The essential advantage offered by fuzzy logic techniques is the use of linguistic
variables to represent key phishing characteristic indicators and the relation of phishing
website probability. In this step, linguistic descriptors such as High, Low, and Medium
are assigned to a range of values for each key phishing characteristic indicator. Since
these descriptors will form the basis for capturing expert inputs based on the impact of
Key Phishing Characteristic Indicators on the Phishing Website, it is important to
calibrate them to how they are commonly interpreted by the experts providing input. 
 
The valid ranges of inputs are considered and divided into classes, or fuzzy sets. For
example, length of URL address can range from ‘low’ to ‘high’ with other values in
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between. We cannot specify clear boundaries between classes. The degree of
belongingness of the values of variables to any selected class is called the degree of
membership; a membership function is designed for each phishing characteristic
indicator, which is a curve that defines how each point in the input space is mapped to a
membership value (or degree of membership) between [0, 1]. Linguistic values are
assigned to each phishing indicator as Low, Moderate and High and for phishing
website risk rate as Legitimate, Suspicious and Phishy (triangular and trapezoidal 
membership function). For each input the values range from 0 to 10 while, for output,
they range from 0 to 100. 
 
An example of the linguistic descriptors used to represent one of the key phishing
characteristic indicators (URL Address Length) and a plot of the fuzzy membership
functions are shown in Figure 4.2 below. The x-axis in each plot represents the range of
possible values for the corresponding key phishing characteristic indicators (Low, 
Moderate and High). The y-axis represents the degree to which a value for the key
phishing characteristic indicators is represented by the linguistic descriptor. 
 
For example, and as we can see in the plot of the membership function for URL
Address Length, 4.5 cm is considered ‘Low’ with a membership of 30% and is also
considered ‘Moderate’ with a membership of 65%. The fact that 4.5 cm URL Address
Length is considered both Low and Moderate to varying degrees is a distinguishing
feature of fuzzy logic, as opposed to binary logic which artificially imposes black-and-
white constraints. The fuzzy representation more closely matches human cognition,
thereby facilitating expert input and more reliably representing experts’ understanding
of underlying dynamics (Bridges and Vaughn, 2001). 
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Figure 4.2: Input variable for URL Address Length component 
 
 
URL Address Length – Low, Moderate, High. 
Linguistic Variable: URL Address Length 
Linguistic value  Numerical Range 
Low    [0, 0, 3, 5] 
Moderate   [3, 5, 7] 
High    [5, 7, 10, 10] 
 
 
Another example of the linguistic descriptors used to represent key phishing
characteristic indicators is the Pop-Up Windows feature. If the website has two
hyperlinks with pop-up windows asking for user credentials, then it is considered ‘Low’
with a membership of 50 % and is also considered ‘Moderate’ with a membership of
50%. 
Pop-Up Windows – Low, Moderate, High. 
Linguistic Variable: Pop-Up Windows 
Linguistic value  Numerical Range 
Low    [0, 0, 1, 3] 
Moderate   [1, 3, 5] 
High    [3, 5, 10, 10] 
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The ranges for this fuzzy variable were specified depending on the high risks that
accompany this particular phishing feature. We cannot allow for too many pop-up
windows asking for vital information that can be used for phishing purposes. That’s
why we decide to put a very small fuzzy set range for fuzzy values "Low" and
"Moderate" to mitigate these kinds of phishing risks. 
 
The same approach is used to calibrate all the other key phishing website characteristic
indicators. The ranges of their fuzzy variables are derived and tuned from a series of
phishing experiments with case-studies, surveys and expert knowledge. 
 
4.4.2 Fuzzy Rule Evaluation 
 
This is the second step where the fuzzified inputs are applied to the antecedents of the
fuzzy rules. Since the fuzzy rule has multiple antecedents, the fuzzy operator (AND or
OR) is used to obtain a single number that represents the result of the antecedent
evaluation. We apply the AND fuzzy operation (intersection) to evaluate the
conjunction of the rule antecedents. 
 
Having specified the risk associated with the phishing website and its key phishing
characteristic indicators, the next logical step is to specify how the phishing website
probability varies as a function of the Key Phishing Characteristic Indicators. Experts
provide fuzzy rules in the form of if…then statements that relate phishing website
probability to various levels of key phishing characteristic indicators based on their
knowledge and experience. 
 
Phishing website experiments, anti-phishing tool analysis, web surveys, and detailed
phishing questionnaires were used to find and evaluate all factors and features of
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phishing websites, with all their relationships and associations with one another. This
helped us greatly as experts in creating the phishing website fuzzy rules. 
 
4.4.3 Aggregation of the Rule Outputs  
 
This is the process of unification of the outputs of all the rules. In other words, we are
combining the membership functions of all the rules’ consequents previously scaled into
single fuzzy sets (output). Thus, input of the aggregation process is the list of scaled
consequent membership functions, and the output is one fuzzy set for each output
variable. 
 
4.4.4 Defuzzification 
 
This is the last step in the fuzzy inference process, where a fuzzy output of a fuzzy
inference system is transformed into a crisp output. Fuzziness helps to evaluate the
rules, but the final output of this system has to be a crisp number. The input for the
defuzzification process is the aggregate output fuzzy set and the output is a number.
This step was done using the Centroid technique because it is the most commonly-used 
method of defuzzification (Cox, 2001). 
 
The output is the phishing website risk rate and is defined in fuzzy sets like ‘phishy’ to
‘legitimate’. The fuzzy output set is then defuzzified to arrive at a scalar value as shown
in Figure 4.3. 
 
Linguistic Variable: Phishing Website Risk Rate   
Linguistic value  Numerical Range 
Legitimate    [0, 0, 30, 50] 
Suspicious   [30, 50, 70] 
Phishy   [50, 70, 100] 
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Figure 4.3: Output variable for phishing website rate 
 
 
 Phishy: High guarantee that the website is a forged phishing website, which will hack
all user personal information and passwords, with dangerous or catastrophic
consequences. 
 
Suspicious: There is reasonable doubt about the legitimacy of the website and there
should be some kind of caution in dealing with this website, because it could have risky
consequences.  
 
Legitimate: High guarantee that the website is a legal, genuine website, and there is no
reason to say otherwise. It can be used safely.  
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4.5 Fuzzy Logic Phishing Detection Model  
 
 
In this phishing fuzzy model, we categorize the 27 phishing website characteristics and
factors into six different criteria based on their attack type and source. After that, we
ranked and weighted the characteristic features in each criteria based on their
importance, influence, effectiveness and complexity before considering those in the
fuzzy learning process. We have undertaken the grouping process to simplify the fuzzy
model since dealing with the 27 website phishing features as a whole can make the
fuzzy rule evaluation very complicated and time-consuming. 
 
We grouped and categorized these 27 phishing website features and factors into six
criteria (URL & Domain Identity, Security & Encryption, Source Code & Java script,
Page Style & Contents, Web Address Bar and Social Human Factor). Each criterion has
its own fitted phishing feature criteria. A layering process was also implemented in
these phishing website features to enhance and improve the final phishing website risk
rate fuzzy output. Table 4.1 represents detailed information on grouping the phishing
website features into specific criteria and their association-related layers based on the
types of phishing source and nature. The weights assigned to those are according to
their effectiveness and influence. 
 
The architecture of the fuzzy logic inference-based phishing website risk rate detection
model is shown in Figure 4.4. As can be shown from the structure figure, the final
output website phishing result for this fuzzy model depends on evaluating the fuzzy
outputs of the three layers and then combining those for the final result. 
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Table 4.1: Components and layers of phishing website criteria 
 
 
Criteria No. Component Layer No. 
1 Using the IP Address 
2 Abnormal Request URL 
3 Abnormal URL of Anchor 
4 Abnormal DNS Record 
URL & Domain 
Identity 
 
(Weight = 0.3) 
5 Abnormal URL 
 
Layer One 
 
 
Sub weight = 0.3 
1 Using SSL Certificate 
2 Certification Authority 
3 Abnormal Cookie 
Security &
Encryption 
 
(Weight = 0.2) 
 
4 Distinguished Names Certificate(DN) 
1 Redirect Pages 
2 Straddling Attack 
3 Pharming Attack 
4 Using onMouseOver to Hide the Link 
Source Code &
Java script 
 
(Weight = 0.2) 
 5 Server Form Handler (SFH) 
 
Layer Two 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub weight = 0.4 
1 Spelling Errors 
2 Copying Website 
3 Using Forms with “Submit” Button 
4 Using Pop-Ups Windows 
Page Style & 
Contents 
 
(Weight =0.1) 
 5 Disabling Right-Click 
1 Long URL Address 
2 Replacing Similar Characters for URL  
3 Adding Prefix or Suffix 
4 Using the @ Symbol to Confuse 
Web Address
Bar 
 
(Weight = 0.1) 
 5 Using Hexadecimal Character Codes 
1 Much Emphasis on Security and Response 
2 Public Generic Salutation 
Social Human 
Factor 
(Weight = 0.1) 3 Buying Time to Access Accounts 
 
 
 
Layer Three 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub weight = 0.3 
Total Weight 1 
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Using the IP Address
Abnormal Request URL
Abnormal URL of Anchor URL & Domain Identity
Abnormal DNS Record
Abnormal URL
Anomalous SSL Certificate
Conflicting Certification Authority
Abnormal Cookie Security & Encryption
Inconsistent Distinguished Names (DN)
Redirect Pages Layer Two
Straddling Attack
Pharming Attack Source Code Java Script
Using onMouseOver to Hide the Link
Server Form Handler (SFH)
Website Phishing
Rate
Spelling Errors
Copying Website
Using Forms with “Submit ” Button Page Style & Contents
Using Pop-Ups Windows
Disabling Right-Click
Long URL Address
Replacing Similar Characters for URL 
Adding Prefix or Suffix Web Address Bar Layer Three
Using the @ Symbol to Confuse
Using Hexadecimal Character Codes
 Emphasis on Security and Response
 Public Generic Salutation Social Human Factor
Buying Time to Access Accounts
 
 
Figure 4.4: Architecture of the phishing detection fuzzy modelling system  
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 78 
 
4.6 System Design  
 
Detecting phishing website risk rate is performed based on six criteria: URL & Domain
Identity, Security & Encryption, Source Code & Java script, Page Style & Contents,
Web Address Bar and Social Human Factor. There are also a different number of
components for each criterion, such as five components for URL & Domain Identity,
Source Code & Java script, Page Style & Contents and Web Address Bar, four
components for Security & Encryption, and three components for Social Human Factor.
Therefore, there are twenty-seven components in total. 
 
There are three layers in this phishing website fuzzy model. The first layer contains only
URL & Domain Identity criteria with a weight equal to 0.3 according to its importance;
the second layer contains Security & Encryption criteria and Source Code & Java script
criteria with a weight equal to 0.2 each; the third layer contains Page Style & Contents
criteria, Web Address Bar criteria And Social Human Factor criteria with a weight equal
to 0.1 each. Depending on this fuzzy logic layered architecture model we can calculate
the final phishing fuzzy output result as: 
 
Phishing Website Risk Rating = 0.3 * URL & Domain Identity crisp [First
layer] + ((0.2 * Security & Encryption crisp)+(0.2 * Source Code & Java
script crisp)) [Second layer] + ((0.1 * Page Style & Contents crisp) +(0.1 * 
Web Address Bar crisp) + (0.1 * Social Human Factor crisp)) [Third layer]  
 
 
4.7 Fuzzy Rule Base 
 
All fuzzy rules implemented in our proposed detection model were derived based on our
own phishing background experience and expert knowledge supported by a series of
experimental phishing scenarios with case-studies. Next we will show all fuzzy rules for
all phishing website criteria and layers. 
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4.7.1 The Rule Base1 for Layer 1 
 
The rule base has five input parameters and one output. The rule contains all the “IF-
THEN” rules of the system. For each entry of the rule base, each component is assumed
to be one of the three values and each criterion has five components. Therefore, the rule
base 1-1 contains (35) = 243 entries. The output of rule base 1-1 is one of the phishing
website risk rate fuzzy sets (Genuine, Doubtful or Fraud) representing URL & Domain
Identity criteria phishing risk rate. A sample of the structure and the entries of the rule
base 1-1 for layer 1 are shown in Table 4.2. The system structure for URL & Domain
Identity criteria is the joining of its five components (Using the IP Address, Abnormal
Request URL, Abnormal URL of Anchor, Abnormal DNS record and Abnormal URL),
which produces the URL & Domain Identity criteria (Layer one) as shown in Figure
4.5. Further, the three-dimensional plots of this system structure are shown in Figure 4.6 
using MATLAB.  
 
Table 4.2: Sample of rule base1-1 entries for URL & Domain Identity criteria 
 
Rule 
# 
(comp. 1) 
Using the 
IP Address 
(comp. 2) 
Abnormal 
Request URL 
(comp. 3) 
Abnormal 
URL Anchor 
(comp. 4) 
Abnormal 
DNS record 
(comp. 5) 
Abnormal 
URL 
URL & Domain 
Identity  Criteria 
Phishing Risk 
(Layer one) 
1 Low Low Low Low Low Genuine 
2 Low Low Low Low Moderate Genuine 
3 Low Low Low Moderate Moderate Doubtful 
4 Low Low Low Moderate High Doubtful  
5 Low Low Moderate Moderate High Fraud  
6 Low Moderate Moderate Low High Fraud 
7 Moderate Low High Moderate High Fraud 
8 High Moderate Low Low Low Doubtful 
9 Low High Low Low Moderate Doubtful 
10 High Moderate High High Low Fraud 
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Figure 4.5: System structure for URL & Domain Identity criteria 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Three-dimensional plot for URL & Domain Identity criteria 
 
4.7.2 The Rule Base for Layer 2 
In Layer 2, there are two inputs, Security & Encryption and Source Code & Java script,
and one output. The system structure for Security & Encryption criteria is the joining of
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its four components (Using SSL certificate, Certification authority, Abnormal Cookie
and Distinguished Names Certificate(DN)) using rule base 2-1, which produces Security
& Encryption criteria. The system structure for Source Code & Java script criteria is the
joining of its five components (Redirect pages, Straddling attack, Pharming Attack,
Using onMouseOver to hide the Link and Server Form Handler (SFH)) using Rule base
2-2, which produces Source Code & Java script criteria. 
 
Table 4.3 shows a sample of the rule base 2-1 for Security & Encryption criteria using 
its four components. 
 
Table 4.3: Sample of rule base 2-1 entries for Security & Encryption criteria 
 
Rule 
# 
(comp. 1) 
Using SSL 
Certificate 
(comp. 2) 
Certification 
Authority 
(comp. 3) 
Abnormal 
Cookie 
(comp. 4) 
Distinguished 
Names 
Certificate 
Security & 
Encryption Criteria 
Phishing Risk 
 
1 Low Low Low Low Genuine 
2 Low Moderate Low Low Genuine 
3 Moderate Low Low Moderate Doubtful 
4 Low Moderate Low Moderate Doubtful  
5 Low Low Moderate Moderate Fraud  
6 Low Moderate Moderate Low Doubtful 
7 Moderate Low High Moderate Fraud 
8 High Moderate Low Low Doubtful 
9 Low High Low Low Fraud 
10 High Moderate High High Fraud 
 
The structure and the entries of the rule base for layer 2 are illustrated in Table 4.4. The
system structure for layer 2 is the combination of two phishing website criteria (Security
& Encryption and Source Code & Java script), which produces rule base 2 as shown in
Figure 4.7, and its three-dimensional plots are shown in Figure 4.8 using MATLAB.
The rule base contains (32) = 9 entries and the output of rule base 2 is one of the
phishing website risk rate fuzzy sets (Legal, Uncertain or Fake) representing layer two
criteria phishing website risk rate. 
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Table 4.4: Rule base 2 structure and entries for layer two 
 
Rule # 
Security & 
Encryption 
Source Code & Java
script 
Phishing  Risk 
(Layer Two) 
1 Genuine Genuine Legal 
2 Genuine Doubtful Legal 
3 Genuine Fraud Uncertain 
4 Doubtful Genuine Legal 
5 Doubtful Doubtful Uncertain 
6 Doubtful Fraud Uncertain 
7 Fraud Genuine Uncertain 
8 Fraud Doubtful Uncertain 
9 Fraud Fraud Fake 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: System structure for layer two 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Three-dimensional plot for layer two 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 83 
4.7.3 The Rule Base for Layer 3 
In layer 3, there are three inputs, Page Style & Contents, Web Address Bar and Social 
Human Factor, and one output. The system structure for Page Style & Contents criteria
is the joining of its five components (Spelling errors, Copying website, Using forms
with “Submit” button, Using Pop-Up windows and Disabling Right-Click) using Rule
base 3-1, which produces Page Style & Contents criteria. The system structure for Web
Address Bar criteria is the joining of its five components (Long URL address,
Replacing similar characters for URL, Adding a prefix or suffix, Using the @ Symbol
to Confuse and Using Hexadecimal Character Codes) using Rule base 3-2, which
produces Web Address Bar criteria. The system structure for Social Human Factor
criteria is the joining of its three components (Much emphasis on security and response,
Public generic salutation and Buying Time to Access Accounts) using Rule base 3-3,
which produces Social Human Factor criteria. 
 
Table 4.5 shows a sample of the rule base 3-3 for Social Human Factor criteria using its
three components. 
 
Table 4.5: Sample of rule base 3-3 entries for Social Human Factor criteria 
 
Rule 
# 
(comp. 1) 
Much Emphasis 
on Security and 
Response 
(comp. 2) 
Public Generic 
Salutation 
(comp. 3) 
Buying Time 
to Access 
Accounts 
Social Human 
Factor 
 Criteria Phishing 
Risk 
1 Low Low Low Genuine 
2 Low Moderate Low Genuine 
3 Moderate Low Moderate Doubtful 
4 Low Moderate Low Doubtful  
5 Moderate Low Moderate Doubtful 
6 Moderate Moderate Moderate Fraud 
7 Moderate Low Low Doubtful 
8 High Moderate High Fraud 
9 Low High Low Fraud 
10 High Moderate High Fraud 
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A sample of the structure and the entries of the rule base for layer 3 are shown in Table
4.6. The system structure for layer 3 is the combination of Page Style & Contents, Web
Address Bar and Social Human Factor, which produces rule base 3 as shown in Figure
4.9. The three-dimensional plots of this structure are shown in Figure 4.10 using
MATLAB. The rule base contains (33) = 27 entries and the output of rule base 3 is one
of the phishing website risk rate fuzzy sets (Legal, Uncertain or Fake) representing
Layer Three criteria phishing risk rate. 
 
Table 4.6: Rule base3 structure and entries for layer three 
 
Rule 
# 
Page Style & 
Contents 
Web Address 
Bar 
Social Human
Factor 
Phishing  Risk 
(Layer Three) 
 
1 Genuine Genuine Genuine Legal 
2 Genuine Doubtful Fraud Uncertain 
3 Genuine Fraud Fraud Fake 
4 Doubtful Genuine Genuine Legal 
5 Doubtful Doubtful Doubtful Uncertain 
6 Doubtful Fraud Doubtful Uncertain 
7 Fraud Genuine Genuine Legal 
8 Fraud Doubtful Doubtful Uncertain 
9 Fraud Fraud Fraud Fake 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: System Structure for Layer Three 
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Figure 4.10: Three-dimensional plots for layer three 
 
 
 
4.7.4 The Rule Base for Final Phishing Website Risk Rate 
In the phishing website rule base last phase, there are three inputs, layer one, layer two
and layer three, and one output identifying the risk rate of the phishing website. The
structure and the entries of the rule base for phishing website risk rate are shown in
Table 4.7. The system structure for the fuzzy detection model is the combination of
layer one, layer two and layers three, which produces the final phishing website rule
base as shown in Figure 4.11. The three-dimensional plots of this structure are shown in
Figure 4.12 using MATLAB. The rule base contains (33) = 27 entries and the output of
final phishing website rule base is one of the final output fuzzy sets (Legitimate,
Suspicious, Phishy) representing the final phishing website risk rate. 
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Table 4.7: Rule base structure and entries for the final phishing website risk rate 
 
 
Rule  
URL & Domain Identity 
(Layer one ) 
Layer Two Layer Three Final Phishing 
Website Risk Rate 
1 Genuine Legal Legal Legitimate 
2 Genuine Legal Uncertain Legitimate 
3 Genuine Legal Fake Suspicious 
4 Genuine Uncertain Legal Suspicious 
5 Genuine Uncertain Uncertain Suspicious 
6 Genuine Uncertain Fake Phishy 
7 Genuine Fake Legal Suspicious 
8 Genuine Fake Uncertain Phishy 
9 Genuine Fake Fake Phishy 
10 Doubtful Legal Legal Legitimate 
11 Doubtful Legal Uncertain Suspicious 
12 Doubtful Legal Fake Phishy 
13 Doubtful Uncertain Legal Suspicious 
14 Doubtful Uncertain Uncertain Suspicious 
15 Doubtful Uncertain Fake Phishy 
16 Doubtful Fake Legal Phishy 
17 Doubtful Fake Uncertain Phishy 
18 Doubtful Fake Fake Phishy 
19 Fraud Legal Legal Suspicious 
20 Fraud Legal Uncertain Suspicious 
21 Fraud Legal Fake Phishy 
22 Fraud Uncertain Legal Suspicious 
23 Fraud Uncertain Uncertain Suspicious 
24 Fraud Uncertain Fake Phishy 
25 Fraud Fake Legal Phishy 
26 Fraud Fake Uncertain Phishy 
27 Fraud Fake Fake Phishy 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11: System structure for final phishing website risk rate 
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Figure 4.12: Three-dimensional plots for final phishing website risk rate 
 
 
 
4.8 Experiments and Evaluation Results 
 
 
The aggregated surface of the rule evaluation is defuzzified using the Mamdani method
(Liu, et al., 2005) to find the Centre Of Gravity (COG). Centroid defuzzification
technique shown in Equation (1) can be expressed as: 
 
 
∫
∫
= dxx
dxxx
X
i
i )(
)(
* μ
μ
    Equation (1) 
Where x* is the defuzzified output, µi(x) is the aggregated membership function and x 
is the output variable.  
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The proposed Phishing website detection system has been implemented in MATLAB
6.5. The results of some input combinations are listed in Tables 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 
4.12, 4.13.  
When all phishing website risk criteria represented by the three layers have zero inputs,
which points to a Low phishing indicator as represented by the linguistic value, the final
phishing website risk rate will be very low (13.8%), representing [legitimate website] as
shown in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.13, respectively. 
 
Further, when all phishing website risk criteria represented by the three layers have 10
input values, which points to a High phishing indicator as represented by the linguistic
value, the final phishing website risk rating will be very high (86.2 %), representing
[phishy website] as shown in Table 4.9, which means that the website is undoubtedly a
forged phishing website which is used for phishing users and clients to obtain their bank
accounts, passwords, credit card numbers, or other important information leading to
catastrophic consequences. 
 
Meanwhile, a final phishing website risk rating will be balanced (50%), representing
[suspicious website], when Layer one (URL & Domain Identity) of the phishing
website risk criteria has 10 input values, which points to a High phishing indicator as
represented by the linguistic value, and all other layers have the value of zero inputs as
shown in Table 4.10 and Figure 4.14, respectively. The same result can be achieved and
shown in Table 4.11 when all phishing website risk criteria represented by the three
layers have middle (5) input values, which points to a Moderate phishing indicator as
represented by the linguistic value. These results shows the significance and importance
of the phishing website criteria (URL & Domain Identity) represented by layer one,
especially when compared to the other criteria and layers.  
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Table 4.12 shows that, when Layer one and Layer two of the phishing website risk
criteria have middle (5) input values, pointing to a Moderate phishing indicator as
represented by the linguistic value, and the third Layer has the value of 10 input values,
pointing to a High phishing indicator as represented by the linguistic value, the final
phishing website risk rating will be reasonably high (65%), representing [phishy
website]. This result clearly shows that, even if some of the phishing website
characteristics are not very clear or are not definite, the website can still be phishy,
especially when other phishing characteristics can be clearly identified. 
 
Table 4.13 shows that, when Layer one of the phishing website risk criteria (URL &
Domain Identity) has middle (5) input values, pointing to a Moderate phishing indicator
as represented by the linguistic value, and all the other Layers have the value of zero
input values, pointing to a Low phishing indicator as represented by the linguistic value,
the final phishing website risk rating will be reasonably low (35%), representing a
[legitimate website]. This result clearly shows that, even if we were able to identify
some of phishing website characteristics, the website can still be safe and legitimate,
especially when other phishing characteristics cannot be clearly recognized. 
 
The results also indicate that the worst phishing website rate equals 86.2% and the best
phishing website rate is 13.8%, rather than a full range, i.e. 0 to 100, because of the
fuzzification process. 
 
Table 4.8: All lowest (0) inputs for layer one, layer two, and layer three  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Layer Two Layer Three Comp 
 
Layer One 
URL & Domain 
Identity Security & 
Encryption 
Source 
Code & 
Java script 
Page Style 
& Contents 
Web 
Address Bar 
Social 
Human 
Factor 
% Phishing  
Website Risk 
Rating 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0  
5 0  0 0 0  
 
13.8% 
Legitimate 
Website 
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Figure 4.13: Rule viewer for final phishing website risk rate. Lowest (0) inputs for all
layers criteria  
 
Table 4.9: All highest (10) inputs for all three layers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.10: Five highest (10) for layer one (URL & Domain Identity) and all others
lowest (0)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Layer Two Layer Three Comp 
 
Layer One 
URL & 
Domain 
Identity   
Security & 
Encryption 
Source 
Code & 
Java script 
Page Style 
& Contents 
Web 
Address Bar 
Social 
Human 
Factor 
% Phishing  
Website Risk 
Rating 
1 10 0 0 0 0 0 
2 10 0 0 0 0 0 
3 10 0 0 0 0 0 
4 10 0 0 0 0  
5 10  0 0 0  
 
50% 
Suspicious 
Website 
 
Layer Two Layer Three Comp 
 
Layer One 
URL & 
Domain 
Identity   
Security & 
Encryption 
Source 
Code & 
Java script 
Page Style 
& Contents 
Web 
Address Bar 
Social 
Human 
Factor 
% Phishing 
Website Risk  
Rating 
1 10 10 10 10 10 10 
2 10 10 10 10 10 10 
3 10 10 10 10 10 10 
4 10 10 10 10 10  
5 10  10 10 10  
 
86.2 
Phishy 
Website 
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Figure 4.14: Rule viewer for final phishing website risk rate. Five highest (10) inputs  
for criteria (URL & Domain Identity) and all others lowest (0) inputs  
 
Table 4.11: Middle (5) inputs for all three layers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.12: Five middle (5) inputs for layer one and layer two and highest (10) inputs
for layer three  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Table 4.13: Five middle (5) inputs for layer one (URL & Domain Identity) and all
others lowest (0) inputs  
 
 
 
 
Layer Two Layer Three Comp 
 
Layer One 
URL & 
Domain 
Identity   
Security & 
Encryption 
Source 
Code & 
Java script 
Page Style 
& Contents 
Web 
Address Bar 
Social 
Human 
Factor 
% Phishing  
Website Risk 
Rating 
1 5 5 5 10 10 10 
2 5 5 5 10 10 10 
3 5 5 5 10 10 10 
4 5 5 5 10 10  
5 5  5 10 10  
 
65% 
Phishy 
Website 
 
Layer Two Layer Three Comp 
 
Layer One 
URL & 
Domain 
Identity   
Security & 
Encryption 
Source 
Code & 
Java script 
Page Style 
& Contents 
Web 
Address Bar 
Social 
Human 
Factor 
% Phishing  
Website Risk 
Rating 
1 5 0 0 0 0 0 
2 5 0 0 0 0 0 
3 5 0 0 0 0 0 
4 5 0 0 0 0  
5 5  0 0 0  
 
35% 
Legitimate 
Website 
 
Layer Two Layer Three Comp 
 
Layer One 
URL & 
Domain 
Identity   
Security & 
Encryption 
Source 
Code & 
Java script 
Page Style 
& Contents 
Web 
Address Bar 
Social 
Human 
Factor 
% Phishing  
Website Risk 
Rating 
1 5 5 5 5 5 5 
2 5 5 5 5 5 5 
3 5 5 5 5 5 5 
4 5 5 5 5 5  
5 5  5 5 5  
 
50% 
Suspicious 
Website 
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To validate these results, we implemented these fuzzy rules used for the fuzzy inference
engine on a sample of 120 different e-banking websites drawn from the public 
benchmark Phishtank archive data (Phishtank, 2008), distributed as 60 phishing
websites, 35 suspicious websites and 25 legitimate websites. The results show that
there are good numbers of false positive and false negative signs for all legitimate,
suspicious and phishing websites, indicating a rather high website misclassification rate.  
 
Table 4.14: Results of website legitimacy decision using fuzzy-based detection model  
 
Decision 
Website
Legitimacy 
Legitimate Suspicious Phishy 
Legitimate
Website 
18 4 3 
Suspicious
Website 
6 24 5 
Phishing
Website 
9 8 43 
 
 
For example, and as shown in Table 4.14, there were 7 legitimate websites
misclassified as suspicious or phishy websites, and 17 phishing websites misclassified
as legitimate or suspicious websites. 
 
These results were expected, since all fuzzy phishing rules were extracted only from
human expert knowledge and background experience, which cannot guarantee a high
precision in the rules’ validity. This emphasises the need to look for more efficient
methods to extract from and mine these rules in an intelligent way to achieve a more
precise and accurate results output. This will be presented in the following chapter of
this research.  
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4.9 Improving Our Fuzzy-Based Phishing Detection Model  
 
 
The fuzzy phishing website detection system requires human experts to determine the
fuzzy sets and set of fuzzy rules which allow us to easily construct if-then rules that 
reflect common ways of describing and detecting phishing websites’ characteristics and
attacks. These tasks are time-consuming. However, if the fuzzy rules are automatically
generated, less time would be consumed in building a good phishing website
characteristic classifier and the development time for building or updating phishing
website classifiers would be shortened by reducing the human intervention. 
 
In the following chapter we will propose and develop a prototype intelligent fuzzy
phishing detection system to demonstrate the effectiveness of data mining techniques
that utilise fuzzy logic. This system should combine two distinct website phishing
detection approaches: 
 
 1) Website phishing detection using fuzzy data mining techniques, and 
 2) Website phishing detection using traditional rule-based expert system techniques.  
 
The first approach components look for deviations from stored patterns of normal
phishing behaviour. The second approach looks for previously described patterns of 
behaviour that are likely to indicate phishing. Both websites’ contents and system audit
data are used as inputs. 
 
Our aim next is to demonstrate that the fuzzy data mining technique provides an
effective means to learn and become alert, based on patterns extracted from large
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amounts of data, and to demonstrate that the integration of fuzzy logic with the data
mining techniques enables an improved performance over similar techniques. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
Fuzzy-Based Classification Mining Intelligent Model
for Phishing Website Detection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
In the first half of this chapter, we will introduce and investigate well-known traditional 
classification approaches and Associative Classification machine-learning techniques.
We will also review well-known traditional classification approaches to introduce
association rule discovery and classification tasks in data mining. 
 
In the second part of this chapter, we will propose a dynamic, resilient Intelligent
System model, based on a specific AI approach to phishing website detection. The
technique that is being investigated includes fuzzy logic with a supervised machine
learning approach, which uses simple data mining associative classification techniques
to process the phishing data features and patterns. The proposed system automates the
fuzzy rules production by using the extracted classification rules, which are produced by
using associative classification algorithms and techniques. These fuzzy rules allow us to
construct ‘if-then’ rules that reflect the relationships between the different phishing
characteristics and features and their association with one another for the final phishing
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website detection rate. In other words, we are interested in designing, developing and
evaluating a resilient and effective Intelligent Phishing Detection System with a
technique that is capable of identifying indications for phishing websites tracks, and
classifying individual web pages to determine whether they are legitimate, suspicious or
phishing websites. The model should be precise and adaptable; it should also have a
real-time application, and reduce error rates and false alarms. We believe that this
machine learning model will expose most of deceptions, tricks and schemes used by
phishers today. 
 
5.2 Classification in Data Mining 
 
 
Data mining and knowledge discovery techniques have been applied to several areas
including market analysis, industrial retail, decision support and financial analysis.
Knowledge Discovery from Databases (KDD) (Fayyad, et al., 1998) involves data
mining as one of its main phases to discover useful patterns. 
 
The data mining task is to generate all association rules in the database, which have a
support greater than min sup, i.e., the rules are frequent, and which also have confidence 
greater than min conf, i.e., the rules are strong. Here we are interested in rules with a
specific item, called the class, as a consequent, i.e., we mine rules of the form A → ci 
where ci is a class attribute (1 ≤/i≤/k) (Qaddoum, 2009). This technique is called
classification./ 
 
The goal of classification is to build a model (a set of rules) from a labelled training data 
set, in order to classify new data objects, known as test data objects, as accurately as
possible. Classification in data mining is a two-step process, where in the first step; a
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classification algorithm is used to learn the rules from a training data set. The second
step involves using the rules extracted in the first step to predict classes of test objects. 
There are many classification approaches for extracting knowledge from data such as
divide-and-conquer (Quinlan, 1987a), separate-and-conquer (Furnkranz, 1999) (also
known as rule induction), covering (Cendrowska, 1987) and statistical approaches
(Duda and Hart, 1973; Meretakis and Wüthrich, 1999). The divide-and-conquer
approach starts by selecting an attribute as a root node using information gain (Quinlan,
1979), and then it makes a branch for each possible level of that attribute. This will split
the training instances into subsets, one for each possible value of the attribute. The same
process is repeated until all instances that fall in one branch have the same classification
or the remaining instances cannot split any further. The separate-and-conquer approach
on the other hand, starts by building up the rules in a greedy fashion, one by one. After a
rule is found, all instances covered by the rule are removed and the same process is
repeated until the best rule found that has a large error rate. Statistical approaches such
as Naïve Bayes (Duda and Hart, 1973) computes probabilities of classes in the training
data set using the frequency of attribute values associated with them in order to classify
test instances. Other approaches such as covering algorithms select each of the available
classes in the training data in turn, and look for a way of covering the most of training
instances to that class in order to come up with high accuracy rules. 
 
Numerous algorithms are based on these approaches such as decision trees (Quinlan,
1986; Quinlan, 1993; Quinlan, 1998), PART (Frank and Witten, 1998), RIPPER
(Cohen, 1995), Prism (Cendrowska, 1987) and others.  
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5.3 Common Classification Techniques 
 
5.3.1 Decision Trees (C4.5 Algorithm) 
A popular approach for classification and prediction is that of decision trees (Quinlan,
1979; Quinlan, 1986; Quinlan, 1998). A common example of a decision tree is the
twenty questions game, where one thinks of a common thing that is known by all the
participants in the game. Participants start asking questions, usually up to twenty, in
order to guess the identity of that thing. Most often, a good player seldom needs to ask
all the questions. In that game, the decision tree represents the series of the questions in
which the answer of the first question determines the next question to be asked and so
on. In constructing a decision tree, a candidate record will enter the root node, and a
branch for each possible value for the candidate is built. The same process is applied
recursively until all the records in a node end up with the same class or the tree cannot
be split any further (Quinlan, 1979). The selection of the candidate attribute to split the
data on is a crucial task, since it effects the distribution of classes in each branch. This
process can be implemented in various ways based on the algorithm in use. After the
tree has been constructed, each path from the root node to each of the leaf nodes
represents a rule. The antecedent of the rule is given by the path from the root node to
the leaf node, and the consequent is the majority class that is assigned by the leaf node. 
Several pruning methods are used to simplify the rules and to discard unnecessary ones.
Pruning the tree will involve either replacing some sub-trees with leaf nodes (subtree
replacement) or raising some nodes to replace the nodes higher in the tree (sub-tree
rising) (Quinlan, 1993). Both of these operations are examples of post-pruning 
techniques (Witten and Frank, 2000).  
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5.3.2 Rule Induction and Covering Approach (RIPPER) 
 
Repeated Incremental Pruning to Produce Error Reduction algorithm (RIPPER) is a rule
induction algorithm that has been developed by Cohen (Cohen, 1995). RIPPER builds
the rules set as follows: The training data set is divided into two sets, a pruning set and a
growing set. RIPPER constructs the classifier using these two sets by repeatedly
inserting rules starting from an empty rule set. The rule-growing algorithm starts with
an empty rule, and heuristically adds one condition at a time until the rule has no error
rate on the growing set. In fact, RIPPER is a refined version of the IREP algorithm that
adds some modifications. First, a new stopping condition for generating rules has been
introduced. IREP utilises a heuristic that stops adding rules when a rule learned has an
error rate greater than 50% on the pruning data. This heuristic may stop too early
especially for application domains that hold large number of low coverage rules.
RIPPER stops adding a rule using the minimum description length principle (MDL)
(Rissanen, 1985) where after a rule is inserted, the total description length of the rules
set and the training data is estimated. If this description length is larger than the smallest
MDL obtained so far, RIPPER stops adding rules. The MDL assumes that the best
model (set of rules) of data is the one that minimises the size of the model plus the
amount of information required to identify the exceptions relative to the model (Witten
and Frank, 2000). 
 
5.3.3 PRISM  
 
Prism was developed by Cendrowska in (Cendrowska, 1987) and can be categorised as
a covering algorithm for constructing classification rules. The covering approach starts
by taking one class among the available ones in the training data set, and then it seeks a
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way of covering all instances to that class, at the same time it excludes instances not
belonging to that class. This approach usually tries to create rules with maximum
accuracy by adding one condition to the current rule antecedent. At each stage, Prism
chooses the condition that maximises the probability of the desired classification. The
process of constructing a rule terminates as soon as a stopping condition is met. Once a
rule is derived, Prism continues building rules for the current class until all instances
associated with the class are covered. Once this happens, another class is selected, and
so forth. Prism normally generates perfect rules (those with 0% error rate) and measures
the accuracy of its rules using the accuracy formula: 
 
 (P/T)          (5.1) 
 
Where P represents the number of positive examples and T represents the number of
negative examples covered by a rule. Prism has an advantage over decision trees in that
a rule can be added to the created rule set without having any impact on any existing
rules. On the other hand, adding a path to the tree structure may require reshaping the
whole tree (Witten and Frank, 2000). Though, unlike decision trees which classify an
instance using rules produced by reading them directly from the tree, independence of
the rules in Prism may suffer from problems, such as an instance may be associated
with more than one rule with different classes. 
 
5.3.4 Hybrid Approach (PART) 
 
Unlike the C4.5 and RIPPER techniques that operate in two phases, the PART
algorithm generates rules one at a time by avoiding extensive pruning (Frank and
Witten, 1998). The C4.5 algorithm employs a divide-and-conquer approach, and the
RIPPER algorithm uses a separate-and-conquer approach to derive the rules. PART
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combines both approaches to find and generate rules. It adopts separate-and-conquer to
generate a set of rules and uses divide-and-conquer to build partial decision trees. The
way PART builds and prunes a partial decision tree is similar to that of C4.5, but PART
avoids constructing a complete decision tree and builds partial decision trees. PART
differs from RIPPER in the way rules are created, where in PART, each rule
corresponds to the leaf with the largest coverage in the partial decision tree. On the
other hand, RIPPER builds the rule in a greedy fashion, starting from an empty rule, it
adds conditions, until the rule has no error rate and the process is repeated. Missing
values and pruning techniques are treated in the same way as C4.5. 
 
Experimental tests using PART, RIPPER and C4.5 on different data sets from (Merz
and Murphy, 1996) have been reported in (Frank and Witten, 1998). The results
revealed that despite the simplicity of PART, it generates sets of rules, which are as
accurate as C4.5 and more accurate (though larger) than those of RIPPER. 
 
 
5.4 Classification Based on Association (CBA) 
 
Classification and association-rule discovery are two of the most important tasks
addressed in the data mining literature. Association mining aims to discover descriptive
knowledge from databases, while classification focuses on building a classification
model for categorizing new data. Both association pattern discovery and classification
rule mining are essential to practical data mining applications. If these two relevant jobs
can be somehow integrated, great savings and conveniences to the user can be resulted.
Hence, considerable efforts have been made to integrate these two techniques into one
system. In recent years, extensive research has been carried out to integrate both
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 102 
approaches. By focusing on a limited subset of association rules, i.e. those rules where
the consequent of the rule is restricted to the class variables, it is possible to build more
accurate classifiers (Lan, et al., 2005). 
 
Association rule mining and classification are analogous tasks, with the exception that
classification’s main aim is the prediction of class labels, while association rule mining
describes associations between attribute values in a database. In the last few years,
association rule mining has been successfully used to build accurate classifiers, which
resulted in a new approach, known as Associative Classification (AC) (Ali, et al., 1997;
Liu, et al., 1998). Associative Classification (AC) is a branch in data mining that
combine’s classification and association rule mining.  
 
In other words, it utilises association rule discovery methods in classification data sets.
Several studies (Liu, et al., 1998; Li, et al., 2001; Yin and Han, 2003) provide evidence 
that AC approaches are able to extract more accurate classifiers than traditional
classification techniques, such as decision trees (Quinlan, 1993, Quinlan, 1998), rule
induction (Quinlan and Cameron-Jones, 1993; Cohen, 1995) and probabilistic (Duda
and Hart, 1973) approaches. 
 
CBA is the first algorithm using association rules for classification (Liu et al., 1998).
This algorithm generates a special subset of association rules called Class Association
Rules (CARs). The difference between association rules and CARs is the consequences
of the rules. The consequence of CARs is only limited to class label value. Thus the
form of CAR called ruleitem is X→ C where C is a set of all class labels. 
The CBA algorithm consists of two parts: a rule generator called CBA-RG and a
classifier builder called CBA-CB. For CBA-RG part, all frequent ruleitems are
generated by using the algorithm like association rule mining process. For CBA-CB 
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part, all frequent ruleitems from the CBA-RG are ranked in decreasing order according 
to the following criteria. 
 
Given two rules, ri and rj. ri is ranked higher than rj if 
1. conf(ri) > conf(rj) , or 
2. conf(ri) = conf(rj) , but sup(ri) > sup(rj) , or 
3. conf(ri) = conf(rj) and sup(ri) = sup(rj) , but ri is generated before rj. 
 
A training dataset called database consists of transactions. In process of selecting the
rules into the classifier, the algorithm iterates through each rule starting from the first
order rule to find all transactions containing all items in the antecedence of the current
rule (covered by the rule). If at least one transaction covered by the rule is classified
correctly by this rule, the rule is selected into the classifier and all of these transactions
covered the rule are removed from the database, otherwise the rule is pruned. This
process terminates when either all of rules are considered or no transactions are left in
the database. In addition, a default class is selected by the majority class in the
remaining transactions. 
 
In classifying an unseen case, that case is predicted as a class by the consequence of the
first rule covering the case. The default class is used to classify when no covering rules
in the classifier can be used (Srisawat and Kijsirikul, 2008). 
 
 
 
5.5 Heuristics Web Page Analysis  
 
 
Heuristic phishing solutions look for specific techniques and patterns used by phishers.
The techniques for analyzing website pages involve examining the properties of the web
page and all its features and patterns to distinguish between phishing, suspicious and 
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legitimate websites. Page properties are typically derived and extracted from the website
page’s contents as HTML tags, URL address and Java Script source code. Examples of
properties are the existence of password fields, SSL certificate, the number of links, and
the DNS domain name. 
 
For our study, we aimed to determine these properties and features, and their
applicability as reasonable candidates for use with the associative classification fuzzy
machine learning technique, for constructing and building a phishing websites detection
model, to distinguish between phishing, suspicious and legitimate websites. 
 
 
 
5.6 Mining Phishing Detection Data  
 
 
Data mining is the automated extraction of previously unrealized information from large
data sources for the purpose of supporting actions. The rapid development in data
mining has made available a wide variety of algorithms, drawn from the field of
statistics, pattern recognition, machine learning and databases ((Idris and Shanmugam,
2006). Association and classification rule algorithms find correlations between features
or attributes used to describe a data set. Having specified the risk associated with an e-
banking phishing website and its key phishing website characteristics and factor
indicators, the next step is to specify how the different features of the e-banking 
phishing website are related and associated with one another. Experts provide fuzzy
rules in the form of if…then statements that relate e-banking phishing website
probability to various levels of key phishing characteristic indicators based on their
knowledge and experience. On that matter, and instead of just employing an expert
system, we utilised data mining classification and association rule approaches in our
new e-banking phishing website detection model to automatically find significant
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classified rules that find and control all associations and correlations between different
patterns of phishing characteristics in the e-banking phishing website archive data.
Particularly, we used a number of different existing data mining association and
classification techniques implemented within WEKA (WEKA, 2006) and CBA
packages (Liu, et al., 1998). JRip (Witten and Frank, 2005) WEKA's implementation of
RIPPER, PART (Witten and Frank, 2005), PRISM (Cendrowska, 1987) and C4.5
(Quinlan, 1996) classification algorithms are selected to discover the relationships
between the selected different phishing features and their correlation with one another.
They were conducted using the WEKA software system, which is an open Java source
code for the data mining community that includes implementations of different methods
for several different data mining tasks such as classification, association, and regression.
Meanwhile, for the association classification algorithm, CBA were conducted using an
implementation version provided in the work by Liu, et al., (1998). We have chosen
these classification algorithms based on the different strategies they use to generate the
rules and because their learned classifiers are easily understood by humans (Ciesielski
and Lalani, 2003).  
 
 
5.7 Experimental Setup 
 
 
5.7.1 Phishing Dataset 
 
 
Two publicly available phishing datasets were used to test our implementation: The
“PhishTank” from the phishtank.com (Phishtank, 2008) and the Anti-Phishing Working 
Group(APWG) which maintains a “Phishing Archive” describing phishing attacks
(APWG, 2008). We choose them as sources of phishing and suspicious websites since
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the information from these sites is freely available and the amount of reported phishing 
sites is very large. The PhishTank database is considered one of the primary phishing-
report collators. It records the URL for the suspect website that has been reported, the
time of that report and, sometimes, further details such as screenshots of the website, as
they are publicly available. 
 
For our study, it was very necessary to collect a large number of phishing, suspicious
and legitimate pages. That’s why we managed to construct a dataset of 2178 phishing,
suspicious and legitimate websites collected between January 10, 2006 and September
15, 2008, to be used in our research study, of which 731 are phishing and 711 are
suspicious. This set of phishing and suspicious websites covers many of the newer
trends and styles in designing and developing phishing websites. It was very important
to make local copies of each phishing website using an application called Website 
eXtractor (InternetSoft, 2008), since most of them are only online for a short period of
time, and extracting all phishing characters, factors and patterns from the website
page’s contents, HTML tags, Java Script code, and URL address requires some time.  
 
We performed a cognitive walk-through on these datasets within this archive, and used
a series of short Java scripts to programmatically extract the phishing features, storing
these in an excel sheet for quick reference as shown in Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3
and Figure 5.4 as examples. 
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Figure 5.1: Sample of extracted e-banking phishing websites with its links and details 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Linguistic values for phishing features related to web address bar criteria 
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Figure 5.3: Linguistic values for phishing criteria related to layer three 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Linguistic values of the three layers for the final phishing website detection
rate 
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For the legitimate portion of the dataset, we used 736 websites collected from very
popular official internet banking websites and other financial institutions’ websites such
as Bank of America, Citi Bank, HSBC Bank, Yorkshire Bank, Barclays Bank, Bank of
Jordan, Ahli bank, Gulf Bank and many others. Hence, in total our dataset contains
2178 websites, of which 34% are legitimate. Table 5.1 and Figure 5.5 show the
distribution and the percentages of these complete datasets. 
 
Table 5.1: Dataset distribution percentage  
 
Data Set 
No. of 
Websites 
Percentage
(%) 
Legitimate 736 34%  
Phishing  731 33%  
Suspicious 711 33%  
Total 2178 100%  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Dataset distribution percentage chart 
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5.7.2 Phishing Website Extracted Features and Patterns  
 
Our overall approach centres on extracting the information, features and patterns that
are most relevant for identifying phishing websites from our collected datasets. We do
this by looking at features from each phishing website from the phishing dataset
collection. We managed, as stated in chapter 4, to gather 27 phishing features and
factors that can be used to identify phishing websites, representing different structural
characteristics and several styles used by phishers to lure victims by making phishing
websites look legitimate. This involves extracting data directly present in the phishing
website, as well as collecting information from external sources like phishing experts
and surveys. We tried to extract them from the website page’s contents, HTML tags,
Java Script code, and URL address. We analyzed all phishing, suspicious and legitimate
web pages datasets, assigning concrete values to the properties for each page. Using the
collected data as training input and testing input, we applied Associative Classification 
machine learning techniques to generate phishing web page classifier rules. 
 
Our goal is to gather information about the strategies that are used by attackers and to
formulate assumptions about classifying and categorizing all the different e-banking
phishing attacks techniques. By thoroughly investigating these phishing attacks we’ve
created a dataset containing information about the different techniques and methods that
have been used and how the usage of these techniques has been correlated, associated
and utilised for creating phishing websites.  
 
 
 
5.7.3 Mining e-banking Phishing Considerations 
 
 
There are a number of considerations posed in making a post hoc classification of e-
banking phishing websites. Most of them only apply to the e-banking phishing websites
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data and materialize as a form of information, which has the net effect of increasing the
false negative rate. The age of the dataset is the most significant problem, which is
particularly relevant with the phishing corpus. e-Banking phishing websites are short-
lived, often lasting only in the order of 48 hours. Some of our features cannot therefore
be extracted from older websites, making it difficult to conduct our tests. The average
phishing site stays live for approximately 2.25 days (FDIC, 2004). Furthermore, the
process of transforming the original e-banking phishing website archives into record
feature datasets is not without error. It requires the use of heuristics at several steps.
Thus, high accuracy from the data mining algorithms cannot be expected. However, the
evidence supporting the ‘golden nuggets’ comes from a number of different algorithms
and feature sets and we believe it is compelling (Fette et al., 2006). 
 
 
  
5.8 Utilisation of Different DM Classification Algorithms  
 
 
In classification problems, a classifier tries to learn several feature variables as inputs to
predict an output. In the case of phishing website classification, a classifier rule tries to
classify a website as phishing, suspicious or legitimate by learning certain
characteristics, features and patterns in the website. In the following section, we briefly
describe the classifiers used in our experiments. 
 
The practical part of this study utilises five different common DM algorithms (C4.5, 
Ripper, Part, Prism and CBA). Our choice of these methods is based on the different
strategies they use in learning rules from datasets (Misch, 2006). The C4.5 algorithm
employs a divide-and-conquer approach, while the RIPPER algorithm uses a separate-
and-conquer approach. We applied the J48 algorithm to extract a decision tree that can
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classify web pages as legitimate, suspicious or phishing. J48 is an implementation of the
classic C4.5 decision tree algorithm in Weka, a well-known data mining tool. We
selected the C4.5 classifier since it provides an intuitive insight into which features are
important in classifying a dataset, and it is known to work well for a wide range of
classification problems (Ludl et al., 2007). The choice of PART algorithm is based on
the fact that it combines both approaches to generate a set of rules. It adapts separate-
and-conquer to generate a set of rules and uses divide-and-conquer to build partial
decision trees. The way PART builds and prunes a partial decision tree is similar to the
C4.5 implementation with a difference which can be explained as follows: C4.5
generates one decision tree and uses pruning techniques to simplify it; each path from
the root node to one of the leaves in the tree represents a rule. On the other hand, PART 
avoids the simplification process by building up partial decision trees and choosing only
one path in each one of them to derive a rule. Once the rule is generated, all instances
are associated with it, and the partial tree is discarded. PRISM is a classification rule
which can only deal with nominal attributes and which doesn't do any pruning. It
implements a top-down (general to specific) sequential-covering algorithm that employs 
a simple accuracy-based metric to pick an appropriate rule antecedent during rule
construction. Finally, CBA algorithm employs association rule mining to learn the
classifier and then adds pruning and prediction steps. CBA utilises database coverage
pruning to decrease the number of rules. It is worth noting that, without adding
constraints to the rule discovery, the very large numbers of rules make it impossible for
humans to understand the classifier. This pruning technique tests the generated rules
against the training dataset, and only high quality rules that cover at least one training
instance not considered by other higher ranked rules are kept for later classification. 
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There are two important advantages of the classifier using the CBA algorithm. First, as
the classifier is a set of rules, it is easy for the user to understand and interpret the
prediction of phishing susceptibility for a new case. Second, CBA has the ability to
handle literal attributes to construct the classifier (Srisawat and Kijsirikul, 2004). This
results in a classification approach named ‘associative classification’ (Thabtah, et al.,
2005). Experiments were conducted using stratified tenfold cross-validation (which is
set as default in Weka). In cross-validation, the training dataset is divided randomly into
10 blocks, each block is held out once, and the classifier is trained on the remaining 9 
blocks; then its error rate is evaluated on the holdout block. Thus, the learning
procedure is executed ten times on slightly different training datasets (Witten and Frank, 
2005). 
 
 
5.9 Proposed Intelligent Phishing Website Detection Model 
 
 
Based on the collected website properties and patterns from the dataset defined in the
previous section, we build an associative classification fuzzy model that attempts to use
these properties to distinguish between phishing and legitimate websites. The phishing 
website detection intelligent model utilises fuzzy logic along with data mining
association classification techniques and algorithms. It proposes a mechanism to
automate the rule generation process and reduce the human intervention represented by
an expert’s past knowledge and experience of phishing. The system uses a simple data-
mining association classification algorithm to identify the features of phishing websites
and their relationships with one another, to produce the most proper classification rules.
It will be integrated with the created fuzzy rules produced from fuzzy sets, and inserted
into the fuzzy inference engine for the final phishing websites detection rate. The
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inference engine works based on the Mamdani inference mechanism since it is most
suited to our model architecture. The system architecture shown in Figure 5.6 builds
class prediction models for identifying and detecting phishing website attacks. 
  
From the phishing website archive data details, we undertake some data pre-processing 
for extracting specific patterns and attributes, establishing relevant features of the
phishing patterns attack. Attributes are represented by names that will be used as
linguistic variables by the Data Miner and the Fuzzy Inference Engine. Once attributes
of relevant websites have been defined and the phishing dataset identified, training
subset data and test subset data are constructed. Training subset data are then used as
input data for the association and classification algorithms and techniques, producing
AC phishing data miner, which allows the efficient processing of phishing features. The
data miner is capable of discovering association and classification phishing rules and
their relationships with one another. The rules that meet the confidence and support
constraints are considered as input. They are then tested using the test subset data.
Classified rules generated from classification algorithms are used as fuzzy rules, to be
combined with external expert rules. Data Analyzer is employed to compute
configuration parameters that regulate the operation of association classification
algorithm and fuzzy inference engine for the final production of the phishing website
indicator rate. 
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Figure 5.6: Architecture of the intelligent association classification mining fuzzy model
for phishing website detection 
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5.10 Generated Classification Rules for Criteria and Layers 
 
 
We will now show a sample of rules generated by selected associative classification and
classification algorithms. We used CBA application for generating AC rules, and
WEKA application for implementing the different classification algorithms ( JRIP,
PART, PRISM, J48) for generating all classifier rules, which will all be integrated by
the fuzzy inference engine to produce more accurate results for the final phishing
website detection rate. 
Following this, we will demonstrate and analyze the classified rules for URL & Domain
Identity and for Security & Encryption only. The other classified criteria rules are 
shown in Appendix A in order to avoid repetition. 
 
5.10.1 Rules for URL & Domain Identity (Layer One) 
 
Association Classification rules for layer one (URL & Domain Identity Criteria) consist
of five components (Using the IP Address, Abnormal Request URL, Abnormal URL of
Anchor, Abnormal DNS Record, Abnormal URL). Fuzzy variables are High, Moderate
and Low for inputs, and Fraud, Doubtful and Genuine for the output class. 
CBA Rules: 
 
Num of Test Case: 2178; Correct Prediction: 2005; Error Rate: 7.943 %  
MinSup: 10.000%, MinConf: 80.000%  
 
Rule 1:  Abnormal_DNS_record = High  
  Using_the_IP_Address = High   ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 2:  Abnormal_DNS_record = High 
  Abnormal_Request_URL = High   ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 3:  Abnormal_URL = Low 
  Abnormal_DNS_record = Low 
   Abnormal_URL_Anchor = Low   ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 4:  Abnormal_URL = Low 
  Abnormal_DNS_record = Low   ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 5:  Abnormal_URL = Low 
   Abnormal_URL_Anchor = Low   ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 6:  Abnormal_DNS_record = Low 
  Abnormal_Request_URL = Low   ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 7:  Abnormal_URL = Low 
  Abnormal_Request_URL = Low   ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 8:  Abnormal_DNS_record = High 
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  Abnormal_URL_Anchor = High   ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 9:  Abnormal_URL = Moderate   ->  class = Doubtful 
Rule 10:  Abnormal_URL_Anchor = Moderate   ->  class = Doubtful 
Rule 11:  Abnormal_DNS_record = Moderate   ->  class = Doubtful 
Rule 12:  Abnormal_Request_URL = Moderate   ->  class = Doubtful 
 
Number of Rules: 12 
 
Sample of JRIP rules: 
=========== 
Correctly Classified Instances        2175               99.8623 %  
Incorrectly Classified Instances         3                0.1377 %  
Mean absolute error 0.0018 
=== Confusion Matrix === 
a b c <-- classified as 
705   0      0 |   a = Genuine 
   1   903    0 |   b = Doubtful 
0 2 567 | c = Fraud 
 
From the confusion matrix we can conclude that all 705 rules classified as "Genuine"
were never misclassified or contradicted by any other rules in the dataset. But, regarding
"Doubtful" classified rules, all 903 were classified correctly and as expected, and just
one was misclassified as "Genuine" instead. Finally, for the "Fraud" classified rules, 567
were classified correctly and 2 were misclassified as "Doubtful".  
 
 
 (Abnormal_DNS_record = High) and (Using_the_IP_ddress = High) => 
URL_&_Domain_Identity_Criteria_Phishing_Risk=Fraud (312.0/0.0) 
(Abnormal_DNS_record = High) and (Abnormal_Request_URL = High) => 
URL_&_Domain_Identity_Criteria_Phishing_Risk=Fraud (155.0/0.0) 
(Abnormal_URL = Low) and (Abnormal_Request_URL = Low) and (Using_the_IP_ddress = Low) => 
URL_&_Domain_Identity_Criteria_Phishing_Risk=Genuine (68.0/0.0) 
(Abnormal_URL_Anchor = Low) and (Abnormal_URL = Low) => 
URL_&_Domain_Identity_Criteria_Phishing_Risk=Genuine (308.0/0.0) 
(Abnormal_Request_URL = Low) and (Abnormal_DNS_record = Low) and (Abnormal_URL = 
Moderate) => URL_&_Domain_Identity_Criteria_Phishing_Risk=Genuine (115.0/0.0) 
 
Number of Rules: 14 
 
Sample of PART decision list 
------------------ 
Abnormal_URL = Moderate AND 
Abnormal_Request_URL = Low: Genuine (115.0) 
Abnormal_URL = Low AND 
Abnormal_URL_Anchor = Low: Genuine (308.0) 
Abnormal_DNS_record = High AND 
Abnormal_URL_Anchor = Low: Fraud (156.0) 
Abnormal_DNS_record = High AND 
Abnormal_URL_Anchor = Moderate: Doubtful (156.0/1.0) 
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Abnormal_DNS_record = High AND 
Abnormal_Request_URL = High: Fraud (155.0) 
 
Number of Rules:  22 
 
Sample of Prism rules 
---------- 
If Abnormal_URL_Anchor = Low 
   and Using_the_IP_ddress = Low 
   and Abnormal_URL = Moderate 
   and Abnormal_Request_URL = High 
   and Abnormal_DNS_record = Low then Genuine 
If Using_the_IP_ddress = Moderate 
   and Abnormal_Request_URL = Low 
   and Abnormal_URL_Anchor = Low then Genuine 
If Abnormal_DNS_record = Moderate 
   and Abnormal_URL = Moderate 
   and Abnormal_URL_Anchor = High then Doubtful 
If Abnormal_DNS_record = High 
   and Abnormal_URL = High 
   and Using_the_IP_ddress = Moderate 
   and Abnormal_Request_URL = Low 
   and Abnormal_URL_Anchor = Moderate then Fraud 
If Using_the_IP_ddress = High 
   and Abnormal_URL_Anchor = High 
   and Abnormal_URL = Low 
   and Abnormal_Request_URL = Moderate 
   and Abnormal_DNS_record = Moderate then Fraud 
 
Number of Rules: 39 
 
Sample of J48 pruned tree 
------------------ 
Abnormal_DNS_record = Low 
|   Abnormal_URL = Low 
|   |   Abnormal_URL_Anchor = Low: Genuine (274.0) 
|   |   Abnormal_URL_Anchor = Moderate 
|   |   |   Using_the_IP_ddress = Low: Genuine (0.0) 
|   |   |   Using_the_IP_ddress = Moderate: Genuine (69.0) 
|   |   |   Using_the_IP_ddress = High: Doubtful (35.0) 
|   |   Abnormal_URL_Anchor = High 
|   |   |   Abnormal_Request_URL = Low: Genuine (0.0) 
|   |   |   Abnormal_Request_URL = Moderate: Genuine (36.0) 
|   |   |   Abnormal_Request_URL = High: Doubtful (35.0) 
|   Abnormal_URL = Moderate 
|   |   Abnormal_Request_URL = Low: Genuine (115.0) 
|   |   Abnormal_Request_URL = Moderate 
|   |   |   Abnormal_URL_Anchor = Low: Genuine (22.0) 
|   |   |   Abnormal_URL_Anchor = Moderate: Doubtful (23.0) 
 
Number of Leaves:  43 
Size of the tree:  64 
 
We recorded the prediction accuracy and the number of rules generated by the
classification algorithms for URL & Domain Identity criteria in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2: Classification prediction accuracy and rules number for URL criteria 
 
 URL & Domain Identity Criteria (Layer One) 
 
Algorithms 
JRIP 
R.I.P.P.E.R 
 
PART 
 
PRISM  
C4.5  
Decision 
Tree(J48) 
 
CBA 
Test Mode 10 FOLD CROSS VALIDATION 
Attributes 
Using the IP Address, Abnormal Request URL, Abnormal URL of 
Anchor, Abnormal DNS Record, Abnormal URL                          
CLASS 
Number of Rules 14 22 39 43 Leaves 
Tree size 64 
12 
Correctly Classified 2175 
(99.862 %) 
2005   
(92.057%) 
Incorrectly Classified 3  
(0.138 %) 
173 
(7.943%) 
Number  of Instances 2187 
 
 
 
5.10.2 Rules for Security and Encryption Criteria 
 
Association Classification rules for Security and Encryption Criteria, which consist of
four components (Using SSL Certificate, Certification Authority, Abnormal Cookie,
and Distinguished Names Certificate (DN)). Fuzzy variables are High, Moderate and
Low for inputs and Fraud, Doubtful and Genuine for the output class. 
 
CBA Rules: 
 
Num of Test Case: 2178; Correct Prediction: 2091; Error Rate: 3.994%  
MinSup: 10.000%, MinConf: 80.000%  
 
Rule 1:  Distinguished_Names_Certificate[DN] = Low 
  Abnormal_Cookie = Low 
   Certification_authority = High  ->  class = Doubtful 
Rule 2:  Distinguished_Names_Certificate[DN] = High 
  Certification_authority = High   ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 3:  Distinguished_Names_Certificate[DN] = Low 
  Using_SSL_certificate = High   ->  class = Doubtful 
Rule 4:  Abnormal_Cookie = High 
  Certification_authority = High   ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 5:  Distinguished_Names_Certificate[DN] = Low 
  Certification_authority = Low 
  Using_SSL_certificate = Moderate  ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 6:  Distinguished_Names_Certificate[DN] = High 
  Using_SSL_certificate = High   ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 7:  Distinguished_Names_Certificate[DN] = High 
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  Abnormal_Cookie = High  
  Using_SSL_certificate = Low   ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 8:  Certification_authority = High 
  Using_SSL_certificate = High   ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 9:  Abnormal_Cookie = High 
  Using_SSL_certificate = High   ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 10:  Using_SSL_certificate = Moderate  ->  class = Doubtful 
Rule 11:  Certification_authority = Low   ->  class = Doubtful 
Rule 12:  Abnormal_Cookie = Moderate   ->  class = Doubtful 
Rule 13:  Distinguished_Names_Certificate[DN] = Low   ->  class = Genuine  
Rule 14:  Abnormal_Cookie = Low     ->  class = Genuine 
 
Num of Rules: 14 
 
 
Sample of JRIP rules: 
=========== 
Correctly Classified Instances        2169               99.5868 %  
Incorrectly Classified Instances         9                0.4132 %  
Mean absolute error 0.0055 
=== Confusion Matrix === 
a   b   c <-- classified as 
 384    2    0 |   a = Genuine 
   3  930      2 |   b = Doubtful 
   0   2 855 | c = Fraud 
 
  
(Using_SSL_certificate = Moderate) and (Certification_authority = Low) and (Names_Certificate(DN) = 
Low) => Security_&_Encryption_Criteria_Phishing_Risk=Genuine (232.0/2.0) 
(Certification_authority = Moderate) and (Abnormal_Cookie = Low) => 
Security_&_Encryption_Criteria_Phishing_Risk=Genuine (155.0/1.0) 
(Names_Certificate(DN) = High) and (Abnormal_Cookie = High) => 
Security_&_Encryption_Criteria_Phishing_Risk=Fraud (467.0/0.0) 
(Using_SSL_certificate = High) and (Certification_authority = High) => 
Security_&_Encryption_Criteria_Phishing_Risk=Fraud (234.0/0.0) 
 
Number of Rules: 7 
 
 
Sample of PART decision list 
------------------ 
Names_Certificate(DN) = High AND 
Abnormal_Cookie = High: Fraud (467.0) 
Using_SSL_certificate = High AND 
Names_Certificate(DN) = Low: Doubtful (233.0) 
Using_SSL_certificate = High: Fraud (312.0) 
Certification_authority = High AND 
Abnormal_Cookie = Low: Doubtful (311.0/1.0) 
Certification_authority = Low AND 
Names_Certificate(DN) = Low: Genuine (156.0/1.0) 
 
Number of Rules:  9 
 
 
 
    
    
    
   
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 121 
Sample of Prism rules 
---------- 
If Using_SSL_certificate = Moderate 
   and Certification_authority = Low 
   and Names_Certificate(DN) = Low 
   and Abnormal_Cookie = Moderate then Genuine 
If Abnormal_Cookie = Low 
   and Certification_authority = Moderate 
   and Names_Certificate(DN) = Low then Genuine 
If Using_SSL_certificate = Moderate 
   and Certification_authority = High 
   and Abnormal_Cookie = Low 
   and Names_Certificate(DN) = Low then Doubtful 
If Abnormal_Cookie = High 
   and Certification_authority = High 
   and Using_SSL_certificate = Low 
   and Names_Certificate(DN) = Low then Fraud 
If Names_Certificate(DN) = High 
   and Using_SSL_certificate = Moderate 
   and Certification_authority = Low 
   and Abnormal_Cookie = Moderate then Fraud 
 
 
Number of Rules: 24 
 
 
Sample of J48 pruned tree 
------------------ 
Names_Certificate(DN) = Low 
|   Abnormal_Cookie = Low 
|   |   Certification_authority = Low 
|   |   |   Using_SSL_certificate = Low: Doubtful (0.0) 
|   |   |   Using_SSL_certificate = Moderate: Genuine (76.0/1.0) 
|   |   |   Using_SSL_certificate = High: Doubtful (155.0) 
|   |   Certification_authority = Moderate: Genuine (77.0) 
|   |   Certification_authority = High: Doubtful (311.0/1.0) 
|   Abnormal_Cookie = Moderate 
|   |   Using_SSL_certificate = Low: Genuine (0.0) 
|   |   Using_SSL_certificate = Moderate: Genuine (156.0/1.0) 
|   |   Using_SSL_certificate = High: Doubtful (78.0) 
|   Abnormal_Cookie = High 
|   |   Certification_authority = Low: Doubtful (0.0) 
|   |   Certification_authority = Moderate: Doubtful (78.0/1.0) 
|   |   Certification_authority = High: Fraud (78.0/2.0) 
Names_Certificate(DN) = Moderate 
 
 
Number of Leaves:  19 
Size of the tree:  28 
 
 
We recorded the prediction accuracy and the number of rules generated by the
classification algorithms for Security & Encryption Criteria in Table 5.3.  
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Table 5.3: Classification prediction accuracy and rules number for security criteria 
 
 Security & Encryption Criteria 
 
Algorithms 
JRIP 
R.I.P.P.E.R 
 
PART 
 
PRISM  
C4.5  
Decision 
Tree(J48) 
 
CBA 
Test Mode 10 FOLD CROSS VALIDATION 
Attributes 
Using SSL Certificate, Certification Authority, Abnormal Cookie, 
Distinguished Names Certificate (DN) 
CLASS 
Number of Rules 7 9 24 19 Leaves 
Tree size 28 
14 
Correctly Classified 2169 
 (99.587 %) 
2091   
(96.005%) 
Incorrectly Classified 9  
(0.413 %) 
87  
(3.994%) 
Number  of Instances 2187 
 
 
 
5.10.3 Rules for Layer Two 
 
Association Classification rules for Layer Two which consist of Two Criteria (Security 
Code & Encryption Criteria, Source Code & Java Script Criteria). Fuzzy variables are
Fraud, Doubtful and Genuine for inputs and Fake, Uncertain and Legal for the output
class. 
CBA Rules: 
 
Num of Test Case : 2178; Correct Prediction : 2170; Error Rate : 0.367%  
MinSup: 10.000%, MinConf: 80.000%  
 
Rule 1:  Source_Code_&_Java_script = Genuine 
  Security_&_Encryption = Genuine  ->  class = Legal 
Rule 2:  Source_Code_&_Java_script = Fraud 
  Security_&_Encryption = Fraud  ->  class = Fake 
Rule 3:  Security_&_Encryption = Fraud  ->  class = Fake 
Rule 4:  Security_&_Encryption = Doubtful ->  class = Fake 
Rule 5:  Source_Code_&_Java_script = Fraud 
  Security_&_Encryption = Genuine  ->  class = Uncertain 
Rule 6:  Security_&_Encryption = Genuine  ->  class = Legal 
 
Num of Rules: 6 
 
JRIP rules: 
=========== 
Correctly Classified Instances        2170               99.6327 %  
Incorrectly Classified Instances         8                0.3673 %  
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Mean absolute error 0.0049 
=== Confusion Matrix === 
a  b c <-- classified as 
547 3 1 | a = Legal 
0  296 4 | b = Uncertain 
0  0 1327 | c = Fake 
 
(Source_Code_&_Java_script = Fraud) and (Security_&_Encryption = Genuine) => 
Layer_Two_Phishing_Risk=Uncertain (299.0/3.0) 
(Security_&_Encryption = Genuine) => Layer_Two_Phishing_Risk=Legal (547.0/0.0) 
 => Layer_Two_Phishing_Risk=Fake (1332.0/5.0) 
 
Number of Rules : 3 
 
PART decision list 
------------------  
Security_&_Encryption = Fraud: Fake (735.0/2.0) 
Security_&_Encryption = Doubtful: Fake (597.0/3.0) 
Source_Code_&_Java_script = Genuine: Legal (390.0) 
Source_Code_&_Java_script = Fraud: Uncertain (299.0/3.0) 
: Legal (157.0) 
Number of Rules :  5 
Sample of Prism rules 
---------- 
If Security_&_Encryption = Genuine 
   and Source_Code_&_Java_script = Genuine then Legal 
If Source_Code_&_Java_script = Doubtful 
   and Security_&_Encryption = Genuine then Legal 
If Security_&_Encryption = Genuine 
   and Source_Code_&_Java_script = Fraud then Legal 
If Security_&_Encryption = Doubtful 
If Security_&_Encryption = Fraud 
   and Source_Code_&_Java_script = Genuine then Uncertain 
If Security_&_Encryption = Fraud 
   and Source_Code_&_Java_script = Fraud then Fake 
If Security_&_Encryption = Fraud 
   and Source_Code_&_Java_script = Genuine then Fake 
 
Number of Rules : 15 
 
J48 pruned tree 
------------------  
Security_&_Encryption = Genuine 
|   Source_Code_&_Java_script = Genuine: Legal (390.0) 
|   Source_Code_&_Java_script = Doubtful: Legal (157.0) 
|   Source_Code_&_Java_script = Fraud: Uncertain (299.0/3.0) 
Security_&_Encryption = Doubtful: Fake (597.0/3.0) 
Security_&_Encryption = Fraud: Fake (735.0/2.0) 
 
Number of Leaves :  5 
Size of the tree :  7 
 
We recorded the prediction accuracy and the number of rules generated by the 
classification algorithms for Layer Two in Table 5.4 and the chart of decision J48 tree
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for layer two in Figure 5.7 which demonstrate the importance of security criteria inside
layer two. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Chart of decision J48 tree for layer two 
 
Table 5.4: Classification prediction accuracy and rules number for layer two 
 
 Layer Two 
 
Algorithms 
JRIP 
R.I.P.P.E.R 
 
PART 
 
PRISM  
C4.5  
Decision 
Tree(J48) 
 
CBA 
Test Mode 10 FOLD CROSS VALIDATION 
Attributes 
Security Code & Encryption, Source Code & Java Script  
CLASS 
Number of Rules 3 5 15 5 Leaves 
Tree size 7 
6 
Correctly Classified 2170  
(96.633 %) 
2170 
(99.633 %) 
Incorrectly Classified 8 
(0.367%) 
8  
(0.367%) 
Number  of Instances 2187 
 
5.10.4 Rules for Layer Three 
 
Classification Association Classification rules for Layer Three which consist of Three
Criteria (Page Style & Contents, Web Address Bar and Social Human Factor). Fuzzy
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 125 
variables are Fraud, Doubtful and Genuine for inputs and Fake, Uncertain and Legal for
the output class. 
 
 
CBA Rules: 
 
Num of Test Case : 2178; Correct Prediction : 2138; Error Rate : 1.837%  
MinSup: 10.000%, MinConf: 80.000%  
 
Rule 1:  Web_Address_Bar = Genuine 
  Page_Style_&_Contents = Genuine   ->  class = Legal 
Rule 2:  Web_Address_Bar = Genuine 
  Page_Style_&_Contents = Doubtful  ->  class = Uncertain 
Rule 3:  Social_Human_Factor = Fraud 
  Web_Address_Bar = Fraud   ->  class = Fake 
Rule 4:  Web_Address_Bar = Fraud 
  Page_Style_&_Contents = Fraud   ->  class = Fake 
Rule 5:  Social_Human_Factor = Fraud 
  Page_Style_&_Contents = Fraud   ->  class = Fake 
Rule 6:  Social_Human_Factor = Genuine 
  Page_Style_&_Contents = Doubtful  ->  class = Uncertain 
Rule 7:  Web_Address_Bar = Doubtful   ->  class = Uncertain 
Rule 8:  Social_Human_Factor = Genuine 
  Web_Address_Bar = Genuine   ->  class = Legal 
Rule 9:  Social_Human_Factor = Genuine 
  Web_Address_Bar = Fraud   ->  class = Uncertain 
Rule 10:  Web_Address_Bar = Genuine   ->  class = Legal 
 
Num of Rules: 10 
 
 
Sample of JRIP rules: 
=========== 
Correctly Classified Instances        2173               99.7704 %  
Incorrectly Classified Instances         5                0.2296 %  
Mean absolute error 0.003  
 
=== Confusion Matrix === 
 
a  b c <-- classified as 
598  2 0 | a = Legal 
0  929 1 | b = Uncertain 
0  2 646 | c = Fake 
 
 
 (Page_Style_&_Contents = Fraud) and (Social_Human_Factor = Fraud) => 
Layer_Three_Phishing_Risk=Fake (265.0/0.0) 
(Web_Address_Bar = Fraud) and (Social_Human_Factor = Fraud) => Layer_Three_Phishing_Risk=Fake 
(173.0/0.0) 
(Page_Style_&_Contents = Fraud) and (Web_Address_Bar = Fraud) => 
Layer_Three_Phishing_Risk=Fake (172.0/0.0) 
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(Web_Address_Bar = Genuine) and (Page_Style_&_Contents = Genuine) => 
Layer_Three_Phishing_Risk=Legal (390.0/0.0) 
(Web_Address_Bar = Genuine) and (Page_Style_&_Contents = Fraud) and (Social_Human_Factor = 
Genuine) => Layer_Three_Phishing_Risk=Legal  
 
Number of Rules : 8 
 
Sample of PART decision list 
------------------  
Web_Address_Bar = Doubtful AND 
Social_Human_Factor = Genuine: Uncertain (182.0/1.0) 
Web_Address_Bar = Doubtful AND 
Page_Style_&_Contents = Genuine: Uncertain (87.0/1.0) 
Web_Address_Bar = Genuine AND 
Page_Style_&_Contents = Genuine: Legal (218.0) 
Page_Style_&_Contents = Fraud AND 
Social_Human_Factor = Fraud: Fake (265.0) 
Web_Address_Bar = Fraud AND 
Social_Human_Factor = Fraud: Fake (173.0) 
 
Number of Rules :  14 
 
 
Sample of Prism rules 
---------- 
If Web_Address_Bar = Genuine 
   and Page_Style_&_Contents = Genuine then Legal 
If Web_Address_Bar = Genuine 
   and Page_Style_&_Contents = Fraud 
   and Social_Human_Factor = Genuine then Legal 
If Page_Style_&_Contents = Doubtful 
   and Social_Human_Factor = Doubtful 
   and Web_Address_Bar = Fraud then Uncertain 
If Web_Address_Bar = Fraud 
   and Social_Human_Factor = Fraud then Fake 
If Page_Style_&_Contents = Fraud 
   and Web_Address_Bar = Fraud then Fake 
 
 
Number of Rules :  22 
 
 
Sample of J48 pruned tree 
------------------  
Web_Address_Bar = Genuine 
|   Page_Style_&_Contents = Genuine: Legal (390.0) 
|   Page_Style_&_Contents = Doubtful: Uncertain (284.0) 
|   Page_Style_&_Contents = Fraud 
|   |   Social_Human_Factor = Genuine: Legal (152.0) 
|   |   Social_Human_Factor = Doubtful: Legal (56.0) 
|   |   Social_Human_Factor = Fraud: Fake (129.0) 
Web_Address_Bar = Doubtful 
|   Social_Human_Factor = Genuine: Uncertain (182.0/1.0) 
|   Social_Human_Factor = Doubtful: Uncertain (79.0) 
|   Social_Human_Factor = Fraud 
|   |   Page_Style_&_Contents = Genuine: Uncertain (57.0/1.0) 
|   |   Page_Style_&_Contents = Doubtful: Uncertain (30.0/1.0) 
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|   |   Page_Style_&_Contents = Fraud: Fake (43.0) 
Web_Address_Bar = Fraud 
 
Number of Leaves :  17 
Size of the tree :  25 
 
 
We recorded the prediction accuracy and the number of rules generated by the
classification algorithms for Layer Three in Table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.5: Classification prediction accuracy and rules number for layer three 
 
 Layer Three 
 
Algorithms 
JRIP 
R.I.P.P.E.R 
 
PART 
 
PRISM  
C4.5  
Decision 
Tree(J48) 
 
CBA 
Test Mode 10 FOLD CROSS VALIDATION 
Attributes Page Style & Contents, Web Address Bar, Social Human Factor  CLASS 
Number of Rules 8 14 22 17 Leaves 
Tree size 25 
10 
Correctly Classified 2173 
(99.770%) 
2138 
(98.163%) 
Incorrectly Classified 5 
(0.229 % ) 
40 
(1.837%) 
Number  of Instances 2187 
 
 
5.10.5 Rules for Final Phishing Website Detection Rate 
 
Association Classification rules for the Final Phishing Website Detection Rate which
consists of Three Layers (Layer One, Layer Two and Layer Three). Fuzzy variables are
Fraud, Doubtful and Genuine for Layer one input. For layer two and three, fuzzy
variables are Fake, Uncertain and Legal and Phishing for inputs, Suspicious and
Legitimate for the final output class. 
 
CBA Rules: 
 
Num of Test Case : 2178; Correct Prediction : 1972; Error Rate : 9.458%  
MinSup: 10.000%, MinConf: 80.000%  
 
 
Rule 1:  Layer_Two = Fake 
  Layer_Three = Fake  ->  class = Phishing 
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Rule 2:  Layer_Two = Fake 
  Layer_Three = Uncertain 
  Layer_One = Doubtful  ->  class = Suspicious 
Rule 3:  Layer_Two = Legal 
  Layer_One = Doubtful  ->  class = Legitimate 
Rule 4:  Layer_Two = Fake 
  Layer_One = Fraud  ->  class = Phishing 
Rule 5:  Layer_One = Fraud  ->  class = Phishing 
Rule 6:  Layer_Three = Uncertain 
  Layer_One = Genuine  ->  class = Legitimate 
Rule 7:  Layer_Two = Legal  ->  class = Legitimate 
Rule 8:  Layer_Two = Fake 
  Layer_Three = Legal  ->  class = Suspicious 
Rule 9:  Layer_One = Genuine  ->  class = Legitimate 
Rule 10:  Layer_One = Doubtful  ->  class = Legitimate 
 
 
Num of Rules: 10 
 
JRIP rules: 
=========== 
Correctly Classified Instances        2046               93.9394 %  
Incorrectly Classified Instances       132                6.0606 %  
Mean absolute error 0.0693 
=== Confusion Matrix === 
a  b   c <-- classified as 
736  0  0 |   a = Legitimate 
92  590 29 | b = Suspicious 
0  11 720 | c = Phishing 
 
(Layer_Two = Fake) and (Layer_One = Doubtful) and (Layer_Three = Uncertain) => 
Final_Phishing_Website_Rate=Suspicious (246.0/0.0) 
(Layer_Three = Legal) and (Layer_Two = Fake) and (Layer_One = Doubtful) => 
Final_Phishing_Website_Rate=Suspicious (147.0/0.0) 
(Layer_Three = Legal) and (Layer_One = Genuine) and (Layer_Two = Fake) => 
Final_Phishing_Website_Rate=Suspicious (112.0/0.0) 
(Layer_One = Fraud) and (Layer_Two = Legal) => Final_Phishing_Website_Rate=Suspicious 
(142.0/29.0) 
(Layer_One = Fraud) => Final_Phishing_Website_Rate=Phishing (427.0/21.0) 
(Layer_Two = Fake) and (Layer_Three = Fake) => Final_Phishing_Website_Rate=Phishing (296.0/0.0) 
 => Final_Phishing_Website_Rate=Legitimate (808.0/72.0) 
 
Number of Rules : 7 
 
PART decision list 
------------------ 
Layer_Two = Legal AND Layer_One = Doubtful: Legitimate (234.0) 
Layer_One = Fraud AND Layer_Two = Fake: Phishing (344.0/21.0) 
Layer_Three = Fake AND Layer_Two = Fake: Phishing (296.0) 
Layer_One = Doubtful AND Layer_Two = Fake: Suspicious (393.0) 
Layer_One = Genuine AND Layer_Two = Fake AND 
Layer_Three = Uncertain: Legitimate (187.0/58.0) 
Layer_One = Genuine AND Layer_Two = Legal: Legitimate (171.0) 
Layer_Two = Fake: Suspicious (112.0) 
Layer_Two = Legal AND Layer_Three = Uncertain: Suspicious (62.0) 
Layer_One = Doubtful: Legitimate (117.0) 
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Layer_One = Genuine: Legitimate (99.0/14.0) 
Layer_Two = Uncertain: Phishing (83.0) 
Layer_Three = Fake: Phishing (42.0/13.0) 
: Suspicious (38.0) 
 
Number of Rules :  13 
 
 
Prism rules 
---------- 
If Layer_Two = Legal    and Layer_One = Doubtful then Legitimate 
If Layer_Two = Uncertain    and Layer_One = Doubtful then Legitimate 
If Layer_Two = Legal    and Layer_One = Genuine then Legitimate 
If Layer_Two = Uncertain and Layer_One = Genuine and Layer_Three = Fake then Legitimate 
If Layer_One = Genuine  and Layer_Two = Uncertain and Layer_Three = Legal then Legitimate 
If Layer_One = Genuine and Layer_Three = Uncertain and Layer_Two = Fake then Legitimate 
If Layer_Two = Uncertain and Layer_One = Genuine and Layer_Three = Uncertain then Legitimate 
If Layer_Three = Legal and Layer_Two = Fake and Layer_One = Doubtful then Suspicious 
If Layer_Three = Uncertain and Layer_One = Doubtful and Layer_Two = Fake then Suspicious 
If Layer_Three = Legal and Layer_One = Genuine and Layer_Two = Fake then Suspicious 
If Layer_One = Fraud and Layer_Two = Legal and Layer_Three = Uncertain then Suspicious 
If Layer_Three = Uncertain and Layer_One = Genuine and Layer_Two = Uncertain then Suspicious 
If Layer_One = Fraud and Layer_Two = Legal and Layer_Three = Legal then Suspicious 
If Layer_Three = Uncertain and Layer_Two = Fake and Layer_One = Genuine then Suspicious 
If Layer_One = Fraud and Layer_Two = Legal and Layer_Three = Fake then Suspicious 
If Layer_Three = Uncertain and Layer_Two = Fake and Layer_One = Fraud then Suspicious 
If Layer_One = Fraud and Layer_Two = Uncertain then Phishing  
If Layer_One = Fraud  and Layer_Two = Fake and Layer_Three = Fake then Phishing 
If Layer_One = Fraud and Layer_Two = Fake and Layer_Three = Legal then Phishing 
If Layer_Three = Fake and Layer_Two = Fake then Phishing 
If Layer_One = Fraud and Layer_Two = Fake and Layer_Three = Uncertain then Phishing 
If Layer_One = Fraud and Layer_Three = Fake and Layer_Two = Legal then Phishing 
 
Number of Rules : 22 
 
J48 pruned tree 
------------------  
Layer_Two = Legal 
|   Layer_One = Genuine: Legitimate (171.0) 
|   Layer_One = Doubtful: Legitimate (234.0) 
|   Layer_One = Fraud 
|   |   Layer_Three = Legal: Suspicious (38.0) 
|   |   Layer_Three = Uncertain: Suspicious (62.0) 
|   |   Layer_Three = Fake: Phishing (42.0/13.0) 
Layer_Two = Uncertain 
|   Layer_One = Genuine: Legitimate (99.0/14.0) 
|   Layer_One = Doubtful: Legitimate (117.0) 
|   Layer_One = Fraud: Phishing (83.0) 
Layer_Two = Fake 
|   Layer_Three = Legal 
|   |   Layer_One = Genuine: Suspicious (112.0) 
|   |   Layer_One = Doubtful: Suspicious (147.0) 
|   |   Layer_One = Fraud: Phishing (97.0) 
|   Layer_Three = Uncertain 
|   |   Layer_One = Genuine: Legitimate (187.0/58.0) 
|   |   Layer_One = Doubtful: Suspicious (246.0) 
|   |   Layer_One = Fraud: Phishing (149.0/21.0) 
|   Layer_Three = Fake: Phishing (394.0) 
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Number of Leaves :  15 
Size of the tree :  22 
 
We recorded the prediction accuracy and the number of rules generated by the
classification algorithms for final phishing website detection rate in Table 5.6, and the
chart of decision J48 tree in Figure 5.8, which demonstrate the importance of layer two
compared to the other layers. 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Chart of decision J48 tree for final phishing website detection rate 
 
 
Table 5.6: Classification prediction accuracy and rules number for final phishing
website detection rate 
 
 Final Phishing Website Detection Rate 
 
Algorithms 
JRIP 
R.I.P.P.E.R 
 
PART 
 
PRISM  
C4.5  
Decision 
Tree(J48) 
 
CBA 
Test Mode 10 FOLD CROSS VALIDATION 
Attributes Layer One, Layer Two, Layer Three CLASS 
Number of Rules 7 13 22 15 Leaves 
Tree size 22 
10 
Correctly Classified 2046 
 (93.939%) 
1972 
(90.542 %) 
Incorrectly Classified 132 
 (6.061%) 
206 
(9.458%) 
Number  of Instances 2187 
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5.11 Experimental Results and Discussion 
 
 
The experiments show that web page properties can be used to successfully distinguish
between phishing and legitimate websites. As a result, page analysis techniques can, in
principle, be effective in building a phishing website intelligent detection model. The
experiments also demonstrate the feasibility of using Associative Classification
techniques in real applications involving large databases. 
 
Association Classification data miner experiments show lots of important results and
conclusions related to classified phishing rules in all of our model layers and criteria.
The rules generated from the associative classification model show the correlation and
relationships between all phishing features and patterns at every phase. These mined
classified rules helped us a lot in producing a more accurate phishing website detection
system, as it integrated into the fuzzy logic inference engine. 
 
From all of the above classification rules which cover all our intelligent detection model
layers and criteria, using the five mining algorithms, we managed to conclude some
very important classification rules. These generated rules helped us greatly in modelling
our intelligent phishing website detection. For example, if only one of the phishing
fuzzy input variables located in any criteria is "High", then all the criteria will have
"Fraud" or "Fake" fuzzy value, whatever the other variables are. This shows of course
the big influence of the "High" phishing fuzzy variable and its effect on the entire
model. We also concluded that, if there are at least two "Moderate" fuzzy input
variables in any criteria without any "High" fuzzy input, then the final result for those
criteria will have "Doubtful" or "Suspicious" fuzzy value.  
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Table 5.7 also shows the most imperative essential phishing features and the most trivial 
influence phishing features of all criteria and layers found in our association
classification detection fuzzy model that reflect the final phishing website detection rate.
The table contents greatly reflected our classified phishing rules implemented on the
practical implementation of our plug-in phishing toolbar, giving more accurate and
precise results in detecting phishing websites, with very little false positive and false
negative alarms.  
 
Table 5.7: Influences of different features and criteria in phishing 
 
 Most Significant Influence  Most Trivial Influence 
URL & Domain Identity 
Criteria 
Abnormal Request URL, 
Abnormal DNS Record 
Using the IP Address 
Security & Encryption 
Criteria 
Using SSL Certificate, 
Certification Authority 
Abnormal Cookies 
Source Code & Java 
Script Criteria 
Pharming Attack, Redirect Pages Using onMouseOver to
Hide the Link 
Web Address Bar 
Criteria 
Long URL address, Replacing
similar characters for URL 
Using Hexadecimal
Character Codes 
Page Style & Contents 
Criteria 
Using Forms with “Submit” 
Button, Using Pop-Ups Windows 
Disabling Right-Click 
Social Human Factor 
Criteria 
Much Emphasis on Security and 
Response 
Public Generic Salutation 
Intelligent Phishing 
Website Detection  
Model 
URL & Domain Identity Criteria,
Security & Encryption Criteria 
Social Human Factor
Criteria 
 
 
Furthermore, to test our approach’s ability, our implemented plug-ins phishing website 
toolbar recognized and detected approximately 92% of the phishing websites selected
from our test data subset, avoiding many misclassified websites and false phishing
alarms. 
 
For our implementation introduced in Chapter 6, we have imported all the output of
WEKA and CBA classification rules and saved the output in a CSV file. From this file,
we have created a pool of classification rules to be integrated into our intelligent
phishing detection toolbar implementation represented by classification rule table. The
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benefit of integrating the rules table in our application is to gain the ability for our
application to be dynamic. Thus, to introduce any new phishing classification rules, all
we have to do is just adding the classification rules into the rule table, avoiding the need
of changing the application each time a new phishing classification rule is introduced.
The defuzzification equation was implemented in our intelligent phishing detection
toolbar to defuzzify the extracted fuzzy variables, acting just like a fuzzy inference
engine.  
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Implementation of the Intelligent Fuzzy-Based 
Classification Phishing Detection Plug-ins Toolbar  
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
For our implementation of the fuzzy based classification mining model for phishing
website detection, we have created our own intelligent phishing website detection
toolbar as a plug-ins for the Mozilla Firefox browser. Our intelligent toolbar helps the
users to identify phishing websites effectively and dynamically. We used a standard
version of JavaScript to extract the basic features of the website. To extract other
sophisticated website features, like protocols (https), certificates (SSL) and DNS record,
the desktop-based Java (J2SE 1.6) was used. For the application user interface we used
standard browser based interface language XUL (XML User Interface Language). 
We used the standard JavaScript to extract the website feature because we wanted to
extend the application to all standard browsers in our future work. It will be easily
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adaptable to be integrated to all browsers which support JavaScript as well as its
platform independent (Windows, Linux, Mac OS and UNIX) usability. 
 
6.2 Development Solution Outline 
 
The proposed intelligent anti-phishing toolbar has the ability to extract all of our 27
phishing website features and patterns for each browsed website. It cross-check each
extracted feature to validate the phishing vulnerability based on specified fuzzy sets to
correspond them to related fuzzy variables (High, Moderate and Low).  
 
The toolbar considers and fits each extracted phishing feature in its predetermined
criteria and layer, based on risk significance and type. The system has defined six
criteria (URL & Domain Identity, Security & Encryption, Source Code & Java Script,
Page Style & Contents, Web Address Bar and Social Human Factor) and three layers
(Layer One, Layer Two, Layer Three) as suggested by our intelligent phishing website
detection model in chapter 5 for the final output. We utilised the classification rules
which were generated automatically from the associative classification data miner
model to correlate each layer with its preceding layer output. 
 
To define all associate rules for phishing features and patterns in every specific criterion 
at each particular layer, we adopted some rule pruning techniques based on the
significance of the criteria and layer of phishing risk ranking and weight. We used the
pruning technique to optimize the processing time for a prompt accurate result. For
example, in layer one if we got a high value as a fuzzy input variable for some phishing
feature; we ignored checking other features on that layer. Since one of the most
important conclusion that results from data miner associative classification algorithms is
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 136 
that finding only one high fuzzy input feature in any criteria is enough to make the
outcome fraudulent or fake for all the criteria. The same rules applied for any two
moderate fuzzy input features to make the whole criteria as doubtful or uncertain. 
 
We used fuzzy-based heuristic mining approach and pruning technique that will make
the toolbar more effective and efficient to detect phishing websites compared to any
other phishing detection technique, because most of existing phishing detection
techniques just use a black-listing or white-listing approach. The success of black-
listing or white-listing depends on an extensive database, and dealing with a massive
database makes the response time much slower and impractical. Another problem is this
technique needs frequently-updated data which makes it totally unreliable, and also this
technique is not effective on 0 days attacks or spear attacks that are targeted to a specific
organisation or group. Our techniques outperform the old existing techniques in terms
of the phishing website detection rate, response time, reliability, accuracy and human
intervention dependability. 
 
With this toolbar plug-ins, we managed to prove the applicability of using fuzzy based
classification mining techniques for phishing website detection. Since website phishing
detection is a fuzzy problem, so we argue that our fuzzy rules based heuristic AI
approach is more accurate and appropriate for phishing detection. 
 
6.3 Screen Shots and Source Code Examples 
•  Screen Shots Examples 
Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 shows screenshots of our intelligent plug-ins phishing website 
detection toolbar for testing the legitimacy of the HSBC official e-banking website
(www.hsbc.co.uk). Our intelligent toolbar checked all extracted 27 phishing features
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and patterns that can be found on this site. Then using the fuzzy-based classification 
rule mining approach adopted by our intelligent toolbar, all layered phishing features
and patterns were associated and classified with each other for the final detection
decision. Since the outputs of the three layers for that website were "genuine" and
"legal", the final phishing detection rate was "Legitimate website" with the green colour 
indicator making it more observable for users. We used the green colour for legitimate
websites, red for phishing websites and yellow for suspicious websites. 
 
Figure 6.1: Our plug-ins phishing detection toolbar (legitimate website-green colour) 
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Figure 6.2: Screen shot of legitimate website (hsbc.co.uk) using our plug-ins 
 
Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 shows screen shots for using our detection toolbar on a
website for Citibank clients (Citybank.net). Since the outputs of the three layers for that
website were mixed between "Fraud" for Layer one and "Legal" for Layer two and
three, the final phishing detection rate was "Phishing website" with a red colour 
indicator. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Our plug-ins phishing detection toolbar (phishing website-red colour) 
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Figure 6.4: Screen shot of phishing website (Citibank.net) using our plug-ins 
 
Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 shows screen shots using our detection toolbar on a website
for Ahli bank clients (ahly.com). Since the outputs of the three layers for that website
were mixed between "Genuine" for layer one and "Uncertain" for layer two and three,
the final phishing detection rate was "Suspicious website" with yellow colour indicator. 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Our plug-ins phishing detection toolbar (suspicious website-yellow colour) 
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Figure 6.6: Screen shot of phishing website (ahly.com) using our plug-ins 
 
Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8 shows other screen shots of the official legitimate websites for 
Ahli bank clients (ahli.com) and Citibank clients (Citibank.com) as indicated by our
intelligent plug-ins phishing website detection toolbar. 
 
Figure 6.7: Screen shot of legititmate website (ahli.com) using our plug-ins 
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Figure 6.8: Screen shot of legititmate website (citibank.com) using our plug-ins 
 
•  Source Code and Pseudo Code Examples 
 
We show now some important source code and pseudo code examples for extracting
some of the phishing website features for our system implementation. This section also
demonstrates how to validate the phishing features with our proposed phishing criteria
and rate the fuzzy variable inputs accordingly. 
 
•  Pop-Up Window Extracting Phishing Feature Source Code Example 
 
var popUpWindow = "Low"; 
 popUpCount = 0;  
 var elems = window._content.document.getElementsByTagName("script"); 
 if(elems){ 
  for(i=0;i< elems.length; i++){ 
   if(elems[i].innerHTML){ 
    var code = elems[i].innerHTML; 
    if(code.indexOf("window.open") > -1){ 
     popUpCount++; } 
   } 
  } 
 } 
 var toCheck = window._content.document.body.innerHTML; 
   
 var findLock = toCheck.indexOf("window.open"); 
   
 while(findLock > -1){ 
  findLock = toCheck.indexOf("window.open", findLock+1); 
  popUpCount++;   
 } 
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  if(popUpCount >= 0 && popUpCount < 2){ 
  popUpWindow = "Low"; 
 }else if(popUpCount >= 2 && popUpCount <8){ 
  popUpWindow = "Moderate";  
 }else{ 
  popUpWindow = "High"; 
 } 
  if(popUpWindow == "High") 
  return "Fraud"; 
 else if(popUpWindow == "Moderate" && formSubmit == "Moderate"){ 
  return "Doubtful"; 
 } 
 
Here we count how many times the pop-up window exists on the website. If it does not
exist at all in the website, or there is at most just one pop-up window, then we give the
fuzzy input variable "Low" value. If there is from 2 to 7 pop-up windows then we give
the fuzzy input variable "Moderate" value. Otherwise, we give it "High" fuzzy value. 
 
•  Redirect Page Extracted Phishing Feature Source Code Example 
 
 var elems = window._content.document.getElementsByTagName("script"); 
 redirectCount = 0; 
 usingRedirect = "Low"; 
 if(elems){ 
  for(i=0;i< elems.length; i++){ 
   if(elems[i].innerHTML){ 
     var code = elems[i].innerHTML; 
     var findLoc1 = code.indexOf("window.location=\""); 
     if(findLoc1 > -1){ 
      var findLoc2 = code.indexOf("\"",findLoc1+1); 
      var toCheck = code.substring(findLoc1,findLoc2); 
      url = 
window.top.getBrowser().selectedBrowser.contentWindow.location.href; 
    domain = url.split(/\/+/g)[1].replace('www.',''); 
    pattern = "/"+domain+"/gi"; 
    pattern = eval(pattern); 
    if(toCheck.match(pattern) == null) 
     redirectCount++;  } 
     } 
 } 
 var elems = window._content.document.getElementsByTagName("meta"); 
 if(elems){ 
  for(i=0; i< elems.length; i++){ 
   toCheck = elems[i].content; 
   if(toCheck.indexOf("url=") > -1){ 
    return redirectCount; 
    url = 
window.top.getBrowser().selectedBrowser.contentWindow.location.href; 
    domain = url.split(/\/+/g)[1].replace('www.',''); 
    pattern = "/"+domain+"/gi"; 
    pattern = eval(pattern); 
    if(toCheck.match(pattern) == null) 
     redirectCount++; }     
  } 
 } 
 if(redirectCount < 2) 
  usingRedirect = "Low"; 
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 else if(redirectCount >= 2 && redirectCount <= 4) 
  usingRedirect = "Moderate"; 
 else 
  usingRedirect = "High"; 
   
There are two ways to "Redirect Pages" from one site to another. The first is a script
used to redirect with a syntax "window.location" and the other one is on the page where
the <meta> refresh tag is used with a URL specified to the final targeted page. In this
section of the code we considered both the possibility and count number of occurrences
of these two techniques on a browsed page. To rate the Redirect Page feature as "High",
the fuzzy input variable we considered had more than 4 occurrences; to rate it as
"Moderate" we are considering between 2-4 occurrence; and finally less than 2
occurrence were rated as "Low". 
 
•  Abnormal URL Anchor Extracting Phishing Feature Pseudo Code Example 
 
elems :- extract all window elements by the tag name a (Anchor); 
url :- get the browsing URL address from the Location bar; 
Domain :- get the Domain name part from the Whole URL without the "www" part;  
Pattern :- make the pattern match using the extracted domain name; 
notMatchedCountAnchor :- set the counter to 0; 
abnormalURLRequestAnchor :- set the Fuzzy Variable to "Low" initially 
 Check if there is any anchor element 
  Do for every element 
   Check if the link URL does not match with the pattern 
    notMatchedCountAnchor :- increment the counter;    
  End           
Calculate the percentage of mismatched found using the notMatchedCountAnchor counter and 
the total number of Anchors in the page  
notMatchedCountAnchorRatio :- (notMatchedCountAnchor/ total number of Anchor)*10  
 Check if notMatchedCountAnchorRatio is less then or equal to 20 
  abnormalURLRequestAnchor :- "Low"; 
 Otherwise check if notMatchedCountAnchorRatio is in the range between 21 and 50 
  abnormalURLRequestAnchor :- " Moderate "; 
 Otherwise 
  abnormalURLRequestAnchor :- " High "; 
 
 
   
To validate the "Abnormal URL Anchor" feature we extracted all the anchor elements
of the page. Then we counted the number of anchors that were pointed at some other
website other than the browsed domain name, and we calculated the percentage of
URLs that were pointed to some other website. If the percentage was less than 20% we
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rated the fuzzy variable as "Low"; we rated it "Moderate" if the percentage was between
21 -50; otherwise we rated it as "High". 
 
 
6.4 Implementation Constraints 
We faced some implementation constraints regarding extracting and validating some of 
the 27 phishing website features. For example, validating the extracted spelling errors
phishing feature was not 100% accurate since it included nouns which were not listed as
dictionary words and would be considered spelling errors. This is likely to give a 25%
error on spelling error detection. 
 
As another example, we did not include WHOIS database query result with the
validation process of phishing website features; because of the difficulties in extracting
the data from WHOIS query result. That is the reason we could not validate the
"Abnormal DNS Record" and "Abnormal Request URL" 100% accurately. The validation
of these two features did not give the expected output for www.facebook.com,
www.yahoo.com or any other website that uses a different valid and registered domain
for image, script and other recourses. Nevertheless we are not facing this problem for e-
Banking or e-Commerce sites, since they are very consistent in using their single
domain to store every resource for security purposes. 
 
Finally, we faced some constraints regarding 100% validation of Copying Website
phishing feature. Some phishing websites copy the whole contents from some legitimate
websites, and put it on their own domain. This malicious technique disguises the track
of the origin of the resources, such that it appears to be owned by the phishing site, but
actually it is not. This malicious technique leaves hardly 40% non matches between the
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legitimate and the phishing sites. So we have to rely only on this percentage of accuracy
for that feature. 
 
 
6.5 Testing and Validation 
 
 
While there is no mature technology that defends against phishing web sites yet, there is
currently no anti-phishing benchmark set of expectation or standardized set of data for
phishing detection products evaluation. Most of the claims made by vendors of
available products are based on proprietary test data and testing methodology. In this
research, a test framework has been constructed which can evaluate a generic anti-
phishing technology against the latest existing phishing sites. This framework has been
used to evaluate the effectiveness of our intelligent plug-ins phishing detection toolbar.
We have selected the PhishTank data as the public benchmark for our comparing
phishing detection. Details of this experimentation framework and findings are
presented below. 
 
Using testing sample of 120 different e-banking website that was used previously on our
fuzzy logic phishing website detection model, we tested our intelligent web-based plug-
ins toolbar to prove its validation and high phishing detection precision. The dataset
sample was taken from the public benchmark Phishtank archive data (Phishtank, 2008),
consisting of 60 phishing websites: 35 suspicious websites and 25 legitimate websites.  
Our toolbar managed to detect the phishing e-banking websites that were found in the
testing sample with a very small miss-classification rate. The results indicate clearly the
high precision of phishing classification with very small false positive and false
negative rates, as specified in the confusion matrix shown in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1: Results of website legitimacy decision using the intelligent fuzzy-based
classification detection model  
 
Decision 
Website 
Legitimacy 
Legitimate Suspicious Phishy 
Legitimate 
Website 
22 2 1 
Suspicious 
Website 
1 32 2 
Phishing 
Website 
1 3 56 
 
As shown in Table 6.1, there were just 3 legitimate websites miss-classified as
suspicious or phishy websites, and only 4 phishing websites were miss-classified as
legitimate or suspicious website. 
These results demonstrate very clearly how effective and reliable detecting phishing
website can be when applying an intelligent heuristic search using association
classification mining algorithms combined with a fuzzy logic model approach. The
obvious enhancement that happened to the final results can be justified by using an
approach not only depending on the human expert knowledge alone, but also on
integrating and combining an intelligent supervised machine learning approach, using
specific mining associative classification algorithms. When comparing our intelligent
web browser plug-ins toolbar with other famous anti-phishing toolbars like Netcraft
(Netcraft, 2006) and Spoofstick (Spoofstick, 2005) toolbars, we found that our toolbar
outperformed the other detection toolbars regarding the accuracy, efficiency and the
speed of classifying and detecting phishing websites. It managed to classify correctly
approximately 92% of all tested websites, beating all other anti-phishing toolbars, which 
depend mainly on using black-list and white-list databases in classifying phishing
websites. Figure 6.9 shows the comparative performance of all tested anti-phishing 
toolbars for the accuracy phishing classification rate.   
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Figure 6.9: Phishing classification precision comparing chart 
 
It is noted that the proposed tool offered best performance among the tested tools, being
about 11% better compared to Netcraft and 6% better compared to Spoofstick. We
argue that our solution is better since it uses a novel AI heuristic search on all phishing
features that can be found on the websites, grouping them into specific criteria and
layers depending on their type, and then by using specific fuzzy-based classification
rules, the final phishing detection rate appears. 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Conclusions 
 
 
An AI-based hybrid system has been proposed for phishing website detection systems.
Fuzzy logic has been combined with association classification data mining algorithms to 
provide efficient techniques for building intelligent models to detect phishing websites.
Empirical phishing experimental case studies have been implemented to gather and
analyze range of different phishing website features and patterns, with all its relations.  
Our experimental case-studies point to the need for extensive educational campaigns
about phishing and other security threats. People can become less vulnerable with a
heightened awareness of the dangers of phishing. Our experimental case-studies also
suggest that a new approach is needed to design a usable model for detecting e-banking 
phishing websites, taking into consideration the user's knowledge, understanding,
awareness and consideration of the phishing pointers located outside the user’s centre of
interest. 
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The fuzzy logic based detection model has been proposed using its four standard phases
(Fuzzification, Rule Evaluation, Aggregation and Defuzzification). Phishing website
features and patterns are characterized as fuzzy variables with specific fuzzy sets. Fuzzy
rules captured from previous human expert knowledge, processed by the fuzzy set
operations into the inference engine for the final calculation of the phishing website
detection rate. Results shows the significance and importance of the phishing website
criteria (URL & Domain Identity) represented by layer one, especially when compared
to the other criteria and layers.  
Enchantment has been proposed by utilising supervised machine learning techniques to
automate the fuzzy rule generation process, in order to reduce the human expert
knowledge intervention and increase performance of the phishing detection system.  
In this investigation, we have generated classification rules and investigated the
predictive accuracy of five classifiers on a phishing data set. The classifiers included
JRip (RIPPER), PART, PRISM, C4.5 Decision Tree (J48) and Classification Based on
Association (CBA). By analyzing a large number of phishing pages, we built an
associative classification model that attempts to use the properties of a page (e.g., URL
address length, SSL certificate, Abnormal URL request, Certification Authority, etc.) to
distinguish between phishing and legitimate website pages. We constructed a data set
from 731 phishing websites, 711 suspicious websites and 1718 legitimate websites,
where 27 phishing features were trained and tested to detect phishing websites. During
training and testing we used 10-fold cross-validation to evaluate the error rate for all
classifiers. Mining association classification rules were then combined with the fuzzy
logic inference engine to provide efficient and competent techniques for phishing
website detection rate. 
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We showed that data mining associative classification fuzzy-based solutions are actually
quite effective in building detection solutions for protecting users against phishing
websites attacks. We believe our model can be used to improve existing anti-phishing 
approaches which use an Artificial Intelligence heuristics page search. Using this
approach will automate the fuzzy rule generation process and reduce the human
intervention in building an effective phishing detection intelligent model. 
 
 
A browser-based plug-ins phishing detection toolbar has been implemented using an
intelligent heuristic approach. The toolbar has extracted all the phishing website features
and patterns. Validation of the extracted features has been integrated into the solution to
effectively identify phishing, legitimate and suspicious website. An intelligent pruning
technique has been used to increase the performance of the phishing detection rate.  
 
The intelligent phishing detection toolbar reduces the requirement of human knowledge
intervention for detection of a phishing website. Our toolbar has been provided as an
alternative solution of depending only on the black-list or white-list approach, by
adopting a new fuzzy-based classification mining technique to detect phishing website.
The results of our testing and validation shows that the proposed solution outperformed
the existing detection toolbars regarding the accuracy, efficiency and the speed of
classifying and detecting phishing websites. It managed to classify correctly
approximately 92% of all tested websites. 
 
The experimental results showed that both its false-positive rate and miss rate are
reasonably low. A comparative performance of the proposed scheme was presented in
order to demonstrate the merits of capabilities through a set of experiments. It is noted
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that the proposed intelligent system offers better performance as compared to other
existing tools and techniques. 
 
Many contributions evolved from our investigation research which can be very useful
for all researchers interested in the field of internet security and online identity theft
protection using artificial intelligence (AI). Following are summary of the main
contributions: 
•  Two phishing experiments which covered website phishing attack techniques and
phishing detection survey scenario were conducted to cover all phishing approaches, 
motivations and deception behaviour techniques. 
•  27 phishing features and patterns which characterize any phishing website were
successfully extracted, divided into 6 criteria or categories distributed in three
layers, depending on its attack type.  
•  A dynamic intelligent phishing website detection system has been proposed based
on specific AI supervised machine learning approach. The technique utilises fuzzy
logic combined with simple data mining associative classification techniques and
algorithms to process the phishing data features and patterns, for extracting
classification rules into the data miner. The proposed phishing website system
combines these techniques together to automate the fuzzy rules production by using
the extracted classification rules to be implemented inside the fuzzy inference
engine for the final phishing website detection. 
•  A web-based plug-ins intelligent phishing website detection toolbar has been
designed for testing and validation, using our integrated fuzzy based classification
mining model to prove its feasibility, reliability and detection precision. The
implementation was programmed using Java language, and it successfully
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recognized and detected approximately 92% of the phishing websites selected from 
our test data subset, avoiding many miss-classified websites and false phishing
alarms.  
 
7.2 Future Work 
 
A fuzzy-based classification mining technique has been introduced for building an
intelligent phishing website detection system, by using a layered structure for collecting
and analyzing all phishing website features and patterns. This kind of supervised
machine learning technique which combined the fuzzy logic model with the associated
classification technique for detecting phishing websites verified lots of potential for its
validity and usability throughout our research investigation. 
 
The results motivate future work to explore the inclusion of any additional variables to
the data set, which might improve the predictive accuracy of classifiers and decrease the
misclassification rate of rule classification. In addition, we will explore developing an
automated mechanism to extract new potential of phishing risk features from raw
phishing websites in order to keep up with new trends in phishing attacks. 
 
As we stated before in implementation Chapter 6, we considered some of the
implementation constraints we faced, regarding extracting and validating some phishing
website features as our future motivation to overcome and resolve. This is important as
it is a major barrier for our intelligent solution to get maximum possible performance
and accuracy.  
 
For example, the validation of the extracted spelling errors phishing features. It includes
nouns that are not listed as dictionary words and will be considered as spelling errors.
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We can use as a future work keyword extraction algorithm to solve the spelling error
problem. 
 
Also, some constraints regarding the validation of "Abnormal DNS Record" and
"Abnormal Request URL". These two features of validation were not giving the expected
output for any website that uses valid and registered but different domains for image,
script and other recourses. We can use intelligent domain identifying database query to
overcome this problem, because this database gives information regarding all valid and
registered websites in detail. 
 
Another example: we faced some constraints regarding 100% validation of Copying
Website phishing features. Some phishing websites copy whole contents from some
legitimate websites, putting all contents and resources in their own domain, leaving
about 40% non matches between sites. So, for this feature we can rely only on this
accuracy percentage. We can use the normalized form of the website contents (text,
image, style and JavaScript) to search for similarities with other websites. 
 
As future work also, we want to extend our work by integrating our phishing website
detection toolbar to all other standard browsers (examples: exe file for internet explorer
and also plug-ins such as Google chrome). Then our ultimate goal is to make the
phishing detection toolbar a desktop application, so that it can run as a background
process to be used as an independent phishing detection tool. 
 
Further, to exploit this application as security awareness regarding phishing attacks and
scams, we will extend it to be used as a learning tool to increase user awareness
regarding phishing attacks and scams. We plan to demonstrate our decision justification
by breaking down our validation of extracted phishing features and their significance
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influence as summarized report. We also want to integrate phishing detection
assessment user interface (example: short questionnaires, tests cases) to measure the
effectiveness of our e-learning tools. To make the learning mechanism more effective
and interactive we are considering integrating the concept of phishing games into the e-
learning process.  This ensures our package will be dynamic and user friendly.  
 
Finally, we believe that our model can integrate other supervised machine learning
techniques like Neural Network (NN). We can use our 27 phishing features as inputs to
Neural Network for the first input layer, and we can use the outputs of the first layer as
the input to the second hidden layer of our Neural Network. Same logic will be applied 
for the third hidden layer of the Neural Network. The output of the final layer will give
us the phishing detection rate as legitimate, suspicious or phishy.  
 
We can use the Neural Network for our solution because its working procedure is
similar to our layered fuzzy structure. We need to implement a phishing feature
extractor engine, which will generate the inputs for our Neural Network to give the final
phishing website detection rating.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
 Rules for Source Code & Java Script Criteria 
 
 
CBA Rules: 
 
Num of Test Case : 2178; Correct Prediction : 2025; Error Rate : 7.024%  
MinSup: 10.000%, MinConf: 80.000%  
 
Rule 1:  Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = High 
  Redirect_pages = High      ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 2:  Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = High 
  Straddling_attack = High     ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 3:  Server_Form_Handler_[SFH] = Low 
  Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = Low 
  Pharming_Attack = Low     ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 4:  Server_Form_Handler_[SFH] = Low 
  Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = Low  ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 5:  Server_Form_Handler_[SFH] = Low 
  Pharming_Attack = Low     ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 6:  Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = Low 
  Straddling_attack = Low     ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 7:  Server_Form_Handler_[SFH] = Low 
  Straddling_attack = Low      ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 8:  Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = High 
  Pharming_Attack = High     ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 9:  Pharming_Attack = Moderate    ->  class = Doubtful 
Rule 10:  Pharming_Attack = Low  ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 11:  Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = Moderate  ->  class = Doubtful 
 
Num of Rules: 11 
 
Sample of JRIP rules: 
=========== 
Correctly Classified Instances        2156               98.9899 %  
Incorrectly Classified Instances        22                1.0101 %  
Mean absolute error          0.0133 
=== Confusion Matrix === 
   a       b  c <-- classified as 
 704    7     0 |   a = Genuine 
   2  885    0 |   b = Doubtful 
   0   13 567 | c = Fraud 
 
(Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = High) and (Redirect_pages = High) => 
Source_Code_&_Java_script_Phishing_Risk=Fraud (312.0/0.0) 
(Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = High) and (Straddling_attack = High) => 
Source_Code_&_Java_script_Phishing_Risk=Fraud (155.0/0.0) 
(Pharming_Attack = Low) and (Server_Form_Handler_(SFH) = Low) => 
Source_Code_&_Java_script_Phishing_Risk=Genuine (308.0/0.0) 
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(Straddling_attack = Low) and (Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = Low) and 
(Server_Form_Handler_(SFH) = Moderate) => Source_Code_&_Java_script_Phishing_Risk=Genuine 
(115.0/0.0) 
(Straddling_attack = Low) and (Server_Form_Handler_(SFH) = Low) and 
(Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = Low) => 
Source_Code_&_Java_script_Phishing_Risk=Genuine (69.0/0.0) 
 
Number of Rules: 14 
 
 
 
Sample of PART decision list 
------------------ 
Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = High AND 
Pharming_Attack = Low: Fraud (156.0) 
Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = High AND 
Pharming_Attack = Moderate: Doubtful (156.0/3.0) 
Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = High AND 
Straddling_attack = High: Fraud (155.0) 
Server_Form_Handler_(SFH) = Low AND 
Pharming_Attack = Low: Genuine (308.0) 
Server_Form_Handler_(SFH) = Moderate AND 
Straddling_attack = Low: Genuine (115.0) 
 
Number of Rules:  22 
 
 
 
Sample of Prism rules 
---------- 
If Server_Form_Handler_(SFH) = High 
   and Redirect_pages = High 
   and Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = Moderate then Fraud 
If Server_Form_Handler_(SFH) = High 
   and Pharming_Attack = High 
   and Straddling_attack = High then Fraud 
If Pharming_Attack = Moderate 
   and Redirect_pages = Low 
   and Server_Form_Handler_(SFH) = Moderate then Doubtful 
If Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = Low 
   and Server_Form_Handler_(SFH) = Low 
   and Pharming_Attack = Low then Genuine 
If Straddling_attack = Low 
   and Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = Low 
   and Server_Form_Handler_(SFH) = Moderate then Genuine 
 
Number of Rules: 59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample of J48 pruned tree 
------------------ 
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Using_onMouseOver_to_hide_the_Link = Low 
|   Server_Form_Handler_(SFH) = Low 
|   |   Pharming_Attack = Low: Genuine (274.0) 
|   |   Pharming_Attack = Moderate 
|   |   |   Redirect_pages = Low: Genuine (0.0) 
|   |   |   Redirect_pages = Moderate: Genuine (69.0) 
|   |   |   Redirect_pages = High: Doubtful (35.0) 
|   |   Pharming_Attack = High 
|   |   |   Straddling_attack = Low: Genuine (0.0) 
|   |   |   Straddling_attack = Moderate: Genuine (36.0) 
|   |   |   Straddling_attack = High: Doubtful (35.0/1.0) 
|   Server_Form_Handler_(SFH) = Moderate 
|   |   Straddling_attack = Low: Genuine (115.0) 
|   |   Straddling_attack = Moderate 
|   |   |   Pharming_Attack = Low: Genuine (22.0) 
|   |   |   Pharming_Attack = Moderate: Doubtful (23.0/1.0) 
|   |   |   Pharming_Attack = High: Doubtful (22.0/1.0) 
|   |   Straddling_attack = High 
Number of Leaves:  43 
Size of the tree:  64 
 
 
Rules for Web Address Bar Criteria 
 
 
CBA Rules: 
 
Num of Test Case : 2178; Correct Prediction :2034; Error Rate : 6.611%  
MinSup: 10.000%, MinConf: 80.000%  
 
Rule 1:  Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = High 
  Long_URL_address = High    ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 2:  Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = High 
  Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = High  ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 3:  Using_Hexadecimal_Character_Codes = Low 
  Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = Low 
  Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = Low    ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 4:  Using_Hexadecimal_Character_Codes = Low 
  Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = Low   ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 5:  Using_Hexadecimal_Character_Codes = Low 
  Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = Low    ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 6:  Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = Low 
  Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = Low  ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 7:  Using_Hexadecimal_Character_Codes = Low 
  Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = Low  ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 8:  Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = Moderate   ->  class = Doubtful 
Rule 9:  Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = Moderate  ->  class = Doubtful 
Rule 10:  Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = Moderate  ->  class = Doubtful 
Rule 11:  Using_Hexadecimal_Character_Codes = Moderate  ->  class = Doubtful 
 
Num of Rules: 11 
 
 
 
Sample of JRIP rules: 
=========== 
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Correctly Classified Instances        2156               98.9899 %  
Incorrectly Classified Instances        22                1.0101 %  
Mean absolute error 0.0133 
=== Confusion Matrix === 
a   b  c <-- classified as 
695  0 0 | a = Genuine 
12  895   1 |   b = Doubtful 
0  9 566 | c = Fraud 
 
 
(Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = Low) and (Using_Hexadecimal_Character_Codes = Low) => 
Web_Address_Bar_Phishing_Risk=Genuine (308.0/5.0) 
(Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = Low) and (Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = Low) and 
(Using_Hexadecimal_Character_Codes = Moderate) => Web_Address_Bar_Phishing_Risk=Genuine 
(115.0/1.0) 
(Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = High) and (Long_URL_address = High) => 
Web_Address_Bar_Phishing_Risk=Fraud (312.0/1.0) 
(Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = High) and (Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = High) => 
Web_Address_Bar_Phishing_Risk=Fraud (155.0/0.0) 
(Using_Hexadecimal_Character_Codes = High) and (Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = High) and 
(Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = High) => Web_Address_Bar_Phishing_Risk=Fraud (41.0/0.0) 
 
Number of Rules: 14 
 
Sample of PART decision list 
------------------  
 
Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = High AND 
Long_URL_address = High: Fraud (312.0/1.0) 
Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = High AND 
Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = High: Fraud (155.0) 
Using_Hexadecimal_Character_Codes = Low AND 
Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = Low AND 
Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = Low: Genuine (274.0/5.0) 
Using_Hexadecimal_Character_Codes = Moderate AND 
Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = High: Doubtful (160.0/2.0) 
Using_Hexadecimal_Character_Codes = Moderate AND 
Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = Low AND 
Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = Low: Genuine (115.0/1.0) 
 
Number of Rules:  24 
 
 
Sample of Prism rules 
---------- 
If Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = Low 
   and Using_Hexadecimal_Character_Codes = Low 
   and Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = Low 
   and Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = Low then Genuine 
If Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = Low 
   and Using_Hexadecimal_Character_Codes = Low 
   and Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = Low 
   and Long_URL_address = Moderate 
   and Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = Moderate then Genuine 
If Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = Moderate 
   and Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = Low 
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   and Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = High 
   and Long_URL_address = Low 
   and Using_Hexadecimal_Character_Codes = Low then Doubtful 
If Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = High 
   and Long_URL_address = High 
   and Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = High then Fraud 
If Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = High 
   and Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = High 
   and Long_URL_address = Low then Fraud 
 
Number of Rules: 59 
 
Sample of J48 pruned tree 
------------------  
Using_the_@_Symbol_to_Confuse = Low 
|   Using_Hexadecimal_Character_Codes = Low 
|   |   Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = Low: Genuine (274.0/5.0) 
|   |   Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = Moderate 
|   |   |   Long_URL_address = Low: Genuine (0.0) 
|   |   |   Long_URL_address = Moderate: Genuine (70.0/1.0) 
|   |   |   Long_URL_address = High: Doubtful (35.0) 
|   |   Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = High 
|   |   |   Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = Low: Doubtful (0.0) 
|   |   |   Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = Moderate: Genuine (36.0/1.0) 
|   |   |   Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = High: Doubtful (35.0) 
|   Using_Hexadecimal_Character_Codes = Moderate 
|   |   Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = Low: Genuine (115.0/1.0) 
|   |   Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = Moderate 
|   |   |   Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = Low: Genuine (22.0) 
|   |   |   Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = Moderate: Doubtful (23.0) 
|   |   |   Adding_a_prefix_or_suffix = High: Doubtful (22.0/1.0) 
|   |   Replacing_similar_characters_for_URL = High 
 
Number of Leaves:  43 
Size of the tree:  64 
 
 
 
 
 
Rules for Page Style & Contents Criteria 
 
 
CBA Rules: 
 
Num of Test Case : 2178; Correct Prediction :2072; Error Rate :4.866%  
MinSup: 10.000%, MinConf: 80.000%  
 
Rule 1:  using_Pop-Ups_windows = High 
  Spelling_errors = High     ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 2:  using_Pop-Ups_windows = High 
  Copying_website = High    ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 3:  Disabling_Right-Click = Low 
  using_Pop-Ups_windows = Low 
  Using_forms_with_“Submit”_button = Low ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 4:  Disabling_Right-Click = Low 
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  using_Pop-Ups_windows = Low   ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 5:  Disabling_Right-Click = Low 
  Using_forms_with_“Submit”_button = Low ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 6:  using_Pop-Ups_windows = Low 
  Copying_website = Low    ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 7:  Disabling_Right-Click = Low 
  Copying_website = Low    ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 8:  using_Pop-Ups_windows = High 
  Using_forms_with_“Submit”_button = High  ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 9:  Using_forms_with_“Submit”_button = Moderate  ->  class = Doubtful 
Rule 10:  using_Pop-Ups_windows = Moderate   ->  class = Doubtful 
Rule 11:  Copying_website = Moderate    ->  class = Doubtful 
Rule 12:  Disabling_Right-Click = Moderate    ->  class = Doubtful 
 
Num of Rules: 12 
 
 
 
Sample of JRIP rules: 
=========== 
Correctly Classified Instances 2164               99.3572 %  
Incorrectly Classified Instances        14                0.6428 %  
Mean absolute error 0.0084 
=== Confusion Matrix === 
 
a b c <-- classified as 
 702   1   0 |   a = Genuine 
   3 896   1 |   b = Doubtful 
0 9 566 | c = Fraud 
 
 (Using_forms_with_“Submit”_button = Low) and (Disabling_Right-Click = Low) => 
Page_Style_&_Contents_Phishing_Risk=Genuine (308.0/0.0) 
(Copying_website = Low) and (using_Pop-Ups_windows = Low) and (Disabling_Right-Click = 
Moderate) => Page_Style_&_Contents_Phishing_Risk=Genuine (115.0/1.0) 
(Disabling_Right-Click = High) and (using_Pop-Ups_windows = Moderate) and (Spelling_errors = High) 
=> Page_Style_&_Contents_Phishing_Risk=Fraud (39.0/0.0) 
(using_Pop-Ups_windows = High) and (Spelling_errors = High) => 
Page_Style_&_Contents_Phishing_Risk=Fraud (312.0/0.0) 
(using_Pop-Ups_windows = High) and (Copying_website = High) => 
Page_Style_&_Contents_Phishing_Risk=Fraud (155.0/0.0) 
 
Number of Rules: 14 
 
Sample of PART decision list 
------------------ 
using_Pop-Ups_windows = High AND 
Using_forms_with_“Submit”_button = Moderate: Doubtful (158.0/1.0) 
using_Pop-Ups_windows = High AND 
Copying_website = High: Fraud (311.0) 
using_Pop-Ups_windows = High AND 
Spelling_errors = High: Fraud (156.0) 
Disabling_Right-Click = Low AND 
Using_forms_with_“Submit”_button = Low: Genuine (308.0) 
Copying_website = Moderate AND 
Disabling_Right-Click = Low: Genuine (36.0) 
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Number of Rules:  21 
 
Sample of Prism rules 
---------- 
If using_Pop-Ups_windows = Low 
   and Disabling_Right-Click = Low 
   and Using_forms_with_“Submit”_button = Low then Genuine 
If Copying_website = Low 
   and using_Pop-Ups_windows = Low 
   and Spelling_errors = Low then Genuine 
If Using_forms_with_“Submit”_button = Moderate 
   and using_Pop-Ups_windows = High 
   and Disabling_Right-Click = Low then Doubtful 
If Disabling_Right-Click = High 
   and Using_forms_with_“Submit”_button = High 
   and Copying_website = High 
   and Spelling_errors = Low 
   and using_Pop-Ups_windows = Low then Fraud 
If Using_forms_with_“Submit”_button = High 
   and Spelling_errors = High 
   and Disabling_Right-Click = Low 
   and Copying_website = Moderate 
   and using_Pop-Ups_windows = Moderate then Fraud 
 
Number of Rules: 49 
 
Sample of J48 pruned tree 
------------------ 
using_Pop-Ups_windows = Low 
|   Disabling_Right-Click = Low 
|   |   Using_forms_with_“Submit”_button = Low: Genuine (274.0) 
|   |   Using_forms_with_“Submit”_button = Moderate 
|   |   |   Copying_website = Low: Genuine (69.0/1.0) 
|   |   |   Copying_website = Moderate: Doubtful (35.0) 
|   |   |   Copying_website = High: Genuine (0.0) 
|   |   Using_forms_with_“Submit”_button = High 
|   |   |   Copying_website = Low: Genuine (0.0) 
|   |   |   Copying_website = Moderate: Genuine (36.0) 
|   |   |   Copying_website = High: Doubtful (35.0/1.0) 
|   Disabling_Right-Click = Moderate 
 
 
Number of Leaves:  43 
Size of the tree:  64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rules for Social Human Factor Criteria 
 
CBA Rules: 
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Num of Test Case : 2178; Correct Prediction : 2063; Error Rate : 5.280%  
MinSup: 10.000%, MinConf: 80.000%  
 
Rule 1:  Public_generic_salutation = Low 
  Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = Low  ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 2:  Public_generic_salutation = High 
  Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = High  ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 3:  Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = Moderate 
  Public_generic_salutation = Low    ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 4:  Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = Moderate 
  Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = Low  ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 5:  Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = High 
  Public_generic_salutation = High    ->  class = Fraud 
Rule 6:  Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = Low 
  Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = Low  ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 7:  Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = Low 
  Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = Moderate ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 8:  Public_generic_salutation = Low 
  Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = Moderate ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 9:  Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = Low 
  Public_generic_salutation = Low    ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 10:  Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = Low  ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 11:  Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = Low   ->  class = Genuine 
Rule 12:  Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = High   ->  class = Fraud 
 
Num of Rules: 12 
 
Sample of JRIP rules: 
=========== 
Correctly Classified Instances        2109               96.832  %  
Incorrectly Classified Instances        69                3.168  %  
Mean absolute error 0.032  
=== Confusion Matrix === 
 
a  b c <-- classified as 
1450 50 0 | a = Genuine 
19  98 0 | b = Doubtful 
0  0 561 | c = Fraud 
 
 (Public_generic_salutation = Moderate) and (Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = Moderate) and 
(Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = High) => 
Social_Human_Factor_Phishing_Risk=Doubtful (52.0/19.0) 
(Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = Moderate) and (Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = 
Moderate) and (Public_generic_salutation = High) => Social_Human_Factor_Phishing_Risk=Doubtful 
(57.0/19.0) 
(Public_generic_salutation = Moderate) and (Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = Moderate) 
and (Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = High) => Social_Human_Factor_Phishing_Risk=Doubtful 
(39.0/12.0) 
(Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = High) and (Public_generic_salutation = High) => 
Social_Human_Factor_Phishing_Risk=Fraud (226.0/0.0) 
(Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = High) and (Public_generic_salutation = High) => 
Social_Human_Factor_Phishing_Risk=Fraud (207.0/0.0) 
 
Number of Rules: 7 
 
Sample of PART decision list 
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------------------  
Public_generic_salutation = Low AND 
Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = Low: Genuine (424.0/3.0) 
Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = Low AND 
Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = Moderate: Genuine (233.0) 
Public_generic_salutation = Low AND 
Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = High AND 
Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = High: Fraud (86.0) 
Public_generic_salutation = High: Fraud (139.0) 
Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = High: Fraud (42.0) 
 
Number of Rules:  15 
 
Sample of Prism rules 
---------- 
If Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = Low 
   and Public_generic_salutation = Low then Genuine 
If Public_generic_salutation = Low 
   and Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = Moderate then Genuine 
If Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = Low 
   and Public_generic_salutation = Moderate then Genuine 
If Public_generic_salutation = High 
   and Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = Low 
   and Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = Low then Doubtful 
If Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = High 
   and Public_generic_salutation = High then Fraud 
If Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = High 
   and Public_generic_salutation = High then Fraud 
 
Number of Rules: 26 
 
Sample of J48 pruned tree 
------------------  
Public_generic_salutation = Low 
|   Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = Low: Genuine (424.0/3.0) 
|   Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = Moderate: Genuine (273.0) 
|   Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = High 
|   |   Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = Low: Genuine (79.0) 
|   |   Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = Moderate: Genuine (59.0/1.0) 
|   |   Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = High: Fraud (86.0) 
Public_generic_salutation = Moderate 
|   Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = Low: Genuine (185.0) 
|   Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = Moderate 
|   |   Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = Low: Genuine (51.0) 
|   |   Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = Moderate: Genuine (43.0/12.0) 
|   |   Much_emphasis_on_security_and_response = High: Doubtful (52.0/19.0) 
|   Buying_Time_to_Access_Accounts = High 
 
Number of Leaves:  19 
Size of the tree:  28 
 
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
